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ABSTRACT
This thesis distinguishes Classical Behavioural Economics (CBE) from Modern
Behavioural Economics (MBE) and discusses Herbert Simon’s pioneering contribu-
tions to CBE in detail. CBE emphasises the role of bounded rationality, satisficing and
heuristics (procedures) in human decision making in contrast to optimization, which is
widely used inMBE. In the framework of CBE, heuristics are algorithms, which are em-
bedded in the Information Processing Systems (IPS) in Human Problem Solving (HPS)
environments. The argument here is that the premise of CBE is highly suitable for al-
gorithmic modelling of adaptive agents facing complex economic environments. It ex-
plores the theoretical foundations of bounded rationality and substantiates the difference
between satisficing and optimization, and claims that the former is more general than
the latter. These investigations are carried out from the perspective of Computability
Theory and Computational Complexity Theory, which provide a coherent foundation
for Herbert Simon’s work on problem solving and for CBE in general. The second part
of the thesis explores the game of Go from the perspective of problem solving in CBE.
Its generality, suitability and complexity are analysed in detail. A pseudo IPS which
is capable of playing Go is also constructed based on the insights from Simon’s work
on protocol analysis and information from Go documentaries. The claim of this thesis is
that Go can be a powerful paradigm to better understand human economic behaviour
in diverse and complex environments.
KeyWords: Classical Behavioural Economics, BoundedRationality, Satisificing, Heuris-
tics, Computational Complexity, Information Processing System, Human Problem Solv-
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“What a person cannot do he or she will not do, no matter how strong
the urge to do it.”
Simon (1996b), p. 28
A behavioural approach to economic analysis is slowly becoming an integral part
of the discipline. A simple, though not rigorous, way to characterize this approach
would be to say that it pays explicit attention to the behavioural aspects - cognitive,
psychological, emotional - of the agents, organizations and entities in the economic
sphere. This is in sharp contrast to the established wisdom about how agents behave
within economic theory -rational maximizers. The behavioural revolution in economics
is often traced back to Herbert Simon’s pioneering article titled “A Behavioural Model
of Rational Choice” in 1955. There have been enormous developments in a multitude
of directions for the last 60 years or so since then. However, the behavioural approach
to economics cannot be considered as a homogeneous entity and the theories classified
under this umbrella vary substantially in many respects, such as, their methodology,
philosophy, tools and even the points of emphasis.
The issue of how tomeaningfully characterize an economic agent is at the heart of
the differences between various approaches and an appropriate notion of ‘rationality’
that underpins his/her decisions has generated enormous debate. Limits or bounds to
rationality can be considered as a common thread that runs across different strands
of behavioural economics. The term ‘bounded rationality’ itself can be traced back
to Herbert Simon. These theories can be broadly classified into two categories based
on their methodological approach: Classical and Modern Behavioural Economics - a
distinction that was made by Velupillai (2010a). The former is along the lines forged
by Herbert Simon, while the modern version can be thought of as being along the lines
forged by Ward Edwards, Daniel Kahneman, among others. A more detailed attempt
to trace their origins and spell out the differences can be found in the first part of this
thesis.
When we observe how human decision makers around us actually behave, opti-
mization as a general formalism can be easily disputed. However, this is not a straight-
forward and small step for Economics. Behavioural Economics has emerged from vari-
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ous evidences that are used to challenge the axioms of preference ordering in orthodox
economic theory. Modern Behavioural Economics has made important contributions
in terms of challenging orthodoxy by pointing out anomalies that lie within this the-
ory. However, it has only made peripheral remedies since it tries to fix the problem of
anomalies without challenging the existing paradigm of optimization. One the other
hand, in Classical Behavioural Economics the economic agents are viewed as bound-
edly rational - more precisely, ‘procedurally’ rational, information processing systems,
with no reliance on optimization. Bounded Rationality is neither sub-optimality nor
irrationality and the behaviour of agents is to be investigated through the possible and
actual procedures involved in decision making.
This thesis deals with some crucial themes in Classical Behavioural Economics
and analyses them from different perspectives. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned
that this thesis takes a firm stance that economic agents, solving decision making prob-
lems, should not be formalized as optimizing agents. Instead, they should bemodelled
as adaptive satisficing agents facing complex environments. However, this distinc-
tion cannot be made convincingly without elaborating on the foundations, premises,
methodologies and applications. Within the framework of Classical Behavioural Eco-
nomics outlined in this thesis, crucial notions such as bounded rationality, satisficing
and heuristics - ideas that Herbert Simon pioneered and stressed all his life, can be
faithfully studied and understood in ways that Simon envisaged.
In Classical Behavioural Economics, there is no predetermined preference order-
ing over a given choice set of a problem for an economic agent. Instead, the agent is
expected to adaptively generate methods to explore the problem space and discover
new elements and develop procedures. Besides, the alternatives tend to be compared
qualitatively, rather than quantitatively in many cases. Though the agents will gradu-
ally know more elements in the set, he(she) has limited attention because of computa-
tional constraints on cognitive faculties; therefore the focus is only on a subset of the
choices that he(she) explores. That is to say, human reasoning is bounded by his(her)
limited cognitive capacity.
For Herbert Simon, bounded rationality, satisficing and heuristics are inherently
algorithmic notions. He has developed an approach - Human Problem Solving - to
understand the process of human decision making. In this framework, the satisficing
agent is formally characterized as an Information Processing System and the algorith-
mic aspects of decision making (problem solving) are extensively explored. Classical
Behavioural Economics, in turn, inherits Simon’s approach on Human Problem Solv-
ing and explores and connects it to its algorithmic underpinnings. This is achieved by
means of computability theory and computational complexity theory.
This thesis heavily relies on Herbert Simon’s widely celebrated, but often mis-
understood contributions. He won numerous prizes and honors for his fundamental
contributions - Turing Award in 1975 and Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1978
- to mention a few. Herbert Simon can be considered as a quintessential problem
solver, even in his way of doing academic research. He had broad interests in the
hard sciences and fascination for applying mathematical tools to the social sciences.
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However, he always had penetrating insights in to the problems and the mathematical
tools were mere aids to solve these problems and not dictating terms. Being a genuine
multi-disciplinarian, Simon can be regarded as a scientist in many disciplines. In my
understanding, Simon practiced problem solving throughout his professional and in-
tellectual life. When he was curious about some phenomena in his mind, he searched
for solutions and most of the time he did so by moving across different disciplines. Ei-
ther by corresponding and collaborating with academic friends or by himself, he made
profound contributions in each sphere in which he investigated. On the journey of
solving one problem, he discovered sub-problems unexpectedly. Eventually, he had
been traveling around different science-mazes (Simon’s metaphor) to the extent that
even he could not anticipate. He ended up as a scholar having both depth and breadth
at the same time. For him, problem solving is not merely solving equations or puzzles.
Rather it is the process of identifying alternative methods or sub-problems, knowing
the possible directions for finding methods, and deciding where attention ought to be
employed. It is the core of his view of organizations, economics and his life. It should
be noted that for Simon, human problem solving and behavioural economics are not
disconnected, distinct entities. His approaches across these two areas have a uniform
theme that unites them. This is the notion of ‘problem solving’, boundedly and proce-
durally rational, information processing agent who is engaged in satisficing.
Motivated by Simon’s special role in economics, and his influential contribu-
tions, I aspire to incorporate the notions of Bounded Rationality, satisficing, sequential
decision making and heuristics, into modelling problem solvers(economic agents). I
study problem situations in the game of Go, and thereby extending Herbert Simon’s
paradigm of Chess to understand problem solving. The game of Go, which has a fi-
nite and large search space, provides a rich paradigm for analysing how human beings
solve highly complex problems. This thesis is structured into four chapters.
Chapter 2 formally distinguishes Classical and Modern Economics through their
respective origins, theoretical foundations, methodology and applications. The ori-
gins and development of two kinds of behavioural economics, beginning with the pi-
oneering works of Simon (1953a) and Edwards (1954), are traced and (critically) dis-
cussed. The mathematical foundations of classical behavioural economics are iden-
tified, largely, to be in the theory of computation and computational complexity; the
mathematical basis for modern behavioural economics is claimed to be a notion of sub-
jective probability. Individually rational economic theories of behaviour, with attempts
to broaden - and deepen - the notion of rationality, challenging its orthodox variants,
were decisively influenced by these two mathematical underpinnings.
Chapter 3 aims to interpret and formalize Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded ra-
tionality in the context of computability theory and computational complexity theory.
Simon’s theory of Human Problem Solving is analysed in the light of Turing’s work on
Solvable and Unsolvable problems (Turing, 1954). I analyse Simon’s models of rational
behaviour, emphasizing the characteristics of environments and decision makers, pro-
viding rigorous algorithmic interpretations of Simon’s concepts - bounded rationality,
satisficing, heuristics. Within this framework, it is pointed out that Olympian ratio-
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nality requires human beings to go beyond Turing computability and computational
complexity defines the inner boundary of algorithmic rationality. It is highlighted that
bounded rationality results from the fact that the deliberations required for searching
complex spaces exceed the actual complexity that human beings can handle. The im-
mediate consequence is that satisficing becomes the general criterion of decision mak-
ers and heuristics are the methods for achieving their goals. In such decision prob-
lems, it is demonstrated that bounded rationality and satisficing are more general than
Olympian rationality (coined in Simon (1983b), p.19) and optimization respectively
and not the other way about.
Chapter 4 introduces more detailed content of Information Processing Systems
in Human Problem Solving approach. Information Processing Systems vary according
to different task environments. However, the essential architectures of IPS , such as
the associativity of Long-Term Memory, the limited capacity of Short-Term Memory
and Production Systems, are invariant. Classical Behavioural Economics, on one hand,
heavily emphasizes the severely limited computational capacity of economic agents,
one the other hand, is keen to characterize the general structure of IPS that can be
readily extended to complex economic problems. The chapter argues that the game of
Go, which is qualitatively consistent with many real-life problems, is a potential do-
main for CBE to characterise Human Problem Solving approach to complex economic
problems.
Chapter 5 initiates an attempt to build an pseudo Information Processing Sys-
tem, which can explain Go players’ qualitative behaviour. Go players’ skill in solving
problems reflects their ability to comprehend, communicate and reason with publicly
adopted Go terms. These Go terms differ largely from the idea of chunks, which con-
stitute the domain-specific knowledge for Chess problem solving. From the evidence
on how Go players benefit from using and organising the Go terms, a more general
IPS that contains a higher-level production system is devised. The insights obtained in
this chapter can be suitably extended to economic domains, especially to study orga-
nizational decision making. In the conclusion, several future directions and issues are
proposed for going beyond the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Behavioural Economics: Classical and
Modern1
2.1 Overview
“Let us call [the bounded rationality] model of human choice the behav-
ioral model, to contrast it with the Olympian model of SEU2 theory. Within
the behavioral model of human rationality, one doesn’t have to make choices
that are infinitely deep in time, that encompass the whole range of human val-
ues, in which each problem is interconnected with all the other problems
in the world. . . . Rationality of the sort described by the behavioral model
doesn’t optimize, of course. Nor does it even guarantee that our decisions
will be consistent.”
Simon (1983b), p. 19-23, italics added
Behavioural economics may have, finally, come of age. It is part of the curricula
of graduate schools in economics, finance and management, even one of the compul-
sory courses . More than a decade ago, in a letter to Velupillai (see Velupillai (2010a),
p.407-408; italics added), Herbert Simon was optimistic enough to state, after a half-a-
century tireless efforts to make behavioural economics a viable alternative to orthodox
neoclaasical economics, that:
“The economists here [at Carnegie Mellon University] remain, for the
most part, . . . backward . . . , but I am encouraged by the great upswell, in
the US and especially in Europe, of experimental economics and various
forms of bounded rationality. I think the battle has been won, at least the
first part, although it will take a couple of academic generations to clear
1This chapter unifies and extends several themes and ideas that are present in Kao and Velupillai
(2012b); Kao et al. (2012); Kao and Velupillai (2012a, 2013). These papers are a result of a collaborative




the field and get some sensible textbooks written and the next generations
trained.”
Yet, not much more than one year earlier, at the 84th Dalhem Workshop on
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p.ix), two dis-
tinguished economists claimed:
“Bounded rationality, needs to be, but it is not yet, understood.”
How, one may legitimately ask, can a ‘battle [have] been won’, with a crucial
concept lying at the foundation of its ‘armory’, yet to be understood? We believe there
is a case for Gigerenzer and Selten to feel that the notion of bounded rationality remains
to be clarified. This is because they have been meticulous in having dissected the way
the notion has been (ill-) defined by varieties of orthodox theorists , including those
we shall shortly identify as some of the pioneers of modern behavioural economics.
Moreover, they have also understood, with impeccable perspicacity, that boundedly
rational behaviour has nothing to do with either optimization, or irrationality (ibid,
p.4).
Where we differ with Gigerenzer and Selten is their anchoring of bounded ratio-
nality and satisficing in ‘fast and frugal stopping rules for search’ without, however,
providing this anchor a solid foundation in itself. Bounded rationality and satisficing,
in our frame work, is a natural outcome of replacing optimization with decision prob-
lems (in itsmetamathematical senses), whereby problem solving , in general, and human
problem solving in particular, lead to structured search in computationally complex
spaces that are classified in terms of solvability, decidability and computability. Optimiza-
tion becomes a very special case of the solvability of a decision problem, intrinsically
coupled to algorithms, which are given measures of complexity that are capable of
encapsulating the notions of ‘fast and frugal’ in precise ways.
In many ways the work of Gigerenzer comes closest to our work on classical
behavioural economics, with one important caveat: we identify the notion of heuristics
with the formal recursion theoretic concept of algorithms, and hence subject to the
Church-Turing Thesis (cf. Velupillai, 2000).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. A broad brush discussion of the
two kinds of behavioural economics is provided in section 2.2. Next, the analytical
foundations of modern and classical behavioural economics are discussed and dis-
sected in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is devoted to a discussion of the special role played by
Herbert Simon in forging, ab initio, classical behavioural economics and its rich vein of
characterizing subfields. The concluding section suggests ways of going forward with
a research program in classical behavioural economics - eventually with the hope of
exposing the lacunae in the foundations of modern behavioural economics, and its ad
hockeries.
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2.2 Emergence of Behavioural Economics
Behavioural economics, which originated, almost fully developed, during the 1950s,
can be classified into at least two streams - Classical and Modern. The former was pi-
oneered by Herbert Simon and the latter by Ward Edwards, respectively. The two
streams are clearly distinguishable on the basis of their methodological, epistemolog-
ical and philosophical aspects. Despite sharp contrasts in their approaches to under-
stand (rational) human behaviour, a clear distinction between them was not made un-
til recently (Velupillai, 2010a). Behavioural economics, in general, challenges orthodox
economics theory and its foundational assumptions regarding human behaviour, its
institutional underpinnings (especially in its Classical versions pioneered by Simon),
its poor prediction power and its intrinsic non-falsifiability.
The distinctions between Modern Behavioural Economics (henceforth MBE) and
Classical Behavioural Economics (henceforth CBE) can be classified into three aspects.
First, MBE assumes economic agents maximizing utility with respect to an underlying
preference order - to which ‘an increasingly realistic psychological underpinning’ is at-
tributed (Camerer et al., 2004, p.3); CBE assumes no underlying preference order and
an economic agent’s decision making behaviour, at any level and against the backdrop
of every kind of institutional setting, is subject to bounded rationality and exhibits sat-
isficing behaviour. Put another way, MBE remains within the orthodox neoclassical frame-
work of optimization under constraints; CBE is best understood in terms of decision prob-
lems (in the metamathematical sense, cf. Velupillai (2010a)). Second, MBE concerns the
behaviour of agents and institutions in or near equilibrium3; CBE investigates disequi-
librium or non-equilibrium phenomena. Third, MBE accepts mathematical analysis of
(uncountably) infinite events or iterations, infinite horizon optimization problems and
probabilities defined over σ-algebras and arbitrary measure spaces4; CBE only exem-
plifies cases which contain finitely large search spaces and constrained by finite-time
horizons.
2.2.1 Modern Behavioural Economics
Origins
“The combination of subjective value or utility and objective probability
characterizes the expected utility maximization model; Von Neumann and
Morgenstern defended this model and, thus, made it important, but in 1954
it was already clear that it too does not fit the facts. Work since then has
focussed on the model which asserts that people maximize the product of
3The ‘near’ is defined, in all case we are aware of, by uncomputable approximation processes of
uncomputable equilibria.
4The most intuitive definition of this essentially measure theoretic concept would be to define it as a
non-empty class of sets, closed under the formation of complements and countable unions. However,
the kind of subjective probabilities defined by de Finetti and Ramsey avoided, for epistemological and
methodological reasons, consideration of events as subsets in a σ-algebra
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utility and subjective probability. I have named this the subjective expected
utility maximization model (SEU model).”
Edwards (1961), p.474
The origins of Modern Behavioural Economics are often claimed to have em-
anated from the early works by Richard Thaler, along with Kahneman and Tversky,
for example in the following quote:
“Kahneman and Tversky provided the raw materials for much of be-
havioral economics - a new line of psychology, called behavioral decision
research, that draws explicit contrasts between descriptively realistic ac-
counts of judgement and choice and the assumptions and predictions of
economics5. Richard Thaler was the first economists to recognize the po-
tential applications of this research to economics. His 1980 article “Toward
a theory of consumer choice,” published in the first issue of the remarkably
open-minded (for its time) Journal of Economic Behavior andOrganization,
is considered by many to be the first genuine article in modern behavioral
economics.”
Camerer et al. (2004), p. xxi-xxii
Contrary to these claims, the real origins of modern behavioural economics can
be traced back to Ward Edwards, particularly to Edwards (1954) and Edwards (1961),
which provided the methodological framework for modern behavioural economics.
Edwards, in turn, draws inspiration from the famous subjective probability theorist
and statistician Leonard Savage. The two papers summarize the emergence of core
notions that characterize what may, with hindsight, be called a Neoclassical Theory of
Behavioural Economics and offer detailed philosophical and methodological discussions
related to them. More importantly, Edwards posed challenges to orthodox neoclassi-
cal notions, focusing on psychological and experimental foundations, constraints and
predictions. He also introduces and provides a remarkable and detailed survey of the
classic works in the field of behavioural economics till then6.
The most remarkable aspect of Edwards’ paper is the formalization of weighted
values and the introduction of Subjective Expected Utility (Ramsey, 1926; Savage, 1954).
He also sheds light on the early studies on subjective probability before and after Sav-
age’s book in 1954. The standard formulation on the objective function faced by a
decision maker in an economic model under risk/uncertainty is presented as a linear
combination of the values of outcomes and probabilities attached to each of these out-
comes. The values of outcomes and probabilities, both, can be objective or subjective.
5As if these were not prime motivations for Simon when he launched his programme of research on
behavioural economics. It is just that Simon’s psychological and cognitive bases for modelling realistic
economic behaviour were always underpinned by a model of computation.
6So the claim that behavioural economics was not even a field till 1980 is highly questionable, even
from the works by the precursors of Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler.
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where pi is the probability of the ith outcome of n possible ones and Ui is the value
of the ith outcome. Based on this we can have the following classification: when sub-
jective values are weighted with objective probabilities, it results in Expected Utility.
Instead, when subjective values are weighted with subjective probabilities, it becomes
Subjective Expected Utility. The other two alternatives were considered to be unimpor-
tant or proved to be unrealistic in the literature.
The classic Expected Utility formulation was first devised by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (vN-M), who explicitly invoked formal, ‘objective’ probability theory and
were even prepared to use the frequency theory of probability7 - explicitly and force-
fully rejected by Savage, whose work was deeply influenced by de Finetti’s founda-
tional work on subjective probability theory. Thus, the probability with which they
axiomatized expected utility maximization is actually objective. Since then, it became
clear that Expected Utility fails to explain and predict individual behaviour under risk
- let alone uncertainty (a distinction not carefully maintained by the practitioners of
MBE). vN-M attempted to make the qualitative notion of utility and preference mea-
surable just like, say force in physics. The main argument was that, for economics to
be a rigorous science, formalised mathematically, preferences should be measurable8.
Furthermore, for preferences to be measurable, they should be numerically definable
and mutually comparable. Individuals are supposed to seek and be able to choose
the outcome which will give them the highest satisfaction among all the possibilities.
But neither the process that underpinned ‘seeking’, nor the process of ‘choosing’ were
given any procedural content, unlike the way Simon, who from the outset sought to
emphasise the search processes at the foundations of choice over a complex space of
alternatives.
There was a great deal of effort that was dedicated to measuring utilities and
probabilities under the framework of subjective (personal) probability around the time
of the early work of Ward Edwards. This empirical work went hand-in-hand with the
simultaneous formalization by Savage, who built his foundations of statistics on the basis
of de Finetti’s theory of subjective probability. In Savage’s scheme, the assumptions of
complete preference ordering and the sure-thing principle play a crucial role, and the
individuals learn and adjust their prior beliefs with the occurrence of events according
to Bayes’s theorem. These properties for subjective probabilities proposed by Savage,
in turn, implies that individuals with different sets of subjective probabilities, over the
course of their experience, will end up having subjective probabilities which coincide
with each other.
7But not in its modern refounding and reformulation as algorithmic probability
8How to measure variables over the realswas never specified except by vague references to varieties
of approximations.
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The critical point of rapid development of MBE can be attributed to the proposal
of Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which
was considered as a satisfactory replacement of expected utility theory. The theory
encapsulates the idea of subjective probability9 (not directly) and loss aversion. Even
today, loss aversion remains one of the most notable behavioural postulates used to
interpret and model decision making in different contexts.
A series of “anomalies” - resulting from the violation of transitivity and other
axioms, inconsistency with some principles of neoclassical economics - have been sys-
tematically collected and investigated by contemporary behavioural economists, no-
tably, Richard Thaler, Colin Camerer, George Lowenstein, Matthew Rabin amongmany
others, since the late 1980s in the Journal of Economics Perspectives (for example). The in-
consistency in behaviour is mainly observed in experimental environments, and thus
the neglect of psychological and social factors are proposed as possible causes for this,
according to MBE. The Neoclassical agents are now like physically weakened patients
unable to predict even reasonably well, who are being examined with the benchmark
idealized case of orthodox theory and its strict rational, constrained optimization, be-
haviour and the modern behavioural economists are assuming the role of seeking and
proposing the remedies for them. The themes and fields challenged fromwhich anoma-
lies10 are found cover Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Finance Theory, Industrial
Organization, Game Theory and even Development Economics. This has led to an en-
compassing field of behavioural economics, broadly divided into (at least) Behavioural
micro, Behavioural macro, Behavioural finance and Behavioural game theory.
Sub-Fields of Modern Behavioural Economics
Behavioural Microeconomics Some anomalies concerning preference and utility in
decision making are studied. Preference reversal is believed to be a robust anomaly.
This field of research attempts to challenge the commonly agreed notions in neoclas-
sical theory - that the values of goods or outcomes do exist and people know these
values directly - by highlighting the presence of framing effects, reference based effects,
etc (Tversky and Thaler, 1990). It is also suggested that the assumption of a stable pref-
erence ordering should be discarded. The preference changes can be due to a variety
of factors such as status quo bias, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and endowment effects.
Their thesis is that a consideration of these factors can make the analysis of preference
9But neither consistently, nor meaningfully. In the whole literature on MBE, all the way from the
early works of Kahneman and Tversky, there is a remarkable confusion and conflation of a variety of
theories of probability, even within one and the same framework of modelling rational, psychologically
underpinned, individual behaviour in economic contexts. See in particular, Tversky (1972)
10Velupillai refers to this trait in MBE as anomaly mongering in his lectures on Behavioural Economics.
His point is that both the Newclassicals, whose analogous notion is ‘puzzle’ ‘equity premium puzzle’
being paradigmatic and the Modern Behavioural Economists are consciously invoking Kuhn’s termi-
nology and, therefore, suggesting that their programme of research is leading to that much maligned
concept of a ‘paradigm shift’.
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more manageable and tractable11. The general worry is that importing psychological
inspiration into existing economic models may create new complexities and reduce
their predictive power (Kahneman et al., 1991). Furthermore, the difficulty and infea-
sibility of utility maximization was pointed out, and economists sought for possible
psychological and social causes as explanation for the “mistakes”12 in decision making
(Kahneman and Thaler, 2006).
In MBE, the majority of research seems to focus on suggesting so-called more ‘re-
alistic’ utility functions in the context of modelling decisions. A whole taxonomy of
varieties of MBEs could be catalogued on the basis of the criterion of ‘realistic utility
functions’, but this will be a detour from our more basic aims. There is also a rich
menu of research questioning the fundamental framework of preference maximization
and the modelling of satisficing, even within one or another variety of MBE, where, in
general, for formalizing the notion satisficing in a pseudo-procedural context, heuristic
searches13 are applied. Heuristics serve as guides helping decision makers to find short
cuts for relevant information. Together with satisficing, decision makers are supposed
to stop searching - i.e., an exogenously determined stopping rule for the search process
is activated - whenever some (exogenously determined) criteria are reached (e.g. aspi-
ration level). However, they are not necessarily aware of computability or algorithmic
undecidability which is inherent in many such procedures. If the heuristic search is
programmed as a finite automaton, it will naturally terminate at some point. How-
ever, if it is programmed as a Turing Machine, then the decision maker is confronted
with the famous result of the halting problem for Turing Machine. This means that the
agent who is searching is either not able to determine whether the heuristic reached
the exogenously determined aspiration level, or - even worse - whether it will ever do
so within any reasonable, or even unreasonable, exogenously given time span.
Behavioural Macroeconomics Similar psychological and social reasons are also ap-
plied to interpret someMacroeconomic phenomena14, such as, money illusion, rigidity
of (nominal) wages (loss aversion and fairness) and involuntary unemployment (gift-
changing equilibrium of reciprocal preference). The most far-reaching challenge might
be to address the questionable idea of the traditional notion of Discounted Utility. The
presence of non-exponential discounting of utility was observed (Loewenstein and Thaler,
1989), and subsequently15 other ways (hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discounting etc.)
of discounting were devised, which are believed to be more realistic and better able
11Not formalised in terms of tractability in the formal hierarchy of degrees of computational complex-
ity simply because these models are not underpinned by any formal model of computation.
12In other words, ‘Anomalies’!
13Without, however, any recognition that ‘heuristics’ are, formally, ‘algorithms’.
14Akerlof and Shiller (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) categorise five types of animal spirits: they are confi-
dence, fairness, corruption and antisocial behaviour, money illusion and stories.
15Not quite ‘subsequently’, because the notion of hyperbolic discounting has been ‘around’ in in-
tertemporal macroeconomic policy models at least since the early 1960s. But it is to the credit of the
MBE’s practice and insistence that traditional and almost routine recourse to exponential discounting in
intertemporal optimisation models is being challenged.
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to provide predictive models in the context of intertemporal choices. Other than time
discounting, there is also research on behavioural life-cycle theories (e.g. mental ac-
counting Thaler (1990)) on saving and marginal propensity to consume and on regret
theory, such as using counterfactual, introspective thinking and self control of future
misbehavior on consumption and saving. But in no such case have non-traditional log-
ics been utilized to derive counterfactual predictions based on introspective thinking.
Behavioural Finance Behavioural finance appears to provide an alternative to the
Efficient Market Hypothesis and it is probably one of the most developed subfields in
modern behavioural economics. In other words, it is commonly believed that the effi-
cient market hypothesis has virtually died out. The well known anomalies in finance
include the equity premium puzzle (high risk aversion), calendar effects, status quo effect,
limits to arbitrage, social preference and other stylized facts (de Bondt and Thaler, 1989;
Froot and Thaler, 1990; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Lee et al., 1990; Siegel and Thaler, 1997;
Thaler, 1987b,a). Due to the nature and functioning of financial markets, huge amount
of data points, at high frequencies are available. Therefore it is also a rich ground for
behavioural and (so called) computational economists to investigate and validate their
models.
Behavioural Game Theory Similar to the other fields, behavioural game theory in-
vestigates how the results regarding strategic interaction deviate from the orthodox
game theoretic predictions in the light of some behavioural assumptions regarding de-
cision making in strategic situations. The psychological and social explanations such
as guilt aversion and fairness criteria are incorporated into the traditional models. Be-
havioural game theory benefits from the fact that most of these models can be tested
in laboratory environments by collecting a sufficient number of subjects. Therefore, it
coexists with experimental economics and neuroeconomics. A reasonably up to date
survey of behavioural game theory can be found in Camerer (2003).
Concluding Remarks
Although neoclassical economic theories have been critically questioned by economists
and psychologists for many decades, it is still explicitly specified that optimization, equi-
librium and efficiency, and on which Neoclassical economics - and its variants, such
as Newclassical and New Keynesian - theories are based, are not completely rejected
by behavioural economists (see, for example, the opening, programmatic, pages of
Camerer et al. (2004)). The ultimate goal of behavioural economists seems to be to ex-
tend, not replace, neoclassical theories in a normative sense.
Modern behavioural economists have, over the years, discovered and categorized
different forms of deviations from consistent behaviour. A valid question here would
be: why do these anomalies arise and what are the anomalies with respect to? Dis-
coveries such as reference dependence, loss aversion, preference over risky and uncer-
tain outcomes and time discounting, came mostly from observations in experimental
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environments. The anomalies and puzzles that were discovered and discussed are
departures with respect to the neoclassical normative benchmark for judging ratio-
nal behaviour, which is (subjective) expected utility maximization. These evidences
or anomalies are in turn used to formulate more realistic utility functions and further,
these modified utility functions are incorporated into the existing models. In some
sense, Modern behavioural economists modified fractured pieces in the foundations
of Neoclassical theories, but still they worked within its basic premises (preferences,
utility, equilibrium and maximization).
Thus, MBE preserves the doctrine of utility maximization and does not go be-
yond it or discard it. Though the behavioural models do consider more realistic psy-
chological or social effects, economic agents are still assumed to be optimizing agents
whatever the objective functions may be. In other words, MBE is, still within the am-
bit of the neoclassical theories or it is in some sense only an extension of traditional
theory by replacing and repairing the aspects which proved to be contradictory. These
adjustments in turn are expected to enhance the predictive power of the original theo-
ries. On the contrary, CBE does not try to endow the economic agent with a preference
order which can be represented by utility functions; nor, of course, do equilibria or
optimization play any role in the activation of behavioural decision making by CBE
agents.
2.2.2 Classical Behavioural Economics
It is interesting to note that even before the advent of behavioural economics, eco-
nomic debates on decision making were richly based on behavioural and epistemo-
logical principles and cognitive psychology. Keynes, of course, is the paradigmatic
example of one who explicitly considered psychological factors in his macroeconomic
theories. Simon’s bounded rationality and his view on decision making can be traced
back to his precursors as early as Aristotle’s practical rationality. Practical rationality
is a cognitive state and capacity of identifying the right means or the prescription of
actions for achieving desired state of life or goods (Miller, 1984). The emphasis is on
the actions that need to be undertaken and the deliberation required for recognizing
these actions, rather than the outcomes, let alone the ‘best’ outcome.
One of the most essential and concrete line separating MBE and CBE is that ratio-
nal behaviour is adaptive or procedural in CBE; this makes rational behaviour naturally
algorithmic and the need to underpin it with a model of computation enters right on
the ground floor of theory and its empirical counterparts. Given the nature of adaptive
behaviour and the complex environment in which it takes place, optimization princi-
ples and equilibrium analysis becomemeaningless and nearly infeasible. The resolving
of these difficulties should not be to find approximations of sophisticated mathematical
models using numerical techniques, like what we see in some parts of MBE.
As far as dynamical rational behaviour is concerned, where procedure is central, Si-
mon, Richard Day, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter are considered as the pillars of
CBE (Velupillai, 2010b). In particular, Nelson andWinter’s pioneering contributions to
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evolutionary economics is developed by viewing technological changes or innovations
in a non-conventional way. Innovations are consequences of organizational decision
making, where maximizing strategies have little role to play. In Nelson and Winter
(1977, 2002), uncertainty, complexity and heuristics are highlighted and they play an
important role in shaping the theories of innovation or technological changes. This
way of viewing decision making is consistent with that of Simon’s approach described
earlier.
The research line of the thesis was motivated by the questions ‘How does the
mind work?’; ‘What kind of Mechanisms should we postulate for the Mind, based on
current knowledge and research in Cognitive Science, to make sense of observed be-
haviour’; ‘What postulates are useful to understand and predict behaviour?’; ‘What
metaphors are useful to formalize intelligent procedural behaviour?’; ‘How do oper-
ational institutions emerge and survive’? Research surrounding these questions is in-
trinsically underpinned by cognitive psychology and the theory of computation. They
lead also to what became the natural Simon framework of Human Problem Solving, of
agents faced with complex and intractable search spaces, constrained by computation-
ally underpinned cognitive processes facing time and resource constraints. A notable
precursor for Simon, on these aspects was Polya.
Simon is best known by the felicitous phrase he coined, “bounded rationality”,
which appeared in Simon (1957) for the very first time (although it had appeared in
other forms already from his classic book Simon (1947)). Bounded rationality gen-
erally refers to the internal cognitive limitations, and the constraints of the external
environment which confront human minds in decision making contexts. This latter
is more specifically contextualized by the institutional backdrop for individual be-
haviour. Therefore, in order to incorporate the notion of bounded rationality into the
behavioural model more rigorously, one ought to investigate how human thinking is
limited internally and how human beings adapt and interact with the environment,
especially as members of an institution.
Simon’s insight about modelling adaptive individuals in complex economic en-
vironments can be better understood in the fragment:
“Suppose we are pouring some viscous liquid molasses into a bowl of
very irregular shape.. . .Howmuch would we have to know about the prop-
erties of molasses to predict its behavior under the circumstances? If the
bowl were held motionless, and if we wanted only to predict behavior in
equilibrium, we would have to know little, indeed, about molasses. The
single essential assumption would be that the molasses, under the force of
gravity, would minimize the height of its center of gravity. With this as-
sumption, which would apply as well to any other liquid, and a complete
knowledge of the environment, in this case the shape of the bowl, the equi-
librium is completely determined. Just so, the equilibrium behavior of a
perfectly adapting organism depends only on its goal and its environment;
it is otherwise completely independent of the internal properties of the or-
ganism.
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If the bowl into which we are pouring the molasses were jiggled rapidly,
or if wewanted to know about the behavior before equilibriumwas reached,
prediction would require much more information. It would require, in par-
ticular, more information about the properties of molasses: its viscosity, the
rapidity with which it “adapted” itself to the containing vessel and moved
towards its “goal” of lowering its center of gravity. Likewise, to predict the
short run behavior of an adaptive organism, or its behavior in a complex
and rapidly changing environment, it is not enough to know its goals. We
must know also a great deal about its internal structure and particularly its
mechanisms of adaptation.”
Simon (1959), p. 255
Simon criticized orthodox normative economics for ignoring how human beings
actually behave and questioned the result that only rational agents survive the forces
of competition - with orthodoxy’s Olympian assumptions (Simon, 1983b) on how to
formalize rational behaviour, which was - at least as far as Simon was concerned -
remote from any cognitive realism. Besides, the study of equilibrium requires little
understanding of the characteristics of individuals in out-of-equilibrium situations, sim-
ply because normative economics has nothing to say about process and procedure. In the
real world Simon saw around him, there exists a great deal of turbulence, not only gen-
erated by external shocks, that keeps the system out of equilibrium and agents needing
to relocate their bearings almost ceaselessly.
Furthermore, Simon stated “decision making under uncertainty” instead of “de-
cision making under risk” in Simon (1959). That is, an economic agent might respond
to the changing environment in a personal way rather than knowing the objective prob-
ability of what outcomes might occur in the future. This property brings more diffi-
culties on the prediction of rational individual behaviour by using so-called objective
characteristics of the environment.
Simon’s behavioural economics is almost comprehensively demonstrated by his
encapsulation of Human Problem Solving and agents and institutions as Information Pro-
cessing Systems. Although the problems which Simon dealt with are well structured
problems, such as Chess playing, the combinatorial complexity of the problem is mas-
sive enough to prevent human players using minimax strategies which are suggested
in traditional game theory. In this chapter, only a few of Simon’s massive and wide
ranging contributions are tackled.
2.3 Underpinnings of Behavioural Economics
In this section, different underpinnings and analytical tools of MBE and CBE will be
briefly mentioned. The purpose of this section is not to provide detailed theoretical
and technical details, but to try to make clear distinctions on how the two lines differ
fundamentally. It is slightly puzzling that this distinction has never been made earlier.
As one may realize from the following underpinnings and the sub-branches of MBE
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introduced in previous sections, MBE can be characterized as a massive magnet which
attracts different resources, new tools and ways of explanations. We can almost claim
that MBE has already become a new mainstream economics, as a consequence of it
playing the role of a revised approach of orthodox economics rather than an alterna-
tive approach. On the other hand, CBE is developed on completely different grounds
from MBE. From our point of view, MBE is fostered by Orthodox Economic Theory,
Game Theory, Mathematical Finance Theory and Recursive16 Methods, Experimental
Economics and Neuroeconomics, Computational Economics17 and Subjective Proba-
bility Theory.
CBE, in our reconstruction of it, on the other hand, is based fundamentally on
a model of computation - hence, Computable Economics - computational complexity
theory, nonlinear dynamics and algorithmic probability theory.
2.3.1 Underpinnings of Modern Behavioural Economics
Orthodox Economic Theory
It is in human nature to aspire to predict, at least so the sages say, and the traditional
wisdom of many cultures concur. Microeconomics, in general, is the study of individ-
ual choices and actions. Gradually, economics has developed normative axioms and
theories on how the individual entities (including organizations) should make choices
and how they seem to make choices. There are, classically (but not necessarily ex-
haustively) the normative and positive approaches to behaviour, respectively. In Neo-
classical theory, economic agents are assumed to be fully rational and completely18
informed. It is not that they know everything, but that they can know everything and
there are means to learn - epistemology - and they know how to make the best choices
for themselves (even if only probabilistically). Second, in order for their choices to
be tractable, axioms (completeness, reflexiveness, transitivity, and continuity) of ratio-
nal preference were devised, within classical mathematical formalisms - which simply
means the mathematics of (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory plus some variant of the ax-
iom of choice. Individuals are assumed to have underlying preference orderings for
all the alternatives which are knowable, although the means of getting to know them is
never specified. These rational preferences are, often, represented by a utility function,
which is assumed to bewell-behaved. Third, the non-satiation assumption promises that
the satiation point will never be reached, at least in the economic domain. Thus, the
individuals are always in the state of the world where “more is better”.
In passing, it could be mentioned that there have been serious and contentious
discussions in the history of the development of economic theory as to whether utility
should be cardinal or ordinal, since there might consequently result in differences in
the way in which economists try to measure utility. Eventually, ordinal utility seems
16Not Recursion Theory
17Not Computable Economics
18Often this ‘completeness’ is probabilistic of a naı¨ve variety.
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to have reached dominance, although not very ‘consistently’; subsequently the theory
of individual decision making based on preference and choice-based approaches were
developed.
In passing, in lieu of discussing game theory and its place in MBE, we would
like to make two points: Firstly, we disagree that game theory, even in its strategic
form, originates with either von Neumann-Morgenstern or with von Neumann’s 1928
paper. Our alternative history is outlined in several of Velupillai’s recent papers on
computable economics. Secondly, it may be pertinent to add that no game theoretically
defined Nash equilibrium is computable and no algorithm which has been claimed to
determine it can be implemented without appealing to undecidable disjunctions.
Mathematical Finance Theory and Recursive Methods
A huge amount of mathematical theories and tools have been borrowed to develop
finance theories and time series analysis. In these exercises, different stochastic or ran-
dom processes are imported to represent the data generating process of finance or eco-
nomic time series, e.g. Brownian motion and Markov chains. The random processes
applied here are based on measure theoretic concepts.
Recursive methods inmacroeconomic are built on dynamic programming, Markov
decision processes and Kalman filtering and again, measure theory, underpinning or-
thodox theories of stochastic processes and probability, plays a central role - all within
one or another form of nonconstructive and non-recursion theoretic real analysis (for
example, for dynamic programming the notion of one or another form of contraction
mapping in a suitable metric space).
Although the mathematical tools used are much more sophisticated than in non-
dynamic methods - but only up to a point, economic entities are still modelled as opti-
mizers (e.g. maximizing present values in intertemporal contexts, Value functions and
Euler equations in the context of dynamic programming and optimal control formula-
tions) where it is little realised that the analysis is around uncomputable equilibria (cf.
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004; Stokey and Lucas, 1989).
Experimental Economics and Neuroeconomics
Experimental Economics appears as a tool for examining economic theories in com-
putational, numerical and other obviously implementable ways in which idealized
subjects are placed in artificial settings that purport to mimic the theoretical environ-
ment. Narrowly speaking, it is not categorized as a branch in economics, instead, it is
a methodology for researchers to support or refute specific economic theories. While,
broadly, it can be considered to be cohabiting with behavioural economics. This is
because - or claimed to be because - what people actually do can be observed in exper-
imental environments, and almost all the anomalies are found and induced from lab-
oratory environments or field studies. The methodology of experimental economics is
heavily based on so-called induced value theory (Smith, 1976). Induced value theory sug-
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gests that in the controlled laboratory environment, if subjects are suitably motivated,
experimenters can expect to obtain desirable induced values from choices of subjects
on certain economic problems they are given to ‘solve’19. This theory is obtained from
non-satiation assumptions, andmonetary payment is the most commonly used reward
for inducing real values from subjects. However, if economic agents are actually ap-
plying satisficing principles to the experiments they attend, i.e. they are satisfied by
performing decently rather than trying their best or thinking hard in order to get the
most reward, then the results of experimental economic could be very misleading.
Neuroeconomics is the new extension of experimental economics incorporating
neuroscience to obtain the data of brain activity, simultaneously, when the subject is
in a laboratory environment. It is also viewed as a young subfield of behavioural
economics which is believed will be the main focus in the future. A popular claim
is the dual system in our brain supervising our judgemental and intuitive thinking,
corresponding to rational and emotional behaviours. It provides the technique to col-
lect data in the brain for examining how and when the behaviour of decision makers
could deviate from rational and consistent behaviour. Recent surveys can be found
in Camerer (2007), Glimcher et al. (2005), and Rustichini (2005); a critical view of the
claims of Neuroeconomics can be found in Rubinstein (2008).
Computational Economics
Computational Economics is also an extension of experimental economics from an-
other perspective, i.e. the subjects are not human subjects but software subjects. So
far, there are at least two well-developed lines, which are heterogeneous agent mod-
els and agent-based modelling, and the survey for these respective lines can be found
in Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006). A thorough critique of the excessive claims
of both these lines - and of other strands of computational economics - is given in
Velupillai and Zambelli (2011).
Heterogeneous agent models seem to have been inspired by related results on
cellular automata modelling in the physical sciences, resulting in unpredictable and
complex phenomena generated by simple interaction rules. The claims in this line of
research are as vacuous as those made by agent-based modellers in finance and eco-
nomics. They both suffer from a serious lack of scholarship and complete unhinging of
their foundations in either serious computability theory or even a familiarity with the
fruitful and frontier research in the interface between dynamical system theory, numer-
ical analysis and computability. These interactions were the fulcrum aroundwhich von
Neumann and Ulam, Conway and Wolfram and Turing (1952) pioneered their studies
of emergent complex dynamics in interacting systems with simple rules of interaction.
19But this is not the search for ‘solutions’ in any kind of ‘problem solving’ context, as in CBE.
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Subjective Probability Theory
Subjective expected utility theory was proposed by Savage in 1954, between the period
in which Edwards wrote his first and second survey papers on behavioural economics
(Edwards, 1954, 1961). Savage followed the axiomatizations along the lines proposed
by Ramsey (Ramsey, 1926) and de Finetti (de Finetti, 1964), and applied Bayes’ rule for
updating the prior probabilities over time.
The idea of subjective expected utility ‘first’ appeared in Modern Behavioural
Economics20 through the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), when building a de-
scriptive theory of decision making by individuals under risk. Their theory in turn
borrowed heavily from Edwards (1962), who in turn built on Savage (1954). Both Ed-
wards and later Kahneman and Tversky, however do not refer to Bruno de Finetti
whose contributions are not mentioned in these two papers. There seems to be some
ambiguity while they talk about probabilities in their model and this gets particularly
unclear when they refer to decision weights21.
“In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a deci-
sion weight. Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects
much as subjective probabilities are inferred from preferences in the Ramsey-
Savage approach. However, decision weights are not probabilities: they do
not obey the probability axioms and they should not be interpreted as mea-
sures of degree of belief.”
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 280
In this framework, decision weight measures over stated probabilities do not
obey the property of additivity22. In the Savage-de Finetti framework, the sum of the
probabilities over exclusive and exhaustive events adds up to unity. In prospect theory,
the sum of decision weights is considered less than one in most of the cases. However,
while they invoke the Ramsey’s approach of inferring these decision weights from
choices, it naturally raises the question as to what these decision weights are? Al-
though the propositions of decision weights are derived in the paper, it is unclear how
they are different from degrees of belief - although different they must be!
In Edwards (1962), two categories of subjective probability models are intro-
duced: additive and non-additive ones23. In Edwards’ elaboration, first of all, subjective
20Ignoring, for the moment, the much earlier work of Edwards, who was more than a mentor to
Kahneman and Tversky.
21Decision weights, in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), are the measures associated with each proba-
bility, reflecting the impact of probability of the overall value of the prospect.
22Additivity of probability is defined as follows: If n numbers of events form a complete set of incom-
patible evens (meaning exactly one of the events has to be true), then the probability of the logical sum
(the logical sum of a group of events is true, if and only if, one of the events is true) is equal to the sum
of their respective probabilities. Since n is a finite natural number, the definition above is more precisely
finite additivity. On the other hand, when n approaches infinity, it becomes countable additivity.
23The distinction of additive and non-additive probability made in Edwards (1962) is that additive
probabilities sum up to specific (real) numbers, non-additive ones are not supposed to do so then, what
are they, if they do not do so?
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probability is a number raging from zero to one and describing a person’s assessment
of the likeliness of an event. Further, it is assumed objective probabilities exist, and
they are related to subjective probabilities. Edwards argues that its is meaningless to
debate whether objective probabilities can be defined, in contrast to de Finetti’s and
Savage’s firm belief that there are no objective probabilities. He goes on to make a dis-
tinction between risk and uncertainty. He argues that there are some cases, such as die
tosses, which have “conventional” probabilities over their outcomes. Consequently,
there events which can be given objective probabilities, are defined as risky; otherwise,
they are uncertain. However, both Edwards (1962) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
considered only risky cases. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is a revision of prospect
theory including (allegedly) uncertain outcomes.
The concept of subjective probability is used ambiguously - to put it mildly - in
MBE. One the other hand, MBE introduced the idea of personal probability, defining
it and mapping it over the objective probabilities in risky choices. This is quite different
from the kind of subjective probabilities proposed by de Finetti, and does not necessarily follow
his axioms of subjective probabilities.
Subjective probabilities of outcomes, for de Finetti, are the different degrees of
belief regarding the occurrences of events that people possess. These degrees of belief,
however, need not be the same for all the people. In an attempt to find admissible
ways of assigning numbers to different degrees of belief, de Finetti constructed axioms
over events and their probabilities, especially, through the logical relations of events.
By standardizing a random quantity into 1 and 0 representing the truth and falsity of
an event and by introducing the coherence criterion, de Finetti derives some basic conse-
quences. Themost important one amongst them is the concept of finite additivity, where
the sum of assignments over finite events (logical sums) adds to unity. More specifi-
cally, for de Finetti, the qualitative criteria regarding coherence appears first, and then,
the individuals are allowed to freely attach numbers to their degrees of belief over
a complete set of incompatible events (i.e., exhaustive and exclusive events), however,
within the coherence constraint. This way, a qualitative idea of coherence is linked to
the mathematical expressions of (subjective) probability. The coherence principle de-
mands consistency in assignments, based on the idea that no arbitrary gains should
be available for either player by accepting certain books of bets (the Dutch Book argu-
ment). In order to satisfy the coherence principle, the sum of probabilities of the event
has to be unity (the necessary and sufficient condition of coherence). Besides, it should
be noted that Bayes’ conditional probability formula is derived in turn form coherence,
and it is not taken as a definition in de Finetti’s theory of probability.
Before de Finetti, Frank Ramsey gave a talk in 1926 and the lecture was published
in Ramsey (1926), of which de Finetti was not aware until 1937. Both of them, almost
simultaneously but independently, formulated subjective probability as a degree of be-
lief held by an individual and devoted their efforts to axiomatize it. In particular, de
Finetti assumed and insisted only the use of finite additivity, because the requirement
of coherence implies finite additivity. On the other hand, Ramsey simply and intuitively
addressed this issue saying that is meaningless to discuss infinite events, because he
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doubted a human being’s capability of handling infinite events.
“[N]othing has been said about degrees of belief when the number of
alternative is infinite. About this I have nothing useful to say, except that
I doubt if the mind is capable of contemplating more than a finite number
of alternatives. It can consider questions to which an infinite number of
answers are possible, but in order to consider the answers it must lump
them into a finite number of groups.”
Ramsey (1926), p. 18324
In contrast to finite additivity, frequentists and measure theorists advocate and
justify the use of countable additivity (or denumerable additivity, infinite additivity
and σ-additivity) by invoking the strong law of large numbers (Borel) and relative
frequency in limits. Howson (2009) discusses these issues in detail and supports de
Finetti’s idea of finite additivity, but not, in our opinion, in a convincing way.
In particular, we fundamentally disagree with Howson that ‘de Finetti himself
would have recommended’ doing ‘probabilistic reasoning . . . in an informal metathe-
ory consisting the usual mathematics of analysis and set theory’ so that:
“Deductive consistency and probabilistic consistency are . . . subspecies
of the same fundamental notion of the solvability of equations subject to
constraints: those of a classical truth-valuation in the deductive case, and
the rules of finitely additive formal probability in the probabilistic case”
Howson, op. cit, p. 55-6; italic added.
This is a fundamental violation of every tenet of epistemology and methodology
advocated by de Finetti. Moreover, Howson does not seem to realize that it is provably
hard to devise procedures to validate ‘classical truth-valuation’.
Edwards (1962, p.117), inexplicably, considers the infinite case to be more inter-
esting as compared to the finite case . More recently, Bayesian approaches, together
with Savage’s notion of subjective probability, are challenged by empirical evidences
that suggest agents are incapable of applying the Bayesian rule to revise their prior
probabilities. Case based theory which is considered as one of the new foundations for
behavioural decision theory, bases the probabilities assigned to different events on pre-
vious histories regarding similar cases and consequently, adopts a (non-algorithmic)
frequentist approach for the probabilities (cf. Thaler, 2005; Camerer et al., 2004).
2.3.2 Underpinnings of Classical Behavioural Economics
“If we hurry, we can catch up to Turing on the path he pointed out to us
so many years ago.”
Simon (1996a), p. 101
24It may be apposite to point out that Ramsey’s equally distinguished fellow-Kingsman, a few years
later, in his classic on computability theory, appealed to the same kind of ‘finiteness’ for the same kind
of reason (cf. Turing, 1936, p.249)
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Classical Behavioural Economics was underpinned, always and at any and every
level of theoretical and applied analysis, by amodel of computation. Invariably, although
not always explicitly, it was Turing’s model of computation.
The fundamental focus in classical behavioural economics is on decision prob-
lems faced by human problem solvers, the latter viewed as information processing systems,
as we emphasise in this thesis. All of these terms are given computational content, ab
initio. But given the scope of this chapter we shall not have the possibility of a full
characterisation. The ensuing ‘birds eye’ view must suffice for now.
Firstly, a decision problem asks whether there exist an algorithm to decidewhether
a mathematical assertion does or does not have a proof; or a formal problem does or
does not have an algorithmic solution. Thus, the characterisation makes clear the cru-
cial role of an underpinning model of computation; secondly, the answer is in the form
of a yes/no response. Of course, there is the third alternative of ‘undecidable’, too. It
is in this sense of decision problems that we interpret the word ‘decisions’ here.
As for ‘problem solving’, we shall assume that this is to be interpreted in the sense
in which it is defined and used in the monumental classic by Newell and Simon (1972),
which is, in our opinion, an application of the theory underlying Turing (1954).
Finally, the model of computation is the Turing model, subject to the Church-
Turing These. To give a rigorous mathematical foundation for bounded rationality
and satisficing, as decision problems25, it is necessary to underpin them in a dynamic
model of choice in a computable framework. However, these are not two separate
problems. Any formalization underpinned by a model of computation in the sense of
computability theory is, dually, intrinsically dynamic. Moreover,Decidable-Undecidable,
Solvable-Unsolvable, Computable-Uncomputable, etc., are concepts that are given content
algorithmically, within a model of computation.
Definition 1. A Boolean formula consisting of many clauses connected by conjunctions (i.e.,
∧) is said to be in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF).
Now consider the Boolean formula:
(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ ¬x2) ∧ (x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (x3 ∨ ¬x1) ∧ (¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3)
Each subformula within parenthesis is called a clause; The variables and their
negations that constitute each clause are called literals; It is ‘easy’ to ‘see’ that for the
truth value of the above Boolean formula to be t(xi) = 1, all the subformulas within
each of the parenthesis will have to be true. It is equally ‘easy’ to see that no truth
25The three most important classes of decision problems that almost characterise the subject of com-
putational complexity theory, underpinned by a model of computation in general, the model of com-
putation in this context is the Nondeterministic Turing Machine are the P, NP and NP-Complete classes.
Concisely, but not quite precisely, they can be described as follows: 1. P defines the class of computable
problems that are solvable in time bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the input; 2. NP is the
class of computable problems for which a solution can be verified in polynomial time; 3. A computable
problem lies in the class called NP-Complete if every problem that is in NP can be reduced to it in polyno-
mial time.
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assignments whatsoever can satisfy the formula such that its global value is true. This
Boolean formula is unsatisfiable. This is the kind of ‘satisfiability’ we ascribe to Simon’s
notion of ‘satisficing’.
Definition 2. SAT - The Satisfiability Problem
Given m clauses, Ci(i = 1, . . . ,m), containing the literals (of) xj(j = 1, . . . , n), determine if
the formula C1 ∨ C2 ∨ . . . ∨ Cm is satisfiable.
Determine means ‘find an (efficient) algorithm’. To date it is not known whether
there is an efficient algorithm to solve the satisfiability problem - i.e., to determine the
truth value of a Boolean formula. In other words, it is not known whether SAT∈P. But:
Theorem 1. SAT∈NP
Finally, we have Cook’s famous theorem (Cook, 1971):
Theorem 2. Cook’s theorem
SAT is NP-Complete
It is in the above kind of context and framework within which we are interpret-
ing Simon’s vision of behavioural economics. In this framework, optimization is a
very special case of the more general decision problem approach. The real mathemat-
ical content of satisficing26 is best interpreted in terms of the satisfiability problem of
computational complexity theory, the framework used by Simon consistently and per-
sistently - and a framework to which he himself made pioneering contributions.
We have only scratched a tiny part of the surface of the vast canvass on which Si-
mon sketched his vision of a computably underpinned behavioural economics. Noth-
ing in Simon’s behavioural economics - i.e., in Classical Behavioural Economics - was
devoid of computable content. There was - is - never any epistemological deficit in
any computational sense in classical behavioural economics (unlike in Modern Be-
havioural Economics, which is copiously endowed with epistemological deficits, from
the ground up).
2.4 CBE - Notes on the Special Role of Herbert Simon
A basic tenet of Simon’s approach to behavioural economics is that the limitations of
cognitive processing should be linked, in some formal way, with the definable limita-
tions of computation, subject to the Church-Turing Thesis (without say space or time
constraints). The limits of computational complexity, on the other hand, are naturally
26In Simon (1997), p. 295, Simon clarified the semantic sense of the word satisfice:
“The term ‘satisfice’, which appears in the Oxford English Dictionary as a Northum-
brian synonym for ‘satisfy’, was borrowed for this new use by H. A. Simon (1956) in ‘Ra-
tional Choice and Structure of the Environment’ ”
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bounded by the time and space. Behavioural models, in which agents are supposed
to exercise rational behaviour, whether psychologically more realistically constrained
or not, hypothesizing capabilities transcending these theoretical and practical limita-
tions are, for Simon, empirically meaningless. Simon has taken the limits of human
cognition into account, transformed into computational complexity measure, for de-
scribing agents who make decisions. This is why we are convinced that computable
foundations and nonlinear dynamics can be found in Information Processing Systems27,
the paradigmatic formalization of agents and institutions in the kind of behavioural
economics Simon advocated.
2.4.1 Bounded Rationality
The idea of bounded rationality was first proposed by Herbert Simon in the paper titled
“A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice”, which was published in 1953. It was further
polished and republished with a same title as the much more famous Simon (1955)
and was initially phrased as “limited rationality”. Less than a decade later, the idea
was more specifically termed as “procedural rationality.” It reveals Simon’s explicit
intention of introducing procedural contents of decision making into the notion of ra-
tionality. Though the idea of bounded rationality has been discussed using different
names by Simon, there is no inconsistency among them. In Simon (1955), an example
was constructed where agents tend to be satisfied by using certain information they
have and avoid information they do not really have any means of obtaining in algo-
rithmically meaningful ways. They anticipate something acceptable in the near future
without calculating any probabilities or assigning probabilities to prospective future
events. Simon further described human behaviour as “intendedly rational” in Simon
(1957, p.196).
The book Models of Man collected the papers which he published in early to
mid 1950s. It is where the phrase Bounded Rationality appeared for the first time, in
the introduction of Part IV (p.196). The phrase was, then much maligned in its uses
and misuses, compared to the original definition and formalizations by Simon. Subse-
quently, bounded rationality became one of the frequently used terminologies of MBE.
On the contrary in Simon’s advocacy, human beings can solve their problems relying
on heuristics and intuition without a given model in mind28. Therefore, there seems
to be a mismatch between the contemporary interpretation of bounded rationality and
its original definitions. In Simon’s point of view, human beings have no capability and
willingness to always find procedures to reach the best alternative, even if such a thing
27Agents and institutions and all other kinds of decision-making entities, in CBE, are information
processing systems which in their ideal form are Turing Machines.
28This may well be one way for agents in CBE to transcend the limits of Turing Computability subject to
the Church-Turing Thesis. However, we do not subscribe to the view that Simon assumed that the limits
of Turing Computability are violable; we believe Simon could have resorted to oracle computations,
when necessary, and also formalize via nondeterministic and alternating Turing Machines to encapsu-
late procedures - heuristics and other similar algorithms - that give an impression to the uninitiated that
there are formal means to transcend Turing Computability.
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is meaningfully definable, or make the ‘Olympian choice.’ Reasoning capabilities, for-
mally defined as algorithmic procedures, are constrained by the limits of computability
theory and, at an empirical level, by measures of computational complexity. Simon’s
definition of bounded (limited, procedural) rationality encapsulates different notions,
such as limited attention, limited cognitive capacity of computation, satisficing, and
sequential decision making (naturally dynamic) (Simon, 1955, 1956). That is to say, it
is not evident and admissible to assume that human beings are able to exhaust all the
information and make the ‘best’ choice out of it. Indeed, the notion of ‘best’ is given
content via the formulation of problem solving by information processing systems in
what is known in metamathematics as a decision problem. In such a framework one
seeks algorithms to solve problems and classifies them as ‘easy’ or ‘hard’ using mea-
sures of computational complexity. There is no such thing as ‘best’ algorithm or a ‘best’
heuristic.
Therefore, the dynamics of non-maximizing agents can be described adequately in
the following way. The knowledge we have, and interpretation of the world where we
are living in , are associated with our experience andmemories. Gradually, our tastes and
understanding are constructed. The process of construction is the central pre-analytic,
Schumpeterian visionary (Schumpeter (1954), p.51, ff), stage in the decision problem.
Therefore, the pursuit for stable gain in taste and knowledge also relies on what has
been constructed. This is one part of requiring a program to modify itself. The unhap-
piness and satisfaction which are associated with our aspirations depends on whether
the desires are satisfied in terms of our anticipation. The aspiration level expends with
satisfaction and shrinks with disappointment. Nonetheless, the memory that is stored
in our mind prevents our aspiration level from becoming null. Thus, we are in the
loop of unhappiness and satisfaction, a loop given formal content via the structure of
a program for a Turing Machine or a heuristic implemented on one of them Simon
(1991c).
This thesis argues that Simon’s version of Bounded Rationality is not entirely
comprehended and also that it has been misinterpreted and redefined. Many have de-
veloped their own versions of bounded rationality, however, none of them capture the
essence and the richness of this notion as Simon intended it. The primary feature that
distinguishes Simon’s version from others is the explicit analogy between rational de-
cision making and models of computation, where procedures are central in the latter.
This argument is supported by ?. Though there is a vast and growing body of mod-
ern literature on bounded rationality, we opt to characterize and underpin Simon’s
bounded rationality through Simon’s own diverse contributions and computability
theory. Hence, this thesis does not engage in a comparative analysis of all different
strands of Bounded rationality found in the literature, though it can be an interesting
exercise for the future.
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2.4.2 Human Problem Solving
The notion of bounded rationality has been encoded implicitly and explicitly into
the information processing system which was proposed in Newell et al. (1958a) and
analysed thoroughly with detailed recording and interviews with human subjects in
Newell and Simon (1972). IPSs have shown their capability of solving problems, such
as cryptarithmetic, logic, and chess games, algorithmically, In their conclusion, it is
suggested that task environments of greater complexity and openness ought to be
studied. Thus, we can see that they are on the track of pursuing Turing’s suggested
program of research on Solvable and Unsolvable Problems (Turing, 1954).
Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, encapsulated within the formalization of
an IPS is, in turn, used in simulating (representing) human problem solving. Simula-
tion, even if not precisely theorized in Simon’s monumental work onHuman Problem
Solving, nevertheless is defined in analogy with the dynamics intrinsic to partial dif-
ferential functions or their machine embodiment in the definition of the processing of
information by a Turing Machine, or its specialized variants. Problem solving is the
implementation, via heuristics, themselves algorithms, of search processes for paths from
initial sates to the target states. The complexity of a problem solving process - the com-
plexity, therefore, of the algorithm that is implemented in the search processes from
initial conditions to ‘halting’ states - defines its hardness on a well-defined computa-
tional complexity measure. This also means that there could be problems that will be
subject to the famous theorem of the halting problem for Turing Machines.
The methods that a problem solver uses are strongly associated with his or her
memory and experience. The accumulated knowledge in the memory will form the
heuristics - the current state of the program and its structure - to guide the problem
solving him(her)self. Intuition is copiously invoked, and defined computationally and
cognitively, in seamlessly leading the problem solver to one or another path at a node,
when he or she faces a huge number of possible choices, in the Nondeterministic Turing
Machine formulation of a problem.
Theory of Human Problem Solving
Literally, we need a problem and the problem solver to achieve problem solving, and
the problem should be presented, recognized and understood. A problem is faced
when one wants to do something about a particular task but does not know what se-
ries of actions can be done to implement it immediately. The three main factors that
characterise problems are the huge size of possible solutions, the dispersion of actual solu-
tions and the high cost of search. The problem space contains a set of elements which
represent knowledge, a set of operators which generate new knowledge from existing
knowledge, an initial sate of knowledge, a problem which is specified by a set of de-
sired states, and the total knowledge available to problem solvers. The problem can be
further formulated (represented by) set-predicate formulations and search formulation.
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Representation In the former representation, the set of elements includes symbolic
objects which are all possible solutions, not necessarily formally definable. Precisely,
the set can be generated by a certain enumerative procedure. Thus, the problem solver
will not be given the entire set, rather, is given a process to generate elements out of
the set. This is exactly analogous to Brouwerian constructive spreads, arising out of free
choice sequences. In a search representation, solutions as elements of a set, have the
format of sequences. For instance, a proof of a theory contains a sequence of steps and
chess representations contain continuations for some players.
Task Environment A Task Environment describes the attributes that are associated
with the problem that problem solvers encounter. It consists of external and inter-
nal representations, where the former is the format in which the problem is exactly
presented and the latter stands for the subjective representation the player applies.
Accordingly, not only the presentation of the current problem, but also the ability and
intelligence of the problem solver should be considered. This is because players with
diverse abilities may perceive the problem differently. It should be made very clear
that in Simon’s framework of human problem solving, as well as in Turing’s considera-
tion of Solvable and Unsolvable Problems, concept like ability and intelligence are precisely
defined, even if pro tempore, in terms of computability theory.
Information Processing System The information processing system which is capa-
ble of problem solving can be characterised as follows. An IPS is a serial, adaptive
(dynamic), and deterministic system which receives input and generates output. It is
composed of internal building blocks such as long term memory (LTM), short term
memory (STM) and external memory (EM). LTM and STM share identical patterns but
are distinguished by their size. LTM can contain all the symbolic objects without limi-
tation, while STM contains only five to seven symbols. The fact of sequential decision
making is inherent in IPS; moreover, how a problem solver retrieves objects from LTM
to STM relies on heuristic search. This is exactly equivalent to the partial recursive
function formalization of computability or a Turing Machine definition of computable
process (cf. Davis, 1958), Chapter 1, in particular, and Part 1, in general; indeed, reading
and mastering the foundational mathematics of computability theory simultaneously
with an approach to problem solving in the Simon or Turing sense is the best way to
understand all the equivalences inherent in all these formalizations.).
Heuristics
Heuristic is a method of “Rule of Thumb” that serves as a guide in searching. Intu-
itively, it is an ability and process to refer to one’s own memory and experience and
lead oneself to focus on appropriate subsets of knowledge. Without external help, one
can learn and discover new knowledge by him/herself. Essentially, it is the ability
of Machine to reconstruct its internal structure by itself. When an IPS receives in-
formation from the task environment, it generates the goals and the methods for the
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achievement by heuristic search. If heuristics cannot achieve a satisfactory solution,
then either the heuristic method will be reprogrammed or the representation, namely,
the internal representation in the task environment, will be reformulated. It will be
clear that ‘satisfactory’ here is precisely defined by means of time and space compu-
tational complexity measures. In short, IPS and task environment are interdependent,
and the process of change is learning. This is one way the human problem solver as a
learner encounters him/herself as a learning machine.
In addition to bounded rationality and satisficing, Simon uncovered an interest-
ing property, which became a recurring theme in his works, observed in many en-
tities. In the very early 1950s Simon became familiar with Goodwin (1947) and the
concept of Near Decomposability, culled from Goodwin’s notion of unilateral (weak)
coupling, began to be used in his papers and he applied it to diverse problems, such as
identifying causality (Simon, 1952, 1953b, 1987; Simon and Iwasaki, 1988), counterfac-
tuals (Simon and Rescher, 1966), aggregation (Simon and Ando, 1961), organizational
behaviour (Guetzkow and Simon, 1955; Simon, 1993), complex system (Simon, 1973,
1990b), complexity (Simon, 1962, 2001), and human and machine thinking (Simon,
1995). Near decomposability has its rigorous mathematical characterisation, while con-
ceptually the idea can also be connected to heuristics. Especially, in Simon (2002), near
decomposability is the basis for causing a greater speed of evolution in organisms with
a hierarchical structure. When the hierarchical structure is applied to the problem and
problem solver in human problem solving circumstances, then evolution is analogous
to learning and discovery.
Near decomposability in human problem solving can be interpreted as decom-
posing a problem into subproblems when the subproblems are not completely inde-
pendent. In Polya’s little book Polya (1945), “heuristic method” was demonstrated by
an educator decomposing and reformulating a problem step by step for a student who
is asked to solve the problem. Turing at the same time, also proposed his idea of a
child’s machine and education process in Turing (1950) (p.456). The influence of Polya,
Turing and Goodwin are unambiguously evident in Newell and Simon (1972); and in
Newell et al. (1958a) for their postulation of the internal structure of minds and the
representation of task environments in human problem solving.
2.4.3 Classical Behavioural Economics and Computable Economics
Satisficing, SAT and Diophantine Problems
Velupillai advocated that the faithful encapsulation of Simon’s bounded rationality
and satisficing ought to be through models of computation in the context of decision
problems. Particularly, he suggests posing problems of rational choices as SAT prob-
lems (satisfiability problem) Velupillai (2010b). A SAT problem looks for the truth as-
signments of the arguments which can make the global statement true. If such assign-
ments can be found, then the SAT problem is satisfiable.
Solving SAT problems can be formulated, equivalently, as linear Diophantine
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equations, linear systems with nonnegative integer variables, or integer linear pro-
gramming problems. Theoretically, SAT is NP-Complete (Cook’s theorem), that is, a
SAT problem is not solvable in nondeterministic polynomial time in its inputs, but can
be verified in polynomial time. However, Velupillai has realized very recently that Si-
mon’s notions should be better formalized in terms of space computational complexity.
In particular, SAT can be solved with a linear space algorithm. An intuitive explana-
tion might be that in real human problem solving, subjects are never given sufficient
amount of time to make decisions, rather, they are trained to restructure their short-
term memory in order to process a problem in a given period of time. Subsequently,
Velupillai has proved, via duality between computability and dynamic systems, that
Simon’s information processing system is capable of computation universality which
is the relevant model of computation for rational choice. Furthermore. orthodox no-
tions of rationality (through optimization) has been shown as a special (easy) case of
the more general (difficult) case of SAT problem, in terms of models of computation in
a decision problem context.
Chess and Go
Like many other strategic games, though the final target is to defeat the opponent in
one’s own way, Chess players care about many other actions while the game is ongo-
ing. For example, it is important to capture, block and otherwise threaten the oppo-
nent. There are the sub-goals that come to players’ mind alternatively, simultaneously
to playing the game with the global goal, and in the pensive phases between moves.
Being aware of the sub-goals, players can reduce their attention to relatively small
groups of good moves and play accordingly.
Go and Chess are very fundamentally different. Go has no concrete configuration
of terminal conditions, like “Check-mate” in Chess. Instead, a GO game is finished
when both players pass, and the side who occupies greater territory wins. This is a
most intricate ‘stopping rule’ for the program to implement the process of playing GO
by a Turing Machine. The best moves in the Go games are even more ambiguous than
the ones in Chess. Similarly, though it is difficult to list out all the terminal positions
in Chess, it is very possible to decide whether each configuration belongs to the set of
Check-mate. It is only possible for some of the games of GO. Unlike Chess, Go players
rarely benefited by playing forcefully or aggressively - assuming these concepts can be
given formal definitions in the relevant mathematics - because by doing that they can
create unforeseeable ‘dangerous’ configurations to their own group as well.
A go game can be officially played on a 9 by 9, 13 by 13, and 19 by 19 board.
Practically, Go games can be set from 2 by 2, 3 by 3, . . . , 9 by 9, . . . , 13 by 13, . . . , 19
by 19, . . . boards. The combinatorial complexity increases exponentially when the board
size is enlarged. Thus, the complexity of Go games can be expanded theoretically to
countable infinites, of a kind. This is the flexibility that the Chess game may lack.
The main task in playing Go is to enclose some areas on the board, so that the
stones of the opponent which are in this area have no space to escape and are captured.
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On the other hand, when a group of stones are in danger of being captured, the task is
to create holes (eyes) to save a region. No matter how big the board size is, the warfare
will be localized into separate regions on the board. When the game is being played,
the attribution of some regions can be determined and it is known for both players
that there is no need to fight on those regions any more. That is to say, the players
will decompose the board into several blocks and try to invade or defend those regions.
We conjecture, therefore, that near decomposability will turn out to be a useful way of
representing some configurations in a game of Go.
It formalizing the Go games, it is reasonable to start with smaller sizes and apply
them to the bigger board with the idea of decomposing into smaller blocks. In spite of
the fact that the complexity of a game of Go increases exponentially with the board size,
human players can reduce the practical complexity drastically by decomposing the
board configurations and attack them separately. However, the Go board can never be
partitioned unambiguously, this is where a plausible application of near decomposability
can be envisaged. Despite all the differences of the two games, there are important
similarities, too. Go players need to come up with sub-goals, such as joseki (ding shih,
in Chinese), creating atari (da chi, in Chinese), making eyes and escaping from being
captured etc., in order to resolve some situations.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Science, in most of the cases, is built on asking and answering - often unanswerable -
questions. In order to proceed properly, it is critical in most of the cases, that appro-
priate questions be asked. Decision theory deals with the problems of human choices,
and plenty of models have been constructed and examined through the formalizations
of orthodox mathematical economics, econometrics or experiments. Nevertheless, be-
havioural economics emerged based on the failure of orthodox economic frameworks.
Anomalies have been collected and discovered with respect to the normative human
behaviours which are predicted by orthodox economics. The central doctrines of ortho-
dox economics are optimization subject to constrains and equilibrium analysis. Mod-
ern behavioural economics emerged as a field of finding and explaining anomalies in
human decision behaviour. The difficulties of solving these problems (optimization
and equilibrium) have been noticed; however, their solvability has not yet been ques-
tioned and challenged in Modern Behavioural Economics.
Solvability of problems, by problem solvers, requires formal characterisations
of both concepts, neither of which has ever been attempted by modern behavioural
economists. They are almost defined and characterised in classical behavioural eco-
nomics and computable economics, as we have argued above.
Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing”
into economic fields along with their psychological and computational underpinnings.
Intuitively, computability theory tackles the solvability of a problem and computa-
tional complexity theory measures the difficulty of solving a problem. Thus, if a pro-
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gram is designed to mimic human thinking, naturally, the computability of program
has the counterpart in reasoning. Simon’s ideal models of economic agents can be
demonstrated by an Information Processing System and its nature of adaptation can be
captured in the theory of “human problem solving”. Within this framework, “anoma-
lies” are, possibly, those that result in uncomputabilities, undecidabilities and unsolv-
abilities of problems, forced into solvable modes by inappropriate models, precisely
definable as, for example, the use of finite automata where a Turing Machine is re-
quired, and so on.
If Simon’s postulations are taken into account, then “Olympian” rationality (coined
in Simon (1983b), p.19) is merely the special case of bounded rationality, and an op-
timization problem is, again, the special case of a satisfiability problem (satisficing),
within the formal framework of metamathematical decision problems.
Apart from making, hopefully, clear distinctions between Modern and Classical
Behavioural Economics, a more faithful encapsulation of Simon’s notions - with clear
computable underpinnings - was presented in this chapter. In continuing work, we are
expanding the scope of Simon’s notions of bounded rationality and satisfying, within a
formal computable formulation, an exercise already begun in Velupillai (2010b) to the
more general and complex cases of combinatorial game theory. Studying, for example,
boundedly rational agents, choosing satisfying strategies in a game of Go will, we
think, form a meaningful milestone in research along this line.
It is even possible to interpret some strands in Simon’s thinking that human be-
ings do try to solve the formally unsolvable problems, evenwhile they somehow find ‘only’
the methods (heuristics) to satisfactorily solve them. This is to say, they try to make
good decisions for only the near future, but with long-term targets in mind. No actual
agent in his or her right mind (sic!) would even dream of formulating infinite horizon
optimization problems in the economic sphere, except of course those endowed with
Olympian notions of rationality, solvability, computability and decidability.
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Chapter 3
Computable Foundations of Bounded
Rationality1
3.1 Introduction
Bounded rationality is the central theme of Classical Behavioural Economics2, cham-
pioned by Herbert Simon. It is now ubiquitously accepted as a replacement for the
otherwise infeasible notion of Olympian rationality, which was strongly disapproved
by Herbert Simon. Contrary to the popular understanding, Simon perceived bounded
rationality as the more general notion compared to Olympian rationality.
It is worth noting that the classical notions of rationality (also Olympian or sub-
stantive rationality) are infeasible both in empirical (human) and theoretical (recursion
theoretic) senses. Bounded rationality, on the other hand, is adequately equipped to
describe the real life decision processes that are of concern in the decision sciences and
can encompass various notions of rationality used in other social sciences and psychol-
ogy. It is inappropriate to simply characterize or formulate the external environments,
and postulate theoretically that the best choices in such cases can always be found by
the agents, before a method is provided explicitly, disregarding the procedural aspects
of solving a problem. Given the difficulties in finding optimal solution in real life, one
of the popularly held views on alternative directions to optimization is that people are
in fact approximating these optimal solutions.
Although bounded rationality has often been defined merely as an implication of
limited cognitive computational capacity by Simon, models of bounded rationality are
far more complex and have deep epistemological implications.
1A modified version of this chapter (co-authored with K. Velupillai) has been published as
Velupillai and Kao (2013).
2It is termed Classical in order to distinguish it from Modern Behavioural Economics. The distinc-
tion and pioneers of these two traditions is discussed in chapter 2 and Kao and Velupillai (2012b). The
distinction of Classical and Modern Behavioural Economics in terms of their different interpretations of
heuristics can be found in Davis (2012). A detailed of historic review of Modern Behavioural Economics
with particular attention to Kahneman and Tverskey’s work can be found in Heukelom (2012).
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If we accept the premise pro tempore that human thinking is a process of com-
posing language out of a set of finite symbols, then the limitation of human thinking
and humanly attainable procedural knowledge are bounded by computability. That is,
there exist some things that human minds can not think, some problems that human
minds can not solve, procedurally.
If one takes into account the actual situations of human decision making, then we
can soon observe that knowing the alternatives in the choice set and their characteristics
are seldom straightforward. Once we know them, the concern is then about the diffi-
culty involved in solving the problem of decision making. Computational complexity
is one of the measures that describes difficulty associated with solving a problem. The
limitations that are associated with economic agents engaging in procedural decision
making is evident when viewed from the vintage point of computability theory and
computational complexity theory. This has direct implications for what we understand
as bounded rationality in the context of decision making where the emphasis is placed
on the ‘method’. This chapter elaborate the motivations of formulating bounded ratio-
nality in terms of computability theory, and strengthening it by invoking insights from
computational complexity theory.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: First, to clarify, interpret and reformulate
bounded rationality, remaining faithful to the definitions and vision of Herbert Simon.
Second, to emphasize that bounded rationality ought to be placed and studied within
a well structured algorithmic context, which Simon had been advocating all his life.
In particular, bounded rationality and satisficing are two important notions that
are highly relevant for understanding decision making in general. The theory of Hu-
man Problem Solving incorporates these two essential themes. Although Simon al-
most never phrased his theories and concepts in terms of computability and compu-
tational complexity theories explicitly, he devoted himself to construct more realistic
boundaries of human rationality, however, always implicitly within the framework of
rationality as being procedural (algorithmic) and in turn, encapsulated by Turing com-
putability and constrained by theories of computational complexity.
This chapter elaborates the computability theoretic underpinnings of the concept
of bounded rationality and discusses the modelling philosophy involved in charac-
terising economic agents. The discussion is proceeded along the lines of Turing com-
putability, computational complexity and heuristics (empirical complexity), which is
in the belief that this route was traversed by Simon, although it is not stated explicitly.
In other words, computability theory and computational complexity theory are more
appropriate as the underpinnings of bounded rationality. While viewing bounded
rationality in the context of human problem solving, three aspects of problem solv-
ing become relevant: the existence of a method, the construction of a method, and
the complexity of a method. This interpretation of bounded rationality can be used
to demonstrate the impossibility and meaninglessness of optimization doctrines that
largely dominates economic modelling and analysis. Moreover, human rationality
should be meaningfully formalized in terms of other, appropriate tools that are faithful
to the phenomena. Amore important message that this chapter hopes to convey is that
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the bounds to human rationality depends on the complexity of different problems that
the problem solver encounters and the research program on Human Problem Solving
initiated by Herbert Simon is precisely along this direction.
In section 3.2, The analysis the definition of bounded rationality and discussions
on satisficing, procedural rationality and heuristics can be found. In section 3.3, the
meeting ground between Turing’s computability and problem solving on the one hand,
and Simon’s work on Human Problem Solving and Information Processing Systems on
the other is explored. Section 3.4 which is the core section of this chapter contains the
computable and procedural underpinnings of bounded rationality.
3.2 Bounded Rationality
The term “bounded rationality” was coined by Herbert Simon in his introduction to
the fourth part of his collected works -Models of Man. He wrote:
“The alternative approach employed in these papers is based on what I
shall call the principle of bounded rationality:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for
objectively rational behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable approxima-
tion to such objective rationality.
If the principle is correct, then the goal of classical economic theory - to
predict the behavior of rational man without making an empirical investi-
gation of his psychological properties - is unattainable.”
Simon (1957), p.198-199, italics in the original
Although the term appeared in 1957, the original idea of bounded rationality can
be found in both Simon (1955, 1956) and eventually traced back to Simon (1947) which
is the revised form of his PhD thesis.
After Simon proposed his initial models of rational behaviour, successive mod-
els of bounded rationality that were developed have been reviewed in March (1978),
showing the many different directions in which it was developed by Simon and others,
its mild extension and reinterpretations. It is necessary to clarify the difference between
modelling human rationality in normative economics, and as it is done in the models
that take real human decision making into account. It is evident from March’s paper
(loc. cit) that the sprouts of distortion and deviation from Simon’s notion of bounded
rationality has already appeared by then. Often, any inconsistent behaviour with re-
spect to normative rationality is perceived as a mistake from the part of the agent.
Consequently, bounded rationality has been explained as the mistake or short coming
of human beings that arises due to a variety of factors (largely psychological) for about
50 years. Modern behavioural economics is not the only field that considers bounded
rationality as a compromised concept from normative rationality. For example,
36 Chapter 3
“Alternatively, one can recall all of the deviations from normative spec-
ifications as stupidity, errors that should be corrected; and undertake to
transform the style of exciting humans into the styles anticipated by the
theory. This has, for the most part, been the strategy of operations andman-
agement analysis for the past twenty years; and it has had its successes. But
it has also had failures.”
March (1978), p.597
Although on the surface of it, Simon’s descriptions of bounded rationality might seem
that the existence of a ‘bound’ is simply due to the limitations of psychological nature
in human decision making, however, one figures out that this is an obvious concept to
mathematised economics when one engages on a serious study of his Theory of Hu-
man Problem Solving. When we consider both the decision maker and the aspects of
the associated environment, bounded rationality emerges naturally within such a set-
ting. Given the characteristics of the environment and the decision maker, “satisficing”
(first used in Simon (1956)) is the reasonable action to be pursued in a procedurally ra-
tional decision making setting, and heuristics are the means through which satisficing
behaviour becomes possible.
Later, through the interpretation of the principle of bounded rationality, with
computable foundations, where it be clear that bounded rationality is neither irra-
tionality (Simon, 1957, p.200) nor approximate optimality (Simon, 1972, p.170).
3.2.1 Simon’s bounded rationality
The models of rational decision making suggested in Simon (1955, 1956) do not require
utility functions to be defined over the alternatives. They provide some important
ideas regarding how a boundedly rational entity could be modelled. In Simon (1955),
a simplified value function V(·) which takes only two values (1,0) was introduced.
The binary values can be associated with “satisfactory and unsatisfactory”, “accept
and reject”, etc. The domain of function V is S, the set of all possible outcomes which
is mapped to A, a set of all behavioural alternatives. This is in order to distinguish the
means from the ends. The rational decision-process is defined as
1. Search for a set of possible outcomes S′ ⊆ S such that the pay-off function is
satisfactory (V(s) = 1), ∀s ∈ S′
2. Search for behavioural alternatives a ∈ A′, whose possible outcomes are all in S′
through the mapping.
This process does not guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a solution, until
the sequence in which the alternatives arrive and the dynamics of aspiration levels (a
psychological concept) are incorporated into it.
In real life, the alternatives are often examined sequentially and the first satisfac-
tory alternative evaluated is the one that is selected. The difficulty of discovering a
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satisfactory choice depends on the cost of obtaining better information regarding the
mapping of A on S. Thus, if the aspiration level grows when the cost of search is
low and declines when the cost of search is high, then this dynamic can lead to near-
uniqueness and existence of a solution in the long run3.
In Simon (1955), the focus is on suggesting a dynamic process for decision mak-
ers, without going into the details of the mapping between A and S. However, in
Simon (1956), the focus is more on the other important aspect - the environment. The
problem setting in this paper provides a general platform for constructing more elab-
orate models. Here, the organism is assumed to have a single and a fixed aspiration
level - it needs only food. But, the food heaps are located in such a way that the or-
ganism has to walk in a maze where there are branches after each nodes. Each node
is a possible location for food. This is combined with the constraint that its vision is
limited and therefore it cannot see as far as it would like. However, if it sees a food
heap in the range of its vision, it knows the way to reach the food. It has to eat the food
before it dies of starvation and there is a maximal number of moves it can make after
eating before its energy runs out. These are some of the parameters4 regarding the
environment that the organism faces and the “physical” constrains that the organism
has:
• p: 0 < p < 1, is the percentage of branch points, randomly distributed, at which
food is found.
• d: is the average number of paths diverging from each branch point.
• ν: is the number of moves ahead the organism can see.
• H: is the maximum number of moves the organism can make between meals
without starving.
The first two parameters concern the environment (problem space), on how the targets
are distributed and how big the problem space is. The last two parameters are regard-
ing the organism on how far it can search and the capacity it can spend on searching.
With these parameters, Simon was able to demonstrate the probability that the organ-
ism can not survive.
This setting can be applied to a much broader class of problems. The parameters
do not have to be limited only by physical needs and constraints. Especially, the proba-
bility is not central in many realistic cases of decision making for Simon. For example,
3A similar modelling logic can be found in a simple job search model in McCall (1970). McCall’s
models contain the idea of the aspiration level which is attached to the variables that are concerned by
job searcher when deciding to accept the job offers or not. The model demonstrate the negative relation
between the desired level of wage and the cost of information. Besides, it is also suggested in McCall’s
paper (loc. cit) that non-adaptive behaviour could account for persistent unemployment in the period
of recession (p.122). However the processes which exhibits the adaptive policy of decision maker is not
the main concern in the current paper.
4These parameters are algebraic, rational numbers or other computable numbers.
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in chess, a game that was studied intensively by Simon, the goals (some particular
patterns) that a player might seek are not randomly distributed in the problem space.
Integrating the models in the two papers mentioned above, we can summarize
the situation of rational decision making postulated by Simon as the following: There
are always two aspects of decision making - the environment and the mechanism of
the decision maker. The two aspects are highly interrelated. The characteristics of the
environment or the problem space are the following:
• The alternatives are associated to discrete values
• The alternatives or the offers come in a sequence, while the order is not necessar-
ily known
• The alternatives are of combinatorial nature in some cases
The characteristics of decision makers are
• Satisficing. (They are influenced by aspiration levels)
• Limited computational capacities ( such as time and memory )
• Use of heuristics to search
• Some knowledge or clue regarding the stopping rule for searching ( starting from
any node)
• Adapting aspiration levels
• Knowledge of what to choose and what not to choose
The problem space is viewed as one that is like a tree, and this is ’explored’ by the
decision maker. This problem step-up of ’searching in a tree’ is probably inspired from
the means-end schema proposed in chapter IV of Simon (1947). In Simon’s view, the
description of the environment depends on the needs, drive and goals of the decision
maker. This seems to underpin his ‘maze’ metaphor that many problems in life are
like searching in a maze. Therefore, human decision making, which is part of human
thinking activity, can be associated in fertile ways to many deep areas, such as, com-
puter science, graph theory, formal logic, etc. The quotation below makes it clear that
bounded rationality, which is grounded on the combinatorial nature of problem spaces
in the real world, can lead to different frontiers.
“Informally, a maze is a set of rooms connected by one way corridors.
Certain rooms are designated goal rooms and one room is designated the
start room. Thus, a maze is a directed graph with certain nodes or rooms
distinguished. The maze is threadable if there is a path from the start room
to some goal room”
Savitch (1970), p.187
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It is important to note that the probabilities that are used to calculate the likeli-
hood of failing to survive or finding a solution in the model discussed earlier are trivial
or meaningless in many real life problems:
“From a still a third standpoint, the chess player’s difficulty in behaving
rationally has nothing to do with uncertainty - whether of consequences or
alternatives - but is a matter of complexity. For there is no risk or uncer-
tainty, in the sense in which those terms are used in economics or statistical
decision theory, in the game of chess. As von Neumann and Morgenstern
observe, it is a game of perfect information. No probabilities of future events
need enter the calculations, and no contingencies, in a statistical sense, arise.
From a game-theoretical standpoint, the presence of the opponent does
not introduce contingencies. The opponent can always be counted on to do
his worst. The point becomes clear if we replace the task of playing chess
with the task of proving theorems. In the latter task, there is no opponent.
Nor are there contingencies: the true and the derivable theorems reside
eternally in Plato’s heaven. Rationality in theorem proving is a problem
only because the maze of possible proof paths is vast and complex.”
Simon (1972), p.170, italics added.
However, it is debatable whether the opponent can be counted on to do the worst
in games like Chess. The search space of games like Chess or Go are already certain,
but only waiting to be discovered. We can also view the opponent as using heuristics
in her own mind, in order to decide what the possible reacting moves of his opponent
will be. Facing such uncertainty as complexity, the decision maker has to incorporate
some mechanisms for her to terminate the searching process. This leads to satisficing5.
Many problems have relatively closed and a pre-defined problem space, though
the problem space (tree) may be massive. There are many other problems which are
far more complex, for example, finding a particular quotation amongst the books in a
library. However, most of the time, the material that one is looking for is just in the
vicinity, but it is hard to find a good heuristic to reach it.
Satisficing and Optimizing
Satisficing is the other pillar on which Simon’s behavioural economics stands on. Here,
the decision maker does not look for an optimal choice, where the ‘procedure’ of search
will itself lead him/her to choose a satisfactory outcome as and when one encounters
it. This would mean that even though there might be an outcome that could yield a
higher level of satisfaction, the choice process stops once a ‘good enough’ alternative
that matches the aspiration level is met. Simon also comments on the relation between
satisficing and optimizing and that the latter is a special case of the former.
5Minimax is such satisficier.
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“A satisficing decision procedure can often be turned into a procedure
for optimizing by introducing a rule for optimal amount of search, or, what
amounts to the same thing, a rule for fixing the aspiration level optimally....
Although such a translation is formally possible, to carry it out in prac-
tice requires additional information and assumptions beyond those needed
for satisficing”
Simon (1972), p.170
For a decision maker, the act of optimization would require a before-hand knowl-
edge of all the available options and the associated outcomes. Moreover, she also re-
quires a method for listing all the options and to compare each of them. When the
decision maker is confronted with multiple goals, then association between choice and
outcomes gets even more complex. As Simon remarks, this is both unrealistic and
excessively demanding (Simon, 1956, p.136). Simon further emphasizes that the opti-
mizing approach facing real-life complexity is indeed approximate optimization. The
statisficing approach, on the other hand, is linked with the dynamics of aspiration lev-
els and tackles the problem very differently.
Procedural and Substantive Rationality
Although we do try hard to make a good choice, when in the face of time constraints, it
is also likely that a choice just made is bad or disappointing. Furthermore, even though
we may know our goals and sub-goals, it does not mean that we know ‘how’ to attain
them. Even if we have an abstract map of a city, and we would like to travel from A to
B, it does not actually mean that we can reach B from A without any difficulty. We still
have to work through the paths, follow the signs, check the map, etc.
When we begin to claim that “This decision maker is satisficing.”, the next ques-
tion we may ask primarily becomes “What are the procedures that the decision maker
uses?”, instead of “What does the decision maker choose?”. The fundamental distinc-
tion between Simon’s approach and the other theories that invoke behavioural traits,
such as the modern behavioural economics, is the insistence on ‘methods’ or ‘proce-
dures’ involved in choosing and their centrality in the theory of decision making. The
link between a procedurally rational choice and computation is present from the very
outset in Simon’s scheme. The insistence here is on the complexity of this decision
process, in terms of the effort devoted in doing it.
“The search for computational efficiency is a search for procedural ratio-
nality, and computational mathematics is a normative theory of such ratio-
nality. In this normative theory, there is no point in prescribing a particular
substantively rational solution in there exists no procedure for finding that
solution with an acceptable amount of computing effort.”
Simon (1976), p.133
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An important way to procedural rationality for it to be reasonable and illuminat-
ing, is to observe how problem solvers come up with solutions in reality.
Heuristics
Since it is evident that during the course of decision making, procedures, either in
terms thinking or action are involved, understanding decision making would require
a knowledge of these procedures. The question then is to ask, what these procedures are
and how these procedures present themselves in the context of decision making, how
they are discovered and develop dynamically over time. Simon calls these procedures
heuristics6, which are nothing but methods to achieve some goals. They can be dis-
covered by oneself, taught by teachers or forced by regulations. A clever remark on
heuristics is that “a method is simply a plan that you use twice” (Newell and Simon
(1972), p.835). That is, heuristics represents the methods that human beings actually
use to search in a problem space. They are nothing but algorithms.
“Most weak methods require larger or smaller amounts of search be-
fore problem solutions are found, but the search need not be blind trial-
and-error–in fact, usually cannot be, for the search spaces are generally far
too vast to allow unselective trial and error to be effective. Weak methods
generally incorporate Polya’s idea of “heuristics”–rules of thumb that al-
low search generators to be highly selective, instead of searching the entire
space.”
Simon (1983a), p.4570
It is quite obvious that heuristics are heavily associated with one’s experience,
knowledge and cognitive capacity. In terms of decision making among finite alterna-
tives, whose mapping between actions and outcomes is combinatorial, heuristics are
used in the following three respects.
• What to generate?
• How to evaluate?
• When to stop?
These heuristics are in fact algorithms whose commands should be executed step
by step and this is evident from the general approach that underpins Newell and Si-
mon’s theory of Human Problem Solving. Algorithms are formally connected to sym-
bolic structures which are underpinned by computability theory. Physical symbolic
systems such as human beings and digital computers, as Newell and Simon pointed
out, can process only a finite number of steps in any given interval of time. How-
ever, the finiteness to which the most general model of algorithms - Turing Machine
6He called them “rules of thumb” until he got to know the term “heuristics” from Polya (Polya, 1945).
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- appeals is in many cases not strong enough to show the severe limitation that hu-
man minds have to confront (Newell and Simon, 1976, p. 120). Empirical boundaries
correspond to the level of complexity that the human minds can actually handle. A
study of heuristics is crucial in order to understand how human beings handle prob-
lems whose complexity is beyond the empirical boundary. In other words, heuristics
act as procedures that help reduce the problem to a level of complexity which can be
handled.
The approach described in Human Problem Solving that encompasses heuristics
is underpinned by computational complexity theory, which in turn is based on com-
putability theory. Moreover, the significance of heuristics is not revealed until some
algorithmic impossibilities concerned with procedural decision making are formally
proved. To further explore this connection, we need to examine the interconnections
between the approaches of Turing and Herbert Simon, which is attempted in the next
two sections.
3.3 From Turing to Simon: decision making as problem
solving
The ground where bounded rationality and computability meet is comprehensively
presented in Newell and Simon (1972), where symbolic systems can be adopted to un-
derstand human thinking, especially in the activities of information processing. In the
theory of Human Problem Solving, the vague idea of an “environment” is precisely
formulated into a “problem space” and a problem solver into an Information Process-
ing System. In addition to Simon’s approach, the notion of “complex problems” (ap-
pearing in the definition of Bounded Rationality by Simon) needs to be given a precise
definition, and it is done within the context of Turing’s computability theory and com-
putational complexity theory.
The word “computer” in this chapter is used interchangeably to refer to human
computer (mind) and digital computer.
“Moreover, since Homo sapiens shares some important psychological in-
variants with certain nonbiological systems - the computers - I shall want to
make frequent reference to them also. One could even say that my account
will cover the topic human and computer psychology.”
Simon (1990a), p.3, italics in the original.
The crucial element here is to capture the link between the intuitive notion of
thinking that is involved in deciding or problem solving, and the structured machine
that can replicate this. For this, there should also be a formal notion that encapsulates
this intuitive notion. This was achieved by the seminal works of Alan Turing, through
a formal definition of algorithm and a mechanism to encapsulate the intuitive notion
of effective computation in the form of Turing machines. This, in turn, forms the intel-
lectual backdrop in which Simon and Newell developed their theory.
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Man and Machine
The relationship between man and machine has also been discussed philosophically.
One can look back at the discussions along the lineage of Philosophy of Mind back
to Aristotle, Descartes and other precursors. More specifically, the investigation on
the man-machine metaphor is inspired by the mechanistic debates which belong to a
branch of Philosophy of Mind (Shapiro, 2003; Feferman, 2009). In order to extend the
argument on mind and computation in this chapter more intuitively, one of the inten-
tions that make people built machines can be emphasised. Boring (1946) suggested that
a good way to understand ourselves as a creature which has conciousness is to build
machines or robots which behave just like us. For achieving this, different questions
have to be asked successively and we have to answer these questions by introspection.
This intention drives the triangular relationship among artificial intelligence, psychol-
ogy and computer science.
In many circumstances, thinking is highly dependent on languages, despite that
the exact relationship between language and thinking is still controversial and vague.
Languages are sets of strings which are composed of symbols from finite sets (Sipser
(1997), p.14). Simon was aware of the importance of language and the possibility of
linking that to the idea of problem solving in the economic sphere, through a model of
computation proposed by Turing (Simon (1991b), p. 192-193).
Once this view of relating thinking to the process of symbolic computation is
adopted, then the other pieces of the theory fall in place. The notions of what is achiev-
able, procedurally (algorithmically) solvable, the level of complexity that one can han-
dle becomes clear. In the problem solving environment, modern digital computers
have already acquired the abilities that human beings have, such as recognizing sym-
bols, store, copy and compare symbols. Another common feature of computers and
human beings is that they are both finite serial (symbolic) processors, and this property
shows that they are fundamentally the same systems. Simon stressed the infeasibility
of a procedure of optimization by showing that digital computers which overpower
human beings in terms of their physical computational capacity find their strength
insignificant in front of the complexity of real world problems (Simon (1976), p.135).
Understanding our own limits is one of the lessons we obtain from digital com-
puters. The same logic should be applied to economic decision makers, as Simon sug-
gested in the following:
“The humanmind is programmable: it can acquire an enormous variety
of different skills, behaviour patterns, problem solving repertoires, and per-
ceptual habits.....There seems to be no escape. If economics is to deal with
uncertainty, it will have to understand how human beings in fact behave in
the face of uncertainty, and bywhat limits of information and computability
they are bound.”
Simon (1976), p. 144
One of the recurrent questions that sceptics ask is whether machines can also
have emotions which play nontrivial roles in the real decision making circumstances.
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Simon has acknowledged this point very early on in Simon (1967). Simon claimed
that emotions do play a very important role in behaviour and decision making and
suggested ways in which emotions can be incorporated into Information Processing
Systems. As for exploring the roles of emotion in cognitive modelling, Simon considers
that emotion is a gross phenomena or a category of diverse mechanisms among which
“interruption mechanism” can be effectively modelled. However, emotion in decision
making is not the focus of the thesis, thus this issue will not be discussed in detail in
this thesis.
Simon’s many approaches (by viewing the problem solver as an information pro-
cessing system) to develop models of satisficing and bounded rationality are deeply
influenced by Turing’s invention of the machine (possibly abstract) operating on sym-
bols to understand the behaviour of human thinking. When Turing wrote “computer”,
he really meant “human computer”; the first digital computer was not even born by
then! We can add more theoretical rigour to Simon’s distinction of satisficing and opti-
mization by appealing to Turing’s computability. We examine three different versions
of bounded rationality below - computability theory, computational complexity theory
and finally in terms of the theory of Human Problem Solving.
3.4 Computable Foundation of Bounded Rationality
In this section, the focus is on suggesting a computable foundation for bounded ratio-
nality. The building blocks can be initiated by relating the setting in the paper to that
of another famous ‘decision problem’ - Hilbert’s 10th problem and the idea of general
procedure for solving decision problems and the formal definition of the notion of a ‘fi-
nite process’. The insights can be drawn from the last published paper of Alan Turing
dealing with solvable and unsolvable problems. This provides a link between Turing’s
work on computability and Simon’s work on human decision making as problem solv-
ing, where computation and procedures (algorithms) take a centre stage. Complexity
of decision making is analysed within this framework.
“Theories that incorporate constraints on the information-processing ca-
pacities of the actor may be called theories of bounded rationality”
Simon (1972), p.162
There are three aspects on which the theories of bounded rationality are anchored.
They are solvability of the problem, difficulty of this solvable problem and the heuristics
that are used to deal with this complexity, i.e., the computational complexity measur-
ing the difficulty of a solvable problem.
3.4.1 Solvable and Unsolvable Problems
Let us begin with Hilbert’s 10th problem - a decision problem, which was posed by
the mathematician David Hilbert in 1900 as one of the 23 problems that were posed as
challenges for 20th century mathematics and mathematicians.
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“Given a Diophantine equation with any number of unknown quanti-
ties and with rational integral numerical coefficients: To devise a process
according to which it can be determined by a finite number of operations whether
the equation is solvable in rational integers.”
Hilbert,1900, Paris, Second International Congress of Mathematicians,
italics added, Devlin (1988), p.141
This problem could not be answered without a formal definition of “a process ac-
cording towhich it can be determined by a finite number of operations” in other words,
an algorithm. Until about 1936-1937, when the definitions of such a finite procedure
were defined, the mathematicians had only an intuitive notion of an algorithm.
Although Turing does not seem to have made an attempt to solve Diophantine
decision problem, he created the Turing Machine for solving another decision problem
posed by Hilbert in 1928 (Turing, 1936) and theoretical developments based on Turing
machines contributed eventually to the negative solution of Hilbert’s 10th problem, 70
years after the question was posed. The decision problem that concerned Turing was
general: Is there a systematic procedure to decide whether a given problem(puzzle)
is solvable or not?7 This decision problem regards all those problems which can be
transformed into substitution puzzles. The answer to this was proved to be negative
by Turing 8. The negative solution to this decision problem indicates that we need to
develop specific procedures in order to decide specific problems. There is no general
solution - i.e., algorithmic procedure - to any given problem. This has a direct bearing
on the theories of decision making that rely on optimization, without addressing the
procedural aspects.
In order to understand how he arrived at the negative solution, let us have a close
look at the problem setting:
“Given any puzzle we can find a corresponding substitution puzzle which
is equivalent to it in the sense that given a solution of the one we can easily use
it to find a solution of the other. If the original puzzle is concerned with rows of
pieces of a finite number of different kinds,then the substitution may be applied as
an alternative set of rules to the pieces of the original puzzle. A transformation can
be carried out by the rules of the original puzzle if and only if it can be carried
out by the substitutions and leads to a final position from which all marker symbols
have disappeared.”
Turing (1954) p.15, italics in the original.
He further wrote “In effect there is no opposition to the view that every puzzle is
equivalent to a substitution puzzle.”9
7In computability theory, this could be translated as “Is there amachine bywhich one can tell whether
a set of languages is recognizable?”
8The formal definition of substitution puzzle - algorithm - was defined during 1936-7 as mentioned
in Turing (1954) by several people - Turing, Church, Post and others - at about the same time.
9See Turing (1954), p.13 for the example of a substitution puzzle.
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The production rules10 that are introduced in Turing’s example follow type 0
grammar11, though, the time at which Turing proposed it was before the Chomsky
hierarchy was defined (Chomsky, 1956, 1959).
Type 0 grammar is the superset of the hierarchy and includes all recursively enu-
merable languages. Turing Machines are the most general kind of symbol operators
which are capable of recognizing the languages generated from all types of grammar.
In order to prove that there is no systematic procedure to decide, when given
any puzzle, whether the puzzle is solvable or not, Turing claimed that there are two
equivalences:
• The equivalence between the puzzles and the substitution puzzles.
• The equivalence between the substitution puzzles and the systematic procedures.
A substitution puzzle consists of its set of rules (substitution pairs) and starting
position. And a systematic procedure is a puzzle in which there is never more than
one possible move in any of the positions which arise and in which some significance
is attached to the final result. The puzzle described for systematic procedure is also
called “the puzzle with unambiguous moves.”
Then this kind of “puzzle with unambiguous moves” is applied in the argument
to prove the negative answer to the existence of a systematic procedure for deciding
the solvability of a puzzle. Before he started to prove, he transformed the sentences
of the set of rules into the same form of the starting position, i.e., a string of symbols.
Therefore, there are many different strings that can actually represent the same set of
rules of a substitution puzzle. We can represent a puzzle as P(R, S), where R is the
row of symbols describing rules and S is the starting position. It is reasonable that
the puzzle P(R, R) is also considerable, that is the starting position is the same string
of the row of symbols describing rules. Provided that the puzzles being discussed are
those with unambiguousmoves, then these puzzleswill be substituted with their rules,
step by step, until no rules can be carried out, and report a certain result. In Turing’s
example, it is eitherW or B. That is to say, P(R, R) has as its final result eitherW or B,
it cannot have both possibilities. This kind of puzzles are classified into two classes:
• Class I is to consist of sets R of rules, which represent puzzles with unambiguous
moves, and such P(R, R) comes out with the end resultW.
• Class II is to include all other cases, i.e.. either P(R, R) does not come out, or
comes out with the end result B, or else R does not represent a puzzle with un-
ambiguous moves. We may also , if we wish, include in this class sequences of
symbols such as BBBBB which do not represent a set of rules at all12.
10Its formalism can be traced back to Post (1947)
11For the formal definition of grammar, see Tourlakis (1984), p.256
12Maybe the class should include the situation such asWW, which is a result of the puzzle when no
rule can be further applied to it.
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It is assumed that there exists a systematic procedure for deciding whether a puz-
zle is solvable or not. At the same time, this systematic procedure can be transformed
into a substitution puzzle whose set of rules is K. Naturally, K has unambiguous moves
and it always comes out with final result no matter what R, the puzzle of interest, is.
In particular, it will come out with, say B, when R belongs to class I, andW when it be-
longs to class II. Then, when we look at the puzzle P(K,K) to be investigated, we will
find inconsistent results. That is, we should be able to classify that P(K,K) belongs to
class I or II. But according to the substitution puzzle K, it has the potential to come out
both possibilities, as a result, we could not classify it into either of the two classes. This
leads to a contradiction!
This demonstration towards showing that there is no general algorithm for de-
ciding whether a puzzle is solvable or not suggests that we need to seek for separate
algorithms in order to decide whether a kind of problem is solvable or not, given the
initial puzzle and the desired outcome.
At this point, it should be possible to move on to introduce the formal definition
of a substitution puzzle, which sheds light on Hilbert’s 10th problem.
Undecidable Decision Problems
Definition 3. Decision problem: as to the existence of an algorithm for deciding the truth or
falsity of a whole class of statements . . . A positive solution to a decision problem consists of
giving an algorithm for solving it; a negative solution consists of showing that no algorithm for
solving the problem exists, or, as we shall say, that the problem is unsolvable.
It should be noted that when Turing developed his intuitive idea of computation,
he always took into account the natural limitations of (thinking) human beings. A
Turing machine13 can be seen as the mathematical formalism of a human computer.
In Turing (1954), he stressed the importance of having formal definitions or rep-
resentation of “a problem” and a “systematic procedure”. Turing had shown mathe-
matically that there exists unsolvable decision problems by using both Cantor’s diag-
onaliztion method and letting the supposedly existing machine encounter itself and
leading to a contradiction involving the halting problem. He was able to prove that
the halting problem is unsolvable.
13A description of a Universal Turing Machine:
“It is possible to invent a single machine which can be used to compute any computable
sequence. If this machine U is supplied with a tape on the beginning of which is written
the S.D of some computing machine M, then U will compute the same sequence as M.”
Turing (1936), p.241-2
Here, “S.D.” denotes the standard description which is a transformation of a sequence of quintuple in-
structions, e.g. qiSiSjLqm; . . . (meaning the current state qi, the scanned symbol Si, printed symbol Sj,
move to the left, successive state qm) by encoding the sequence into a sequence of letters. The commonly




Church defined algorithm (effective calculability) with the λ-calculus, and Turing de-
fined it in terms of Turing Machines. They were proved to be equivalent definitions
and the intuitive notion of algorithm captured by these definitions imply the so-called
Church-Turing Thesis. If this thesis is true, then the halting problem for Turing ma-
chines is unsolvable. Church (1938) mentioned that the intuitive notion of a effective
procedure can be formalized into three different ways: TuringMachines (Turing, 1936),
λ-definability (Church, 1936) and the general recursive function (Kleene, 1936a). The
equivalence of the three notions had been proved in Kleene (1936b) and Turing (1937).
The equivalence of recursiveness and computability enables us to apply the definition
of recursive function to prove more classes of computable functions. (see Davis, 1958,
Ch.3)
“Concurrently with Turing’s work appeared the work of the logicians
Emil Post and (independently) Alonzo Church. Starting from independent
notions of logistic systems (Post productions and recursive function, respec-
tively), they arrived at analogous results on undecidability and universality
- results that were soon shown to imply that all three systems were equiva-
lent”
Newell and Simon (1976), p.117
The consensus on the notion of effective calculability was reached in the late 1930s
and this led to the development of computability theory. Both Herbert Simon andAlan
Newell were recipients of the Turing Award in 1975 for their contribution to the human
problem solving approach, which they initiated in the mid 1950s together with Cliff
Shaw. It is evident that their work, where computation plays an important role, was
grounded on Turing’s contributions.
Hilbert’s Tenth Problem is Unsolvable
Definition 4. A set S of ordered n-tuples of positive integers is called Diophantine if there is
a polynomial P(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . ym) where m ≥ 0, with integer coefficients such that a given
n-tuple < x1, . . . , xn > belongs to S if and only if there exist positive integers y1, . . . , ym for
which
P(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) = 0
The “negative solution” to Hilbert’s tenth problem was finally proved by Yuri
Matiyasevich in 1970. He proved it by applying the Fibonacci sequence to the hy-
potheses and theorems built along this line by Martin Davis, Hilary Putnam and Julia
Robinson14. The solvability of Diophantine equations has been applied to many di-
verse problems. The first application of this in the context of economic theory was by
14For more details, see Matiyasevich (1994)
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Velupillai. One of the notable applications is in the context of effective playability of
Arithmetical Games 15.
For the empirical concerns, unsolvability of a problem does not really stop people
from looking for a solution for it. The following quotation shows the pros and cons of
proving the unsolvability of a problem:
“After all, showing that a problem is unsolvable doesn’t appear to be
any use if you have to solve it. You need to study this phenomenon for two
reasons. First, knowing when a problem is algorithmically unsolvable is
useful because then you realize that the problem must be simplified or al-
tered before you can find an algorithmic solution. Like any tool, computers
have capabilities and limitations that must be appreciated if they are to be
used well. The second reason is cultural. Even if you deal with problems
that clearly are solvable, a glimpse of the unsolvable can stimulate your
imagination and help you gain an important perspective on computation.”
Sipser (1997), p.151, italic added.
The cultural reason appeared in the above quotation is relevant for us to understand
how bounded rationality is underpinned by computability theory.
Simon was concerned both empirical and theoretical questions of decision mak-
ing and he grounded himself on the basis of Turing Computability. He later looked
for computational complexity in average cases or empirical complexity that is relevant
for human problem solving. Now that we have seen that there exist algorithmically
unsolvable decision problems, we can appreciate how Turing computability should be
the outer limit for human rationality or machine computability. Anything that goes
beyond Turing computability is clearly meaningless (especially for procedural deci-
sion making) since even the most powerful abstract computing machine cannot solve
such a problem, even in principle. But this can only be an outer boundary of how
far procedural rationality can go in theory because the notion of pure computability
in theory does not take into account time and space limitations, which are essential
to solve a problem or compute a function. They become particularly important in the
case of human decision making. This only reinforces the conclusions and strengthens
the concepts that Simon advocated.
3.4.2 Computational Complexity
Before we start to look for the solution for a problem, it is natural for us to ask whether
it is solvable or not, though in most of the cases, we have to try to solve them anyway.
It is also intuitive that there are fairly easy problems and difficult ones. Equivalently,
we can determine that the problem space of a given problem is more complex than
others. Unless we have better heuristics, it is reasonable to say that the more complex
problem is going to take more time and effort. Simon offered some insights on how
15Velupillai (See 2000, p.108)
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to describe complexity which can be associated with computational complexity, which
itself is based on computability theory:
“How complex or simple a structure is depends critically upon the way
in which we describe it. Most of the complex structures found in the world
are enormously redundant, and we can use this redundancy to simplify
their description. But to use it, to achieve the simplification, we must find
the right representation.”
Simon (1962), p.481
The above fragment can be interpreted in terms of computational complexity theory,
where the complexity of a problem is determined by the time and space requirements
of an algorithm that solves the problem. The rigorous definitions on time and space
complexity and those of different complexity classes can be found, for example, in
chapter 7 & 8 in Sipser (1997).
There are three aspects of problem solving: the inherent solvability of a problem,
the procedure to solve a problem and the complexity of the procedure. Provided we
have Turing’s abstract model of computation, we can use this idea to construct an
abstract machine for solving a particular problem. We can then analyse the number
of steps or memory that the algorithm would require, approximately, without going
about to count the precise time and space required by the problems of the same kind.
This helps us to have an idea of the associated difficulty of a problem we are dealing
with before we really start to solve it. Computational complexity provides a more
solid, inner boundary of bounded rationality with Turing computability as its outer
boundary. Although the scale of time steps and space (memory) that computational
complexity theory regards is normally pretty large, it is important to have a general
idea of tackling a problem by knowing the complexity of the algorithm which solves
it. In theory, the reducibility among problems is also used to study the complexity
without actually constructing a real algorithm.
As far as problem solving is concerned, according to Turing’s interpretation, a
decision problem is to decidewhether one can change a string of symbols to the desired
string of symbols, by only using a set of rules that are given in advance. Knowing that
a decision problem is unsolvable leads us to ask different questions and try to solve
them, otherwise, it provides no practical help whenwe try to solve a problem. We need
to find a set of rules for a substitution puzzle, that is “algorithm”, to solve our problem.
However, even if we have an algorithm to solve a certain kind of problem, it does not
guarantee that we can solve the problem within the desirable period of time. If the
problem involved is complex, it can demand immense amount of computation by the
problem solver. Time complexity and space complexity are very useful and standard
tools for providing measures of quantitative ideas on how much effort is needed for
solving a problem.
When we have an algorithm for solving a problem, we can look at its general be-
haviour and analyse how many time steps and the space or memory it would require.
Time complexity tells the number of steps needed for running an algorithm, and space
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complexity takes care of the memory needed. Time and space complexity are the func-
tions of size of input, for example, playing 3-disk Tower of Hanoi needs much less time
steps than 10-disk Tower of Hanoi. In many cases, it is very difficult to obtain the exact
reduced form of time and space complexity of an algorithm. Therefore, in computa-
tional complexity, asymptotic notations, such as O(n), are used to present the asymp-
totic behaviour of an algorithm as the asymptotic approximation of the true function
behind it. When large inputs are concerned, exponential time grows drastically faster
than polynomial time, and the problem becomes unmanageable very quickly.
It should be remembered that there exist always more than one method to solve
a problem, therefore, the complexity of a problem is determined by the method that
solves it16. The complexity of a problem mentioned in theory are associated with the
complexity of the most efficient algorithm ever found. Precise computational com-
plexity in time and space is very hard to attain, but it can be approximated. It can be
approximately estimated by constructing an abstract machine for solving a problem
and analysing the order of growth of complexity of that machine.
Space Complexity
Space complexity has attracted relatively less attention and effort compared to time
complexity, despite the powerful result that PSPACE = NPSPACE17 . By default,
when the complexity of a problem is discussed, time complexity is the one that is re-
ferred to. Arguably, it is because whether P = NP is one of most popular unsolved
problems. One of the claims in this chapter is that in the domain of human problem
solving, space complexity is at least as important as time complexity. Although, there
is no doubt that the architecture of human brain has the potential to store huge amount
of knowledge, the amount of information that minds can process at a given moment is
severely limited.
For example, it is very tough to calculate 4593 ∗ 3274 in the mind for an ordinary
person, unless this person has pencil and paper at hand or he/she is an expert of arith-
metic calculations. Such calculation requires a certain amount of temporary memory
which is a function of input size. In terms of time limitation, minds are constrained by
attention span, apart from other externally imposed time constraints, eg. a chess player
has to make a move in 5 minutes. How minds are constrained by time and memory
varies with different contexts and structure of the problems and among different per-
sons. Furthermore, these two dimensions should not be completely independent, i.e.
the memory constraints affects the time which is needed for solving a problem and vice
versa. Therefore, it is important to investigate the time complexity of a problem (or an
algorithm) together with the space complexity; consequently, we will be able to know
what kinds of heuristics are needed based on these two dimensions. Space complexity
is even more crucial when the problem concerned requires no aid of external memory.
16Sipser (See 1997, p. 229-231), for an example.
17This is implied by the first theorem in Savitch (1970).
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In spite of the fact that the time and space complexity of an algorithm can be
analysed, human beings are constrained very differently from (digital) computers. We
normally have only a certain amount of time to make a decision, and we have very
limited working memory (no matter expert or layman) to process this task, regardless
of the presumably unlimited long-term memory. We are forced to use those algorithms
which will be able to halt within certain amount of time, by applying the knowledge
and experience we have in the long-termmemory. Although, we are often assigned to a
task like “find the best person for this job”, we are not able to solve it as an optimization
problem. At best, we will have the criteria for appropriate candidates and consider
only a small group of people. Depending on the time and memory we are supplied
with and the procedure we should go through, we have to be selective to different
degrees.
Complexity of Combinatorial Games
Turing (1951) suggested that a machine (e.g. Boring’s robot metaphor, see Boring
(1946), p.177) should be programmed to learn to play the games like Chess, Go and
Bridge. Newell and Simon initiated the project on creating a program which learns to
play good Chess in 1954. While they pinned down the investigation of heuristics on
proving theorems in Principia Mathematica to start with. The program they designed
was hand-simulated first and interpreted into machine language which gave birth to
the Logic Theoristwhich was the first example of human problem solving (Newell et al.,
1958a). However, Logic Theorist’s success was rejected by Kleene for it contributed
nothing new and it also received an unjust criticism from Hao Wang:
“There is no need to kill a chicken with a butcher’s knife. Yet the net
impression is that Newell-Shaw-Simon failed even to kill the chicken with
their butcher’s knife. ... To argue the superiority of ‘heuristic’ over algorith-
mic methods by choosing a particularly inefficient algorithm seems hardly
just.”
Wang (1970) p.227
It was a unfortunate that Wang had misunderstood Simon’s attempts (Simon (1990b),
p.209-210). Newell and Simon were involved in finding procedures used by human
beings and used this information to construct the program Logic Theorist. What are
hueristics, if not algorithms?
Chess is the recurring example and an important one for Simon, it is also one
of the examples of complex combinatorial problems18 which make brute-force algo-
rithms infeasible. Even though the problem space of chess is closed and certain, the
massive size of the game tree prevents human beings or even supercomputers to use
brute search algorithm. Let us take the number of the possible continuations of Chess,
which is approximated in Shannon (1950) as an example. If we want to know, from the
18For a brief definition of combinatorial problems, see Moret and Shapiro (1991), p. 1-2
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beginning of the game, whether Black orWhite has a winning strategy, we have roughly
10120 variations to calculate; when each branch reaches its end, we can see whether that
branches leads to awin, loss or a draw. Suppose we have a high-speed computer which
uses only one microsecond (10−6 a second) for one variation, for searching the whole
problem space, it will take 10100 million years! Obviously, in real life, different actions
should be taken, that is why we can always find plenty of Chess tactical guides in the
bookshops.
The game of Go can be one of the possible paradigms to go beyond Simon, by
programming information processing systems of solving it. In a mathematical sense,
Go is more flexible and general than Chess, because its board size can be, in principle,
unlimitedly enlarged. The philosophy and heuristics of Go are not necessarily consis-
tent with those of Chess, which makes human problem solving more interesting. Go
was also in the choice list of Simon, but they finally chose chess19.
This game has already been studied by combinatorial game theory. It is shown
in Lichtenstein and Sipser (1980) that Go is in PSPACE-Hard, although later on, it is
shown that no PSPACE algorithm can exist (Robson, 1983) for Go. Chess, for example,
is not yet shown to be in PSPACE-hard. In game theory or strategic interaction models
the idea is to look for a winning strategy in a game. The problem asked in the Robson
(loc. cit) is “given an arbitrary Go position on an n× n board, determine the winner”.
However, Go was proved to be PSPACE-hard and EXP-time complete, which
means Go is in the exponential time class and it is proved that there can be no PSPACE
algorithm for solving Go (Robson, 1983). Problems in exponential time are considered
to be among the most difficult problems. This result suggests that deciding whether
Black or White has winning strategy at an arbitrary position is practically infeasible.
Clearly, any expectation for finding an optimal strategy to win in such a complex set-
ting is both meaningless and futile. On the other hand, it also provides a perfect setting
for studying ‘actual’ modes of decision making without being tied to the search for op-
timal strategies.
3.4.3 Computable Economics
Two important theorems in Velupillai (2000), are relevant in this context and it provides
the way for economists to reconsider the philosophy and methodology of ‘rationality
as a process’ in decision making. Computable economics, stated briefly, is an algorith-
mic approach to economic theory. It is consistent with the research agenda of Simon
and we establish the superiority of bounded rationality as a theoretical notion for un-
derstanding human problem solving, within this framework. The two theorems from
chapter 3 of Velupillai (2000) that are relevant here are the following:
Theorem 1. “There is no effective procedure to generate preference orderings.”
19The reasons for which are stated in (Newell and Simon (1972), p.664-665). Given these reasons, we
can only wonder whether they would have chosen the game of Go as their paradigm if they had been
from the Orient!
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Theorem 2. Given a class of choice functions that do generate preference orderings (pick out
the set of maximal alternatives) for any agent, there is no effective procedure to decide whether
or not any arbitrary choice function is a member of the given class.
Velupillai (2000, 2010a,b) has formalized decision making as an act of choosing
a subset from a finite, non-empty, countable set, as opposed to uncountably infinite
sets, by using a choice function. Solving optimization of the latter case is equivalent
to solving linear integer programming problem. Velupillai transformed the linear inte-
ger programming problem in to the optimization problem of a combinatorial system,
and then constructed abstract Turing machines to study the characteristics of problem
solving.
In order to show that Bounded rationality is more general than Olympian ratio-
nality in this framework, Velupillai proceeds as follows: First, the notion of the be-
haviour of a suitably programmed (universal) Turing machine is shown to be equiva-
lent to the rational behaviour of the “economic agent” and connect the idea of adaptive
process with that of a dynamical system, for studying its computation universality.
And it is proved that only those dynamical systems which are capable of computa-
tion universality are consistent with rational behaviour in economic theory. He further
proves that no trajectory of dynamical systems capable of computation universality
can be usefully related to optimization in Olympian rationality. On the other hand,
it was also demonstrated that a boundedly rational Information Processing System in
the decision problem framework is capable of computation universality. In the decision-
problem framework, optimization is merely a specially case. The overall conclusion
is that bounded rationality in the context of decision problem is more general than
Olympian rationality.
Satisficing as Satisfiability Problem
Simon showed that Olympian rationality is a special case of bounded rationality by ap-
pealing to the act of satisficing. He suggested descriptively that a model of satisficing
can be turned into optimizing by setting the aspiration level at a optimal level. This
lucid point can be supported mathematically by applying the results in combinatorial
complexity.
“The real mathematical content of of satisficing is best interpreted in
terms of satisfiability problem of computational complexity theory, the frame-
work used by Simon consistently and persistently - and a framework to
which himself made pioneering contributions.”
Velupillai (2010b), p.9
The satisfiability problem is one of the important problems in modern computer
science. In Velupillai (2010b), it is demonstrated that SAT problem is the meeting
ground of Diophantine problems and satisficing, in turn this connection leads to the
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conclusion that bounded rationality is the superset of Olympian rationality, which Si-
mon had been advocating. Velupillai showed that satisficing can be formulated into
Satisfiability problems and optimizing is characterised by Linear programming. There-
fore, Olympian rationality can be shown as a special case of Satisficing, because Linear
Programming is in P (Khachiyan, 1979) and SAT is in NP-Complete (Cook, 1971). P is
believed to be a subset of NP. Many problems in computational complexity theory are
reducible to a satisfiability problem.
Definition 5. The problem Satisfiability (SAT) is defined as follows: Given a Boolean formula
φ, determine whether there is an assignment that satisfies it (i.e., more formally, SAT is the set
of all satisfiable Boolean formulas). The Boolean formula has the Conjunctive Normal Form.
The formal decision problem framework for a boundedly rational information
processing system can be constructed in one of the following ways: systems of linear
Diophantine inequalities, systems of linear equations in non-negative integer variables,
integer programming. Solving the former three problems are equivalent in the sense
that the method of solving one problem provides a method to solve the other two as
well. The Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem and SAT can be translated both
ways, i.e, one can be transformed into another.
Simon’s models where decision making is an act of satisficing can be provided
with procedural content. Essentially, a decision maker reviews the alternatives one at
a time and stops searching when a satisfactory object is encountered. The procedure
can be shown with the following steps:
1. A decision maker applies a kind of mechanism T which draws the objects xi to
be reviewed in a sequential manner, i.e. x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . . ∼ T. xi belongs to the
set X which is a set of combinatorial objects which are relevant to the problem to
be solved.
2. The decision maker has m goals (multiple goals, of course it is possible that
m = 1). The m value functions Vi : X → Z (The output of the value function
are rational numbers or computable numbers. Without loss of generality, they
are assumed to be integers here.) which are characterised by their respective goal
take the object xi and output the values. Therefore, each object xi is now repre-
sented as a vector of its associated values xi = [xi1, xi2, . . . , xim]
3. The decision maker then applies a satisficing procedure S on xi. The output of of
S is either Yes or No, i.e. yi = S(xi), yi ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, . . .. What S does
is to compare xi with the aspiration vector b which contains the aspiration levels
associated with the m goals. b = [b1, b2, . . . , bm].
y =
{
1 if Axi − b ≥ 0
0 otherwise
, where A is an m by mmatrix which contains only integers. In this case, A is an
identity matrix.
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4. The whole decision making procedure will halt when the first solution which
makes y = 1 is found.
In the above procedure, the aspiration vector should be generalized into a func-
tion of time or other factors. Otherwise, the procedure with static aspiration levels
alone does not guarantee that the solution can be found in any reasonable time. The
mechanism T which generates the sequence of xi does not exclude the possibility that
the same object can be generated again. This mechanisms T and Vi are examples of the
algorithms which are called heuristics in human problem solving domain. It is not diffi-
cult to observe that this satificing process is formulated as integer linear programming
(ILP). It has been proved that the methods which solve ILP can also be applied to SAT,
i.e. they are equivalent20. ILP is in NP complete and it can be verified in polynomial
time, such as the procedure S in the above example.
3.4.4 Human Problem Solving
Given the above premise, bounded rationality is interpreted in the context of Turing
computability. This also provides a bridge from computability to computational com-
plexity, by linking satisficing to decision problems. We are then able to study the com-
plexity of a given problem as a general idea of how difficult a problem is. It is legitimate
to ask whether there is an absolute computational complexity beyond which the hu-
manmind can not handle anymore. Note that the computational complexity of a prob-
lem depends on the algorithm for solving it, and brute-force algorithms are normally
the benchmark, especially, when an optimization problem is proposed. Satisficing and
heuristics now have very important roles to play in reducing the computational com-
plexity of a problem. This is where we would need some input from psychology and
cognitive science, in other words, this is the meeting ground of economics, psychol-
ogy, cognitive science and artificial intelligence . It is evident that human minds rely
on very simple heuristics (algorithm) to solve a problem in a satisficing manner and
also rely on the support of external memory and knowledge.
The theory of human problem solving, where human beings are viewed as infor-
mation processing systems21, is a well constructed paradigm of understanding practi-
cal problem solving of an individual or an organization. Simon made this contribution
as soon as he proposed his idea on bounded rationality. A brief introduction on theory
of human problem solving and information processing system which is the computa-
tion model of the human problem solver can be found in (Kao and Velupillai, 2012b,
p.63-65). A critical step that Simon took is to ask different questions, i.e. changing
the focus from “What is my winning move?” to “What is my next good move?”. By
doing so, we are already able to abandon brute-force algorithms and ignore its astro-
nomical complexity. Consequently, we might reach the next question - “what is my
20Although technically translating a problem of ILP into SAT is not trivial.
21The computer programs which represents the information processing system are constructed from
investigating the subjects’ problem solving protocols painstakingly.
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goal for this move such that I can choose a good move?”, “what is the more attain-
able goal of the larger goal?” This approach of dissecting a general problem into its
means-end structure has been fully realized in the study of Human Problem Solving
(Newell and Simon, 1972).
Therefore, it is argued here that it is meaningful and useful to bring in the mea-
sure of time and space complexity into Human problem solving. Subsequently, we can
bring in the context of the task environment and look for the possible heuristics for
reducing the complexity of a problem. No matter how difficult a problem might be,
a physical system has to output an answer with limited resource - time and space -
or crash without achieving anything it is supposed to. Heuristics are the methods or
algorithms that are used to reduce the complexity of a problem to levels that can be
handled. They involve generating a subset of alternatives, evaluating the alternatives
with the ability of pattern recognition associated with accumulated knowledge, stop-
ping evaluation. The first two aspects of using heuristics involve pattern recognition,
and the last one involves both pattern recognition and aspiration levels. Heuristics are
thus central to Human Problem Solving. The three aspects of heuristics - what to gen-
erate, how to evaluate and when to stop, are at the core of HPS. The mapping between
actions and eventual outcomes - i.e, the evaluation of alternatives - is the most difficult
task that the problem solver is presented with.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The proposal of this chapter is that Simon’s Bounded rationality and Human problem
solving theory should be formally understood within the framework of computability
theory and computational complexity theory. By extracting the procedural content of
decision making, heuristics are considered as algorithms. In computational complex-
ity theory, the complexity of a problem is analysed not only through the structure of
task environments but also through the heuristics that problem solvers used to solve
the problems. In this framework, we are able to show that bounded rationality via
satisficing is the general notion of rationality.
Simon’s vision and definitions regarding bounded rationality were always intu-
itive and straightforward. He thus left a large canvas for others to build models based
on bounded rationality. Simon’s notions concerning bounded rationality can be inter-
preted more clearly in the light of alternative mathematical formalisms, those which
are faithful to the notion of procedural decisions. Also, models should be constructed
according to different situations and the actors who handle those situations. In this
chapter, it is argued that the two aspects of human problem solving - the task envi-
ronment (problem space) and problem solver (algorithm) should be distinguished and
then studied.
By appealing to computability theory, it is shown that bounded rationality is a
superset of Olympian rationality. Subsequently, boundary of rationality is further nar-
rowed down to the inner boundary - the one established by computational complexity.
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Finally, it is suggested that Simon’s empirical boundaries can be further approached -
along the same methodology- by investigating the heuristics which are the algorithms
(methods) that are used by human beings in problem solving circumstances.
Chapter 4
Human Problem Solving in Classical
Behavioural Economics
4.1 Overview
Consider the following statement: “This problem is complex”. It can carry different
meanings to different people unless there is an objective measure to define how com-
plex a given problem is. At the meta level, computational complexity provides such an
objective measure for the general solutions (in terms of procedures) of the problems.
When someone engages to solve a problem and gradually becomes experienced and
sensitive to the same kind of problems, the complexity faced by this person/organism
should have been transformed to a very different architecture.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to highlight the fact that Simon has con-
nected his theories of human problem solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) and theories
of bounded (procedural) rationality in economic domains (Simon, 1959, 1972, 1978b),
both explicitly and implicitly. There is no qualitative difference between these two. The
former deals with puzzle-like complex problems, and the latter deals with human de-
cision making in general. These two domains together span what we call as Classical
Behavioural Economics1. Second, it suggests that the game of Go is a good domain for
CBE to further strengthen and enhance the ties between the theories of human problem
solving and bounded rationality in economics.
A robust phenomena discussed in this thesis is that human beings suffer from
severely limited short-termmemory (attention) and computational power, despite their
ability to solve massively complex problems. One intuitive interpretation of this phe-
nomenon is that the problem may no longer appear to be so complex to the problem
solver. It is from this perspective, we start to investigate heuristics and satisficing that
assist the problem solvers to cope with complexity. Likewise, it needs to be reiterated
that any humanly impossible or meaningless procedures ought not to be applied to
model human decision makers.
1This term was coined by Velupillai. For a detailed discussion refer to chapter 2 of this thesis.
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In Classical Behavioural Economics (CBE), satisficing is the guiding principle and
Information Processing Systems are the models which inherently perform satisficing in
the context of problem solving. This chapter attempts at suggesting that the game of
Go as an important paradigm for CBE. Despite the very general characteristics of Infor-
mation Processing Systems, the ones that have been built in the past and realized are
task environment specific. Many domain specific architectures have been applied to re-
vise what is known as general and invariant characteristics of Information Processing
System in Human Problem Solving. Chess is one such prominent domain. A legitimate
question here would be whether Chess, as a domain, has exploited the full potential of
the general structure of Information Processing System. This thesis provides a nega-
tive answer to this question and suggests that the game of Go is a promising candidate.
Formally speaking, Chess is a special case of Go.
CBE seeks for a general enough Information Processing System that can be sys-
tematically transformed tomany economic problems. Many problems asked by economists
may seem straightforward because the inherently multi-dimensional goal in economic
decision making is collapsed to an intangible and single-dimensional utility in the case
of individuals (microeconomics). Such formalisation is very remote from what can be
concretely installed into an Information Processing System. This thesis avoids enter-
ing the multi-dimensional and ill-structured economic domain, instead focuses on a
domain that is general enough and still touches the border of well-structured prob-
lems. The game of Go bridges well-structured and ill-structured domains despite the
boundary between these two types of problems is ambiguous.
In the previous chapters, Information Processing System has been formally con-
nected to bounded rationality, satisficing and theory of algorithms. The first part of
this chapter reveals the finer structures, components and deals with the construction
of Information Processing Systems in the context of human problem solving. Having
this in mind enables us to have deeper understanding of the problems and the problem
solvers. The second part of the chapter is the discussion about Chess and Go within
the scope prescribed by the first part of the chapter.
An immediate, perhaps a superficial justification for Go being a good candidate
for CBE, in order to extend the human problem solving approach, may be that Go
is the new challenge facing the contemporary Artificial Intelligence community. The
difficulty of constructing a competent Go playing program shows that the massive
number of combinations in Go, which is one of the reasons why it is relevant for CBE.
The other reasons2 why Go should concern CBE are i) its flexibility in representation:
2Apart from the formal reasons why Go is chosen, there is an observation regarding personal cu-
riosity. Both Simon and Turing discussed about Go as one of the possibilities. It is interesting to know
that
“[Alan] was able to take advantage of the visit [to New York, in November, 1942,
while working on decrypting the Enigma code] to make sundry purchases, including a
‘Go’ board, and was proposing to attend the ‘Go’ club meetings in his neighbourhood to
discover the American standard of play.”
Turing (1959) p.72
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unlike in Chess, the players of Go have only one weapon - the stone. The operation is
extremely simple: place a stone on a intersection of grids on the board. In each round,
the player needs to decide where to place it, despite the fact that the process of deciding
it can be very prolonged. A stone has no particular character individually, but they
can assume a variety of roles collectively; and ii) its richness in multi-faculties of the
players: Go is a protracted game; at different stages of the game, very different strategic
and tactical skills are required. The later property reflects and reveals its connections
with real world problems, such as politics, management, economic development.
To clarify the relevance of Go as a paradigm for CBE, it is helpful to look at the
issues that concern CBE. This will constitute the main discussion in the second part
of this chapter. Go is an analogue of many life-related decision makings in the sense
that the goal is about how to survive and how to make a better living without being
destructive. Instead, in Chess, it is about how get the supreme target through a mortal
war. It is not unusual that at the end of a game, both kingdoms are almost ruined. Go’s
relevance to many other problems is also discussed by one of the pioneers of computer
Go:
“In all of these respects, the goal structure of Go again resembles that
of many real world political, economic, and business problems. Success in
these domains depends upon making the most effective use of limited re-
sources to achieve a superior dynamic balance among multiple competing
goals.”
Reitman et al. (1974), p.125
The importance of studying Go and other economic problems through the hu-
man problem solving approach has been emphasized by showing the gap that exists
between the realistic or realizable procedures of decision making and those in the eyes
of theorists of computer science, cognitive psychology and behavioural economics.
This gap that describes structural and qualitative differences is often concealed by the
increasingly prominent achievements (i.e. competition and tournament) of contem-
porary AI. CBE is an interdisciplinary approach that encompasses the merits of these
three fields and attempts to reveal and reduce the gap.
Cognitive Science and Computer Science are the engines of Artificial Intelligence,
Behavioural Science and in turn, for CBE as well. It is gradually noticeable that Go is
being considered as a better domain in Cognitive Psychology and Computer Science.
Along the same lines, this thesis aims at suggesting Go as a good or better domain
to extend Herbert Simon’s CBE. In order to construct logical and coherent arguments
for supporting this statement, the following questions are considered by this and the
successive chapter:
1. Are board games good subjects for CBE in general?
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2. What characteristics does an Information Processing System should have in order
to play good Go?
3. Are these characteristics constitute a super set of those characteristics which are
required for Chess?
This chapter servers as the transition phase between the previous chapter of foun-
dations of CBE and the next chapter on the game of Go. It motivates the idea behind
building Information Processing Systems for playing Go and their relevance for CBE,
at the same time, familiarizes the reader about the contents of the theory and early
development of human problem solving in detail. Section 4.2 presents the highlights
of theory and practice of human problem solving. Section 4.3 discusses the qualitative
differences between Chess and Go with particular reference to contemporary AI.
4.2 Human Problem Solving
The project of Human Problem Solving can be traced back as early as 1954, when Allan
Newell initiated an idea of writing good chess program and proposed to investigate
the satisficing aspects and rules of thumb, that were the main concerns for Simon,
while playing chess. This intention that induced a series of research questions has led
to a broader research scheme unintentionally.
The theory and practice of human problem solving is a well developed and ever
growing scheme which came out of a cognitive movement that happened around
1950s3. The ideas underpinning this came from a multidisciplinary ground consti-
tuted by psychology, linguistics and computer science at the very least. The pioneer-
ing contributions of this movement are claimed to be Bruner et al. (1956), Miller (1956),
Chomsky (1956), Chomsky (1959), Newell et al. (1958a), and Broadbent (1958).
The theory of human problem solving (henceforth, HPS) is in fact a theory of
information processing, which views human beings as information processing systems
(henceforth, IPS), at least when they are solving a problem. This approach takes thinking-
aloud protocols as data and constructs computer programs as models or theories. Infor-
mation processing systems are in charge of the procedural activities or organisations
that happen between a given stimulus and the response out of the problem solvers.
Protocol analysis which dissects the verbal reports can shed light to these procedures.
The activities that concern the study of HPS can be classified in terms of three
attributes: across tasks, across individuals and across time. The time dimension can
be further divided into performance, learning, and development. Newell and Simon
(1972) analysed three different tasks, and each task is performed by one specific subject
respectively. Learning and development were not the main concern of their project in
the early stages.
3Around the same time, a seminar organised at Dartmouth gave birth to the modern concept of
Artificial Intelligence which had much in common with the emerging discipline of Cognitive Science.
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Being aware of the non-existence of a general solution to an arbitrary given prob-
lem (undecidability) in theory of computation, and not intimidated by the worst-case
scenarios proved in theory of computational complexity, Simon was eager to seek for
the algorithms that can find a solution to a problem using limited amount of compu-
tational time and effort. HPS approach was driven by the presence of severe scarcity
in terms of human computational capacity, in contrast to those in the neoclassical eco-
nomics. The general and factual observation is that human beings are able to solve
difficult4 problems despite very small processing power as a result of small attention
(short-term memory). This very fact has shaped the design and characterization of
IPSs.
Chess, among other many tasks that are painstakingly studied by Simon and
his colleagues, has shown its fruitfulness in providing access to many issues in HPS.
Simon’s contribution to Chess is the stepping stone towards the game of Go, which is
the subject of this thesis. As a matter of fact, the first mission (see the Overview) of
this chapter is not a new idea to Simon. He had intentionally sowed the seeds of HPS
in his many celebrated works on (organisational) decision making, economics, social
sciences and other scientific fields.
This section summarises the components and characteristics of HPS and presents
a concise report on its early development along the line of Chess.
4.2.1 Theory of Human Problem Solving
Theory of HPS unifies the invariant characteristics of human beings solving complex
problem across different domains and individuals. Thus, it is richer in qualitative
structures than in quantitative assessments. The premises of its scope are i) the ex-
istence of the mental level processing regardless the lower level of neurons, ii) hu-
man beings suffer server limitations in computational power and attention (working
memory) and iii) human begins rely on knowledge-intensive reasoning in some cases.
Different premises can be investigated through different task domains to different ex-
tents. The first premise is linked to some philosophical and methodological debates on
reductionism, which is not the main concern and argument of this chapter. It is thus
taken for granted here.
At the early stages, computational models of selective search were created in a
stark contrast to infinite inductive power assumed by the mathematical models in
game theory. At the later stages, the battles shifted to being between brute-force al-
gorithms and knowledge-based algorithms. This thesis conjectures that the divide is
around 1972 when Newell and Simon (1972) was published. I believe that both limita-
tions in computational capacity and domain-specific knowledge are equally important
and interrelated for HPS on non-trivial domains. A good task domain can reflect the
importance of the two premises simultaneously. Chess was one such good domain
4The difficulty in this context can be better understood with computational complexity, however,
problems are not characterised only in terms of hard-easy divide.
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and several computer programs and cognitive models were developed from studying
it. However, it is the twilight of Chess in the context of HPS, and I believe, the dawn of
Go.
Discussions and practice concerning different focus points about the theory in
varying degrees can be found inNewell et al. (1958a), Newell et al. (1958b), Simon and Newell
(1971), Newell and Simon (1972), Simon (1978a), and Simon (1990a). In the following
part of this section, the general components of HPS and IPS will be described with the
hope of providing a miniature version of this approach, so that the terminologies and
concepts that are frequently used in the later parts of the thesis will not appear to be
too alien. Various IPSs which tackle different aspects of HPS will be briefly mentioned.
From the outset, the act of HPS is performed by a problem solver, characterized
as an IPS interacting with a task environment. When a task is given and accepted by the
problem solver, he/she represents the domain with which he/she works as a problem
space. A problem space is an internal and subjective representation of the external and
objective task environment. Thus, the act of problem solving is the selective search
conducted in the problem space.
There are only very few invariant characteristics of the IPS across tasks and indi-
viduals. While the general property is unambiguous: the systems are only capable of
serial processing, they have small short-term memory and unlimited long-term mem-
ory with fast retrieval (tens to hundreds of milliseconds) and slow storage (seconds to
tens of seconds). These properties impose strong constraints on the ways by which the
systems can seek solutions to problems in larger problem spaces.
A Problem
A problem contains an initial state and a final (goal) state and a problem solver is
engaged in finding a solution with which the final state can be reached5. Travelling
and searching for a path in a maze is an abstract formation of a problem. A final state
can be a configuration of symbols or some criteria over the symbol structures. When a
problem is well posed, there will be a set of all the possible alternatives, P and a subset
S in P represents the desired solutions. Recall that S ⊆ P.
When the task is to make a good move in Chess, P is the set of all legal moves,
and S is a set of good moves that are defined by some criteria. In the case of theorem
proving, P is the set of all possible sequences of expression in a formal language; S
will be a set of sequence that proves a specified theorem. In this formulation, the
standard procedures applied to find the solution out of a problem space is a) generation
of candidate alternatives that are possibly in S and b) verification of the alternatives
and deciding whether they are indeed in S.
The domain of problems can be classified according to at least two attributes: i)
the definiteness of their structure and ii) the amount of semantic information needed
5If a problem solver does not know what is desired to do, then there is no “problem”; in other words,
the problem is not properly defined. As a result, at each given step, problem solver has to decide what
to do and then decide how to do.
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in problem solving. Therefore, some problems are well structured (puzzle-like), and
are easier to be carried out in laboratories; the other problems that we encountered in
many real-life circumstances come across as ill-structured. The type of well-structured
problems has been widely examined and given good explanations by the information
processing theories. As for the semantic attribute, it measures the extensive knowledge
that is required in problem solving. Chess is a semantically rich domain, for example,
and Tower of Hanoi is less rich in semantics, compared to say, chess.
Problem Space and Task Environment
The structure of the task environment6 determines the possible structures of problem
space that the subject indeed works on; the structure of the problem space in turn
determines the possible algorithms (heuristics) that can be used to solve the problem.
It is important to note that problem solving activities are supposed to take place in the
problem space.
A problem space is spanned by knowledge states and operators. The simplest
and straightforward problem space consists of nodes generated by all the legal moves.
Each node in the problem space is a state of knowledge that is available to the prob-
lem solver. The operator applied on a node leads to another node of knowledge stage.
Many problem spaces that are represented by all legal sequences (continuations) are
massive, and some other problems, such as Tower of Hanoi, have relatively small prob-
lem space (constrained by the number of legal moves). Trial-and-error search in the
relatively small problem space is already unendurable for human problem solvers, let
alone huge problem spaces. This is a property that may suggest that the difficulty of a
problem in HPS is not related to the size of the problem space.
Hence, the precise size of a problem space is not the main concern in information-
processing theory of problem solving. The genuine skill of the problem solvers lie in
their ability to extracting information from the task environment and organizing the
problem space so that the highly selective (heuristic) search can be adopted. Apart
from the size of a problem space, which is irrelevant in the context of information-
processing, the problem spaces also differ in their structures as well. The predictability
and redundancy of the structure are the bases for selective search. A difficult problem
will acquire more complex heuristics to solve it, regardless the absolute problem size.
Laboratory Techniques
Since HPS is concerned with the procedures and activities that receive input (stimuli)
and produce output (respond), mere observations on what the subjects respond to is by
definition not sufficient. The standard data collecting techniques are recording verbal
reports and eye-movement tracking.
6Task environment can be described from the task instructions and the primary characterisation of
the subject.
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There are several ways to obtain verbal reports, such as retrospective report (pos-
terior report), thinking aloud protocol that is given simultaneously while the task is
being conducted and spontaneous report (without intervention by the experimenter).
Retrospective report is shown to be too biased and spontaneous verbal report cannot
guarantee the necessary amount of report. Only thinking aloud protocols has been
proved to be faithful in reflecting the cognitive processes that lead to the subjects’ so-
lutions of the problems. Many were sceptical about the thinking aloud assignment to
the subject, for it may affect the actual cognitive processes. Ericsson and Simon (1980,
1993) discuss these issues in detail and provide the valid defence over the scepticism
expressed.
The thinking aloud protocols can be long and tedious, despite they contain an-
swers to the questions asked about the tasks. The Problem Behavior Graph drawn from
thinking aloud protocols is one of the tools for displaying the search in the problem
space. The production system (defined later) employed by the subjects can be induced
from the problem behaviour graph. Theories or models (computer programs) are con-
structed and verified through the building blocks that are extracted from thinking aloud
protocol.
4.2.2 Information Processing Systems
The IPS is a model of human problem solver in problem solving environment. It pro-
vides sufficient explanations to human thinking7. The most elementary unit of IPS is
the symbol. Its structure, components, and specific properties are gradually realized
by the studies on various task environments. It is like solving a huge jigsaw puzzle8 of
IPS. The specification of human problem solver as IPS has gone beyond the stage of a
hypothesis, instead it is a living thesis9.
Information processing is an activity that happens in the brains, however, it is
defined as the level which is above the level of the organization of neurons and, in turn,
the chemical and electrical level of neurology. It is the level that processes information
as symbols and IPS describes the mechanisms of cognitive processes. Its procedures
are conventionally realized by digital computer programs. Computer programs which
can carry out symbolic information processing is formally defined as a set of difference
equations.
An IPS is a serial and an adaptive system. It consists of an active processor, input
(sensory) and output (motor) systems, an internal Long TermMemory (LTM) and Short
Term Memory (STM) and an External Memory (EM)10. There are several elementary
7For example, Logic Theorist, a program shown to be capable of proving theorems in Principia Math-
ematica has its most primitive processes require no more than the ability of reading, writing, storing,
erasing and comparing symbols (patterns).
8I personally prefer mosaic to jigsaw puzzle in this metaphor. The basic elements of mosaic are
meant to be tinnier than normal tiles. The final pattern that shows in mosaic can be both aesthetic and
impressionistic, and thus leaves a lot of freedom for perception.
9One can imagine its counterpart in the theory of computation being Church-Turing thesis.
10EM is associated with what problem solver can visualize immediately during the problem solving
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processors11 whose inputs and outputs are held in the STM. Both STM and LTM share
the identical structure but differ in capacity. It possesses a class of symbol structures,
the goal structures, that are used to organize problem solving. Its program is structured
as a production system, the conditions for activation of a production being the presence
of appropriate symbols in the STM augmented by the foveal EM (the line of sight, the
central focus of gaze). The parameters of IPS such as the capacity of STM, the time
required for storing a new chunk into LTM, the entrance and exit time required in
STM, etc. can be estimated through experiments.
The behaviours of IPSs in HPS can be roughly classified into three phases of rou-
tine: alternative generators, alternatives evaluators and stopping rules. An IPS should
know when to stop evaluating a move and when to stop searching. When different
IPSs of different level players are concerned, the IPS need not differ from each other
only in terms of a single attribute, i.e., not only the amount of knowledge in the long-
term memory that is different, but also the representation and the method of recogni-
tion and retrieval of knowledge are different. IPSs were programmed by Information
Processing Language (list-processing), which is an assembly and low-level language.
Short-Term Memory
Miller pointed out the magical integer seven that is associated to the limitation of hu-
man information processing is repeatedly discovered in many experiments of absolute
judgement and immediate memory. In absolute judgement, number seven is associ-
ated with the limited number of alternatives that the subjects can distinguish without
confusion, and in immediate memory, number seven refers to the number of ‘chunks’.
A chunk is generally defined as an organized or grouped unit that is familiar and can
be recognized by the subject. An relevant example is in English language. Each al-
phabet can be a familiar chunk, and in turn, the words composed by permutation of
alphabets are also chunks. Likewise, familiar phrases or sentences composed of words
are chunks as well. By enlarging the organization of a chunk, one can essentially re-
member more bits of information without altering the limitation on the number of
chunks12.
In IPS, STM holds about five to seven symbols, but only about two can be re-
tained for one task, while another unrelated task is performed. All the symbols in STM
process, e.g. a piece of paper he can write on for solving arithmetic problems, and the chessboard. It
has access times of the order of a hundred milliseconds (the saccade, rapid eye movement) and read
times to STM of the order of fifty milliseconds. Write times are of the order of a second per symbol for
overlearned external symbols.
11IPS’s elementary processes take times of the order of fifty milliseconds, but the overall rate of pro-
cessing is fundamentally limited by read rates from LTM and EM.
12It is not hard to imagine that a chunk can be as big as a whole article! The technical problem derived
from the chunk-hypothesis is that it is then difficult to find the clear cut between chunks. Simon has
encouraged the readers that the experiments held for verifying the chunk-hypothesis can benefit from
taking the chunk-hypothesis as the premise and finding techniques to ‘estimate the parameters’ (Simon,
1974)
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are available to the processes (i.e., there is no accessing or search of STM). The severe
(size) limitation of STM actually directs the search strategies and processes used. An
initiative of an arbitrary hypothesis that a particular state of knowledge is true, which
leads to further possibilities of knowledge states (nodes) in the problem space, requires
the nodes visited by the processors be backed-up in the STM. When this kind of search
is a burden to STM, it will be avoided.
Long-Term Memory
LTM has an unlimited capacity and is organized associatively, and its contents are
symbols and structures of symbols. Any stimulus that becomes a recognizable config-
uration (chunk) is designated in LTM by a symbol. Writing a new symbol structure
that contains K familiar symbols takes about 5K to 10K seconds of processing time.
Accessing and reading a symbol out of LTM takes a few hundred milliseconds.
It is important to note that the infinite capacity of LTM is different from the con-
ventional mathematical understanding; it is emphasized that“Infinite, in this context,
need mean only: far more than he could possibly scan during a problem solving ses-
sion” (in Newell and Simon, 1972, p.819). Besides, one of the characteristics of LTM is
that it is consecutively accumulated with more and more knowledge during problem
solving session, might even last till the lifetime of the problem solver.
Apart from the capacity of memory and the speed of processing, the organisation
of LTM is also an important issue. The symbols in LTM are associative, and the con-
cept of associativity can be traced back as early as Aristotle. A symbol or a group of
symbols (chunk) is familiar and recognized not because a chunk is innate in the mem-
ory. A chunk as a stimulus or cue can be recognized and evoke other symbols because
the internal representation of this chunk is retrieved and evokes its designations. The
chunks are accumulated through learning. In particular, the association of symbols in
LTM of IPS has been represented as list-structures.
Production Systems
The production system is a natural form of an IPS. A production system consists of
a collection of productions that is specifically ordered. A production has the form like
this:
If Condition → do Action
The order of the productions can resolve the conflicts when several conditions are sat-
isfied at the same time. The condition component consists of a set of tests. When the
conditions are satisfied, then do the action, otherwise do nothing.
There are at least two levels of production systems. One is at perceptual level: the
conditions concern the stimuli (visual or aural) and the actions transfer symbols from
LTM to STM; the other is at a general level: the conditions testify the symbol in STM
and the action operates the symbols in either STM or LTM. A system having these two
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levels of production systems, for example, is sufficient to produce a move in chess.
Tower of Hanoi is one of Simon’s favourite examples to build various production sys-
tems for solving it. The alternatives are goal-driven, stimulus driven, pattern driven
and a neat production system for interaction with the rote memory (Simon, 1975).
In this chapter by taking the game of Go as the paradigm, I argue that an IPS
of Go should be equipped with higher level production systems, i.e. semantic level
and reasoning level. Undoubtedly, these higher level production systems do not yet
transcend the scope of operating symbols, but they enhance the hierarchy in to which
the domain-specific knowledge can be organized.
Evaluation
When a problem space is structured, the task of the problem solver (IPS) at any given
point of time is to choose the operator to apply to the current node in the problem
space. It is certain that some evaluation is involved. Recall that each node in the prob-
lem space is a state of knowledge, and some states of knowledge might lead to desired
goal state. Means-ends analysis uses the distance between the current node and the tar-
get node as a measure to choose ideal operators. The criterion for a good operator
is thus the one which reduces a good amount of this difference. Such methods are
applied by the subjects in the task of theorem-proving.
Different problem spaces will suggest different methods of evaluation. The con-
crete IPS that is developed by using means-ends analysis is called General Problem
Solver (GPS). GPS is a type of program originally designed for logic task, and means-
ends analysis is the essential component of it. GPS was developed out of Logic Theorist.
More recent research has proved that the find-and-reduce-difference heuristic of GPS
is a special case of more general processes.
Many specific topics had been marked in the course of uncovering the structure
of IPS through many cases studies. Next section chooses Chess as the lens and demon-
strates the issues that concerned Simon at different points of time.
4.2.3 Newell, Shaw and Simon (NSS) Chess Program and Onward
In this section, we take Chess, the ‘drosophila’ of AI and cognitive psychology, as the
example to see how the IPSs of a specific domain are built from tackling different faces
of the domain over decades. By wondering about the cognitive mechanisms that Chess
players employ, Simon, Newell and Shaw had made the very first step on logic as a
domain and later tackled many different aspects of HPS. Gradually, they have created
different systems which take into account different hypotheses about HPS.
Selectivity
NSS is a Chess program which was developed by Newell, Shaw and Simon in 1958
after few attempts by others. It demonstrates the very first attempt to prune the search
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tree, both width-wise and depth-wise. It is a relatively sophisticated program in com-
parison with its precursors. It is sophisticated in the sense that it included the merits
of earlier programs and considered more realistic characteristics - selectivity - of hu-
man decision making. In a nutshell, it imported the concept of “dead position” from
Turing’s primitive program (see Turing, 1953, for detailed definition) and “move gen-
erators” from Bernstein (1958). The two concepts are highly related to “selection” and
“evaluation”. Dead position13 generally indicates those positions which are not worth
exploring any further because it will not yield any immediate advantage or exchange.
It is useful for pruning the search tree. Move generators are linked with the chess fea-
tures respectively, and Bernstein limited the maximum number of moves for further
evaluation to seven14. As a result, the same amount of resources can be used to eval-
uate each continuation more carefully. Besides, NSS program incorporates satisficing
in making a move and the first move reaching the acceptance or aspiration level is
executed.
Later, the behaviour of NSS program is compared to a subject’s protocol. The
verbal report is divided into episodes and shows several tendency i) the subject gives
a general description of the board first, ii) The subject considers only a handful of
possible moves, and iii) in most of the cases, the subject explores the game-tree straight
down till some point and goes back to the initial position (base-move or base node) to
start all over again. This kind of search method is called progressive deepening, which
will be defined shortly.
Perception
Newell and Simon, motivated by the comparison and the qualitative distances between
programs and the human subject, went on extending the analyses of problem solving
of Chess to various directions. This line of researchwas initiated by deGroot (de Groot,
1965). De Groot’s analysis of Chess players is prone to thrive the knowledge-oriented
modelling for expertise and computer programs. De Groot’s analyses imply that per-
ceptual processes are the radical repertoire of skilled Chess player, especially the re-
sults of the tasks of reconstructing meaningful positions and arbitrary position support
this claim. Namely, the most noticed and frequently mentioned result of de Groot is
that experts outperform nearly perfectly the novices or beginners at reconstructing his-
13The famous alpha-beta procedure used in NSS applies the concept of dead position and min-maxing
to obtain the static evaluations of the nodes which are the possible outcomes after applying the moves
suggested by move generators. Notice that:
“The alpha-beta procedure is not a heuristic. . . .Here, however, the problem is to know
when a better value cannot be obtained by additional exploration, and this is indeed a
heuristic matter”
Newell and Simon (1972), p. 684
14Bernstein’s program was compared with Los Alamos whose search is much less selective.
Newell and Simon (1972) comments that “selectivity is a very powerful device and speed a very weak
device for improving the performance of complex programs.”(p. 678).
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torical meaningful position after a glance for only 5 seconds. However, when it comes
to arbitrary positions, the experts perform as equally badly as the beginners.
Despite the limitation of protocol analysis, Newell and Simon have confirmed
that the subject’s behaviour can be characterised as search in a problem space which
is defined by the rules of Chess and a few abstract moves. It is also evident that the
subject’s search strategies match the progressive deepening. Progressive deepening in-
troduced by de Groot and based on observation of subjects’ protocol consists of four
phases: the first phase of orientation, the phase of exploration, the phase of investiga-
tion and the phase of proof. It indicates that at different phases of thinking, various
degrees of depth and breadth are required. At the first phase, the subjects identify few
possibilities without going deeper. The search conducted in the later phases results in
the traverse in the tree looking not bushy but reaching certain depth and restarting all
over again from the same initial point or new variation. Depending on different needs
and goals in the phases, one branch can be sought more than once with various depth.
Although NSS program and the subject’s behaviour are consistent in their basic
structures, none of the Chess programs by then encompassed all the characteristics of
the subject. Newell and Simon had dedicated their attention to search mechanisms
instead of perceptual and noticing mechanisms. However, they believed that the per-
ceptions of Chess board are inherent in the sub-processes of search algorithms, such as
MATER15, whose sub-processes take the relations on the board into account.
Perceptions in Chess are highly visual activities. PERCEIVER (Simon and Barenfeld,
1969) is another specific program which simulates the local information gathered by
using fixations observed from eye-movement. That is, when the eyes are fixated on
a single piece or a square, its relation between neighbouring pieces and squares are
obtained. However, PERCEIVER had not been designed to explain the Chess players’
ability in retention that the players need to hold up the information observed from the
position in the memory and reconstruct the whole position.
Considering the excellent performance of de Groot’s grandmasters in reconstruct-
ing a position most perfectly after five-second exposure to the position, the reasonable
explanation is that they hold up the information in STM and a position is decomposed
into no more than 9 chunks. The premises of HPS is the existence of LTM and STM,
STM’s capacity is 7± 2 chunks, and it takes at least five seconds to write a chunk from
STM to LTM. Therefore, a glance which lasts for only 5 seconds is not enough for the
problem solver to utilize the storage in LTM.
Based on the associativity of LTM, the discrimination net of EPAM (see below)
is believed to have facilitated the grandmasters to remember the whole position by a
number of chunks in the STM. Any familiar chunk is recognized through the discrim-
15MATER (Baylor and Simon, 1966) is an end-game program that looks for a sequence of checking
moves that lead to a mate and it has incorporated the scan-search strategy - a strategy that humans use
in general. Although the scan-search strategy imposes limitation on the depth of search, it requires a
much bigger capacity for storing the nodes visited in the memory. Provided that the capacity of STM is
small, this strategy has to rely on LTM and write the information into LTM, which will take considerable
amount of time.
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ination process and is given a symbol that designates it; this symbol will be retrieved
to STM. In the reconstruction phase, the master can reconstruct the chunks back to
the board by using those symbols that designate those familiar patterns in the LTM.
A grandmaster is able to recognize more pieces as one chunk than, say, a master does.
That may explainwhy grandmasters perform better thanmasters or Chess club players
in reconstruction provided that they have the same capacity in STM.
Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer (EPAM) EPAM is an IPS that was firstly de-
signed for rote verbal learning and modelling the learning behaviour through associa-
tion and performing behaviour according to what is learnt at the terminals of discrimi-
nation net. The construction of the net is supervised bymacroprocesses (Feigenbaum and Simon,
1962) and microprocesses (Feigenbaum, 1959). Macroprocesses take the processing
time limit into according and coordinate the order and use of time by microproccesses.
Microprocesses are programs that deal with symbolic operations. Discrimination net
is represented as tree-like structure whose intermediate nodes are tests for checking
certain attributes of the stimuli and the terminal nodes are symbol structures that may
contain the stimuli, responses, cues and templates. EPAM’s performance in terms of
recognising stimuli is essentially a sort of production system, however, the condition-
action relation has been internalized into the discrimination net. More discussions
about EPAM-like structures can be found in Feigenbaum and Simon (1984).
Accepting that the masters do perceive a position as few familiar chunks allowed
Newell and Simon to connect the move generations from the features of a position to
means-ends analysis of GPS. Chess indeed plays the role of a non-trivial and complex
domain that brings together various programs that are designed for different tasks.
The studies on Chess perception progressed further over the years. The proposal
for combining PERCEIVER and EPAMwas implemented in Simon and Gilmartin (1973).
Chase and Simon (1973b) conducts a new experimental techniques using time inter-
vals to isolate the chunks that are recognized by the subjects from a position. Later
the chunking theory for the skilled Chess players’ cognitive process was developed in
Chase and Simon (1973a). A series of extensions of memory tasks gave birth to the tem-
plate theory16 (Gobet and Simon, 1996) which revises chunking theory and addresses
a template in the LTM without altering the assumption of capacity of STM. A post-
Simon program, Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructures (CHREST), developed by
Fernand Gobet since 1992 is derived from EPAM (de Groot and Gobet, 1996). Model of
Syntax Acquisition In Children (MOSAIC) is in turn an instance of CHREST.
The discrimination net of EPAM has been the core structure of knowledge repre-
sentation of IPS since then. Its evolution relies heavily on the learning processes and
the environment that the problem solver is confronted with. The actual architecture
and content of a discrimination net vary according to the special cases depending on
the time and circumstances. Each discrimination net is a database that reflects the prob-
16It turns out that the template theory is a relevant architecture for problem solving of Go which is
discussed in next chapter.
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lem solver’s own experience and knowledge. Hayek (1945) argues that the knowledge
of special cases owned by each individual cannot be easily accessible by an autho-
rized central planer who refers to a body of knowledge that is the aggregate “scientific
knowledge.” Thus, he argues pure central planning can not be efficient. Hayek’s argu-
ment suggests the importance of treating individual as having spacial-case knowledge,
which is consistent to the nature of discrimination net, but there is also the difficulty in
aggregating the individual bodies of knowledge to the whole body of existing knowl-
edge. This issue is indeed deep and demands much more deliberation, which is be-
yond the scope of this thesis.
Pattern recognition and perception: A comment The magic behind the Chess grand-
masters’ ability is often pointed to them having at least 50000 familiar chunks in the
memory. A relevant metaphor is the amount of vocabularies one should know for
mastering one natural language. Newell and Simon had similar opinion:
“The quantities demanded by this explanation are of the right order of
magnitude. In the years required to attain mastership in chess, a player
might be expected to acquire a “vocabulary” of familiar subpatterns com-
parable to the visual word-recognition vocabularies of persons able to read
English, or Kanji (or Kanji-pair) recognition vocabularies of persons read-
ing Chinese or Japanese. These vocabularies are of the order of 104 − 105
symbols. Hence, sequences of seven such symbols could be used to encode
1028 − 1035 [i.e., (104)7 − (105)7] different total board positions”
Newell and Simon (1972), p.781-782
The above quotation suggests that remembering patterns for chess player is like re-
membering vocabularies in English or Chinese. Experienced players know and re-
member more patterns or chunks than the beginners do. However, it is also obvi-
ous that placing vocabularies together will not necessarily make meaningful sentences.
The amount of familiar chunks in the memory alone is not sufficient enough to explain
expertise in general. Chess as a domain has the tendency to veil this aspect of necessity.
Because these so called familiar chunks are themselves the conditions or actions which
form the production systems. To our delight, the organization of the domain knowl-
edge of Go experts reveals this property. This is the main argument of this chapter and
detailed discussion can be found in later chapters.
4.3 Go versus Chess
Chess is both a recurrent example of Simon’s argument and his main focus of HPS. The
game of Go, which is more complicated than Chess in terms of complexity, however,
is very different from Chess from many points of view. It is still reasonable to extend
Simon’s research on Chess to the game of Go as a small step, because Go still has an ob-
jectively well-defined problem space compared to other problems which we encounter
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in reality. This section is dedicated to bridge the domain of Chess to Go through an
information-processing path among many other possibilities. We place importance on
selective heuristics and those methods which do not engage in selectivity are irrelevant
for HPS and therefore, ignored.
One of the reasons why Go is worth studying despite the success of Chess is
related to the directions taken by contemporary Artificial Intelligence. I believe that
AI has unfortunately been understood as merely concerned with “machine’s intelli-
gence.” Any algorithm that disregards the human limitation of computational capac-
ity will be considered as outside the scope of Herbert Simon’s definition for AI, which
is synonymous to information processing for Simon.
4.3.1 Artificial Intelligence
If there is an AI spectrum where “Brute-force” is at one end, and “Knowledge” at the
other, then HPS should be located at a place very close to the end of Knowledge. It
shows once again that our computational power is very severely restricted but we are
very good at reasoning and accumulating knowledge. Any form of algorithm that
tends to work towards the side of “Brute-force” is a deviation from human charac-
teristics and thus contributes almost no insight to “intelligence”, instead only to the
“artificial”. From this point of view, Go serves as a good example due its massive
branching factor while searching a game tree. Brute-force algorithms were never un-
der consideration in the field of Computer Go at the beginning since its vastness was
beyond the reach of brute-force AI.
Taking advantage of the improvements in the speed of digital computers today,
many competent algorithms rely on brute force search rather than strategic or selective
search. Relying on the speed and power of digital computers is entirely justifiable if
we program computers to assist our daily work, but an Artificial Intelligence that is
divorced from Cognitive Psychology seems hardly just. Furthermore, if one day the
computer Go in AI reaches a level of beating a human grandmaster, then that result
should be a consequence, not the aim of information-processing AI.
Before modern supercomputers were born, it was clear to the Chess programmers
that increasing the computational power of a physical device cannot reduce the com-
plexity of the problem as effectively as selectivity. However, the charm of the speed of
computer took over in 1990’s. It is about the timewhen Kasparov was defeated byDeep
Blue.The victory of Deep Blue over Chess champion Kasparov in 1997 is one of the in-
dicators of triumph of computer Chess achieving enough expertise. Many believe that
Deep Blue benefited from its specifically designed hardware, which facilitates the pro-
gram to evaluate two million positions in one second. The same success of brute force
has not been seen in the world of Computer Go till then. Two widely accepted reasons
which might explain this phenomenon are (i) Go playing skill is knowledge-intensive
and (ii) there is no appropriate evaluation function.
The ability and quality of HPS and machine problem solving are usually exam-
ined through competitions. Inevitably, people pay more attention to those programs
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and human experts that win the title or beat all other competitors. This diverts at-
tention from the key characteristics which contribute to these triumphs and to the
qualitative distance between human methods and machine methods, despite being
the “strongest” program. It is both commendable and sad at the same time that Chess
playing programs already have the ability to beat human champions. It is commend-
able because it is a big achievement for artificial intelligence. It is sad because people
might be mislead to overlook the existing gap between humans and machines and
think that Chess as a complex problem has been “solved.” I want to emphasise that
the game of Go is a good paradigm because it reminds us that such a gap does exist.
It should be clear by now that the research on problem solving is, in many cases,
fulfilled by machines (algorithm), which consist of procedures that the researchers de-
rive from their observations and deduction. However, these procedures of the ma-
chines may be completely different from those applied by the human problem solvers,
whose methods of solving a problem can sometimes be imprecisely described or ob-
served. Therefore, all the procedures discovered in artificial intelligence are in the form
of approximations to different extent and the gap between the procedures of machines
and those of human beings exist in principle.
Go is an important and fascinating paradigm for our future research not only
because it is far more complex than Chess or any other problem, but because it is too
complex and ill-structured from the point of view of mechanical brute-force search,
which still plays anmajor role in AI. If we interview an expert of Go, wemight find out
that many problems that are computationally complex are not complex at all for him or
her. In other words, the expert may be able to sense a good solution in a short period of
time when a computer program needs to take a massive amount of resource to achieve
the same result or worse. An intuitive answer to the question “why is there a huge
gap between the performance of Go programs and human Go experts?” may be that
the game is no longer so objectively complex to the experts. The huge computational
complexity that a novice (or a preliminary programmer) suffers from has vanished or
been transformed. Computer programs can not improve qualitatively if they do not
find the right internal representations.
In Simon and Schaeffer (1992), a summary of the status of computer Chess asso-
ciated with artificial intelligence is provided. The development of computer chess was
divided into three eras - pioneering era (pre-1975), technology era, and algorithm era
(post-1985). The similar remark on the three eras is made by David Erbach17 in a re-
port written after his participation of the workshop on New directions in game-tree search,
in which many remarkable pioneers of computer chess participated. Among the con-
ference papers, they were only two contributions on Go. Erbach showed his concern
and regret on the rapidly increasing number of Chess programs:
“Here is my summary of some of the points they made. Go does not yet
suffer from most of these. In fact, by a sort of curious inversion, they show
17He was the editor of a quarterly journal (magazine) called Computer Go which functioned during
1986 winter and 1991 spring.
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why computer go research is interesting. But the winds may blow the same
way:
“Research in computer chess has progressed over the past three decades
to the point where programs will soon be grandmaster strength. Superfi-
cially this accomplishment seems impressive ... However, three decades of
progress have relegated the program of building chess programs to only
a peripheral relationship with AI. Why has chess fallen from grace to the
mainstream research community.”
Computer chess may be said to have passed through three periods: the
first pioneering ear . . . The second technical era was marked by the exploita-
tion of the brute-force α− β search. . . .Now, a new algorithm era has begun
with emphasis on new search methods, such as “selective deepening.”
But “why haven’t we tackle the real problems of knowledge representa-
tion, acquisition, and usage?”. . .
There is no doubt these tournaments have been a tremendous boosts to
computer chess. But how does one search for solution to difficult problems,
if success may take many years, when one has an obligation to have an
improved program each year?. . .
“. . . There is lots of theory on search algorithm... However, there is no
theory of chess knowledge and its interactions with the search. Chess pro-
grammers alter their program and have no means for understanding the
potential consequences of change. Instead, they usually conduct experi-
ments to see if the change is beneficial.” ”
Erbach (1989), p.9, italics in the original.
Chess as a domain has contributed to the success of game-tree search techniques,
such as those approaches that benefit from α − β procedure. However, being a much
younger domain, Go has resulted in more ‘advanced’ search approaches up to now.
The competitive computer Go programs up to year 2000 all discard full-width brute
force search and apply selective and heuristic search with the aids of goal-oriented
pattern recognition, life-and-death analysis, etc.. They have reached the advanced kyu
level. However, the contemporary computer go rarely takes the direction of HPS, in-
stead they look for statistical sampling search - such as Monte Carlo. Optimization
technique is also quite ubiquitous in Computer Go literature. “Crazystone” is the
strongest program up to date. It has beaten Yoshio Ishida (9 dan)18 on March, 20,
2013.
4.3.2 Decision Making in CBE and Board Games
We need to understand why board games are important paradigms in CBE to under-
stand decision making. Then, we can appreciate why and what characteristics of Go
make it a better candidate than chess. CBE views that decision making entities (no
18He is a Japanese professional Go player who has won many important titles
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matter individuals or institutions) adapt to the external environment by manipulating
or re-configuring their internal structures. Objective optimality may not make much
sense as a criterion, because the systems in such decision making entities might have
their functional criteria derived from different dimensions. A solution is considered as
good, if it solves the current problem to a degree that is satisfying to all the faculties.
For example, if we consider the human body as a system that contains many subsys-
tems, then there is no ‘best state’ of the system. Because each system is in charge of
different aspects of the functions of life, it is more likely that they have conflicts in their
needs. However, a healthy body is the kind of system that keeps a good balance of the
operation of each subsystems. The same structure reflects on individual decision mak-
ing. A decision, or a problem always involves more than one dimension (attribute) of
our lives. A good solution is a satisfying solution that adaptively takes into account all
aspects of the needs.
Herbert Simon, with one foot in the theory and applications of computation and
the other foot in theories and practice of HPS (where Chess played a crucial role) came
to suggest a few economic domains to which procedural rationality can apply. They are
“normative microeconomics”, “theory of business cycle”, and “Schumpeterian domain
of long-term dynamics” (Simon, 1978b). He was confident enough to address that
these three topics may not be the only and the most promising economic areas to be
benefited by procedural rationality. We suggest that taking the game of Go as a fine
extension fromHPS is very likely to unveil more economic areas to the collection of this
application and the like. Given the above discussion, we can summarize the aspects
that concern Classical Behavioural Economics in the context of HPS.
1. Core premises: Satisficing, Heuristics, Bounded Rationality, IPS, HPS, Compu-
tational Complexity, Computability Theory. Finding ‘satisficing’ choices is the
ultimate goal. There may be several sub-goals with in a problem.
2. Any issue that addresses severe computational limitations of the real computing
entities, who face objectively complex problems and their abilities to solve the
problem satisfactorily well are of concern for CBE.
3. CBE is interested in understanding the growth and evolution of organizations
(organism) in complex environments.
4. It strives to comprehend the ‘procedurally’ rational processes that are involved
in (organisational) decision making, both at individual19 and institutional levels.
5. It seeks for a general theory of human decision making along the lines of an
information-processing approach.
This thesis has taken an initiative on the last point above and suggests that Go
is a promising domain for characterising a more general theory of HPS. First a all,
19It is possible to view an individual as an organization in terms of knowledge during problem solv-
ing.
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using “games” as domains of inquiry is not unfamiliar to behavioural economists. The
popular examples in behavioural economics are the notion of a lottery and some social
games, e.g. dictator game, ultimatum game, trust games, to name a few.
Board games are shown to be comprehensive and representative subjects for
investigating many different aspects of human decision making (Gobet et al., 2004).
Computer Science, which provides the techniques to transform the ‘processes’ of deci-
sion making into executable algorithms serve as a platform to test and validate differ-
ent cognitive models. A field in Cognitive Science believes that board games provide
a solid and a rich platform to study human behaviour in the face of uncertainty. Chess
is well studied and while Go is a new challenge even within cognitive science.
An important message of this chapter is that knowledge plays a central role in
complex problem solving. Chess expertise, for example, involves the perception of
meaningful chunks that suggest good candidate moves. Therefore, domain-specific
knowledge has gained a lot of attention for constructing expert systems. It seems to
suggest that the expert system aimed for specific task environments should be build
independently based on the domain-specific knowledge. Nonetheless, human beings
as general-purpose thinking and reasoning organisms can potentially be all kinds of
experts. A human being can be educated with medical knowledge for ten years and
become a practitioner, likewise, for artists, mathematicians, and lawyers, etc.20. Al-
though, there is no doubt that there exist individual differences in talent, human be-
ings’ potential strongly induces queries such as “what are the general characteristics or
architectures underpinning knowledge acquisition”, “what is the general structure of
knowledge?” “how does new knowledge emerge from existing knowledge”, “to what
extent our knowledge can be represented?”. “If the concepts are not innate, can we
really begin with nothing?”
The game of Go as an increasingly important example in artificial intelligence,
which has as least two advantages over other problems; first, the representation of the
game in the program is fairly simple, because the game is played by identical stones
with black and white colors. Second, the structure of the game is general enough so
that its problem solving architecture can be applied to more problems in the future
(Reitman et al., 1974).
A domain like Chess has helped us unveil many aspects of human thinking and
problem solving activities. It has somewhat reached the limitation that is inherent in
the nature of the game. The game of Go, on one hand, still belongs to the category of
board games where we can confidently claim that the subject is fully working within
the problem space confined by the its task environment when he/she is solving the
Go problem. On the other hand, it is a qualitatively different from Chess and provides
more insights to HPS as we will see below.
The distance between Chess andGo is evident, in particular, Burmeister and Wiles
(1995) has provided an illuminating summary and listed out 12 features by which
Chess and Go can be differentiated. Among the distinctions, the most remarkable ones
20Personally I think that philosophers do not fit for this law, on the contrary, too much training might
kill a philosopher!
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are that i) in computer Go there is still no good enough evaluation function like the
ones in Chess. This property is the main obstacle in computer Go when defeating hu-
man grandmasters or other computer Go programs. ii) Go games do not terminate
with absolutely defined configurations, instead it requires certain levels of mutual un-
derstanding between the players. There are several other interesting and important
distinctions can be added to their list, Some of them are peripheral observations and
some of them lead to deeper discussions in the next chapter:
1. In Chess, the player are provided with a team of army and a small battlefield; In
Go, the players are provided with a big piece of land and identical rawmaterials.
2. The operator in Go is extremely simple, the complexity should result from the
meta-level organisation.
3. Lookahead might be more straightforward in Go then in Chess. Because Go re-
quires the players simply to add stones to the board, but in Chess, the players
have to move the icon, not only what to move, but also where to move.
4. History is much more important in Go then it is in Chess. Thus, static analysis of
a given board configuration cannot always contribute to selecting a good move.
5. Game tree may not be a good representation of Go any more.
6. “Life and death” problem is not so crucial in Chess.
7. In Go, players also need to calculate and care about the number of points they
can potentially get to a very precise level, although this scheme happens mostly
in endgame. One or two points here and there can flip the result of the game
eventually.
8. Board coordinate is less important in Go than it is in Chess. Because the Go board
is highly symmetrical.
9. The counterparts of ‘chunks’ in Go are called ‘Go terms’, both of which however
are qualitatively very different. Chunks consists of definite icons and relations
among them. In contrast, patterns recognized by Go players are categorized with
the aid of definitions labelled by a given ‘Go term’. A Go-term may not refer to
a single or definite configuration (like a chunk in chess). Instead, it refers to a
membership criterion in which many qualitatively similar patterns are grouped
using single definition (a Go-term)
The research questions asked in this chapter result from the fact that there is a
delay of at least 2 decades of achievement in computer Go in contrast to the one of
Chess. There were attempts at programming Go with the intention of dissecting the
structure of the game itself, such as the programs of Zobrist (1969) and Reitman et al.
(1974). The common drawback of these programs is that they all ignore the physical
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limitations of human beings. It is very tempting to utilize the speed and space that
digital computer is now equipped with, but then it is in some sense harmful if we aim
to understand how human beings can be selective in search and perform very well as
an expert.
There are at least two ways to tackle and understand the distance between Chess
and Go. One is to simply accept that Go is an extremely complex problem and develop
more efficient and powerful “artificial” programs to solve it. Another one is to take a
few steps back andwonder themystery underlying human cognition while playing the
game of Go and obtain insights for potential algorithmic approaches to a build a strong
Go playing program. The second direction matches with the spirit of HPS. Many at-
tempts have been made on the second direction, such as Saito and Yoshikawa (1995),
Saito and Yoshikawa (1996), Yoshikawa et al. (1999), Saito and Yoshikawa (2000), Burmeister
(2000), Burmeister et al. (2000), and Gobet et al. (2004). These research attempts guide
the postulates of the next chapter.
I conjecture that Go is a more general paradigm than Chess, in other words a
superset21 of Chess. This specifically relates to knowledge representation structures,
where the chunks in Chess are merely special cases when compared to Go terms. The
problem space is far more complex in Go. The reasoning and hence the production
systems in Go are way more intricate than Chess. The terminal configurations in Go
are not as well defined as in Chess and therefore, providing a more general setting
to investigate strategies, decision procedures, evolution of goals, stopping rules, tacit
knowledge etc. In particular, the generality of Go in comparison with Chess is demon-
strated by a more general architecture of IPS of playing Go in thesis (see section 5.4).
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In orthodox economics and modern behavioural economics, an individual decision
maker is oftenmodelled as amathematician solving optimization problems; in classical
behavioural economics, where algorithms play a central role, the decision maker is
modelled as an IPS. Unfortunately, the latter is often misperceived and dismissed as
a bloodless machine. We reiterate that IPS is actually a general representation of the
mental architecture of a human problem solver.
CBE adopts theory of HPS, which has been proved to be one of the fruitful ap-
proaches to understand the human heuristics and procedures in decision making. The
gap between the realistic procedures and the procedures in theory, in terms of problem
solving, stem from the discrepancy between true internal representations of a problem
and those internal representations that are assumed by the researchers.
In CBE, decision making is multidimensional in general. It is tied to different
goals and needs of decision making entities. A preference ordering over a set of al-
ternatives can never be ‘effectively’ generated in general. A decision is an output of
21The idea of a superset is still vague so far, because it can be understood through different media,
such as mathematical properties, complexity and educational motivations, etc..
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structured procedures that take into account all the faculties involved. Satisficing is
not sub-optimality, but merely an action which ensures a good balance among the as-
pirations from different faculties.
In Go the power of brute force computing is very insignificant, therefore, it pro-
vides the genuine test bed for AI. This chapter attempted to show that the game of
Go is a rich domain for understanding decision making in CBE, cognitive psychology
and computer science, the three fields which are intrinsically connected by HPS. It pro-
vides a different point of view about this game and concludes that Go serves a impor-
tant domain for CBE in terms of organisational decision making (it is a quintessential
case that matches the manifesto of Simon (1944, 1947, 1979, 1991a)), for cognitive psy-
chology in terms of memory structure and knowledge acquisition, and for computer
science in terms of new criteria for knowledge representation. One of the main mes-
sages of this chapter that will be relevant for the next chapter is: “Chunking theories




The Game of Go: An IPS Interpretation
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, the game of Go and the abilities and behaviour of Go players are inves-
tigated. In addition to the selectivity that is universal and a recurring theme in human
problem solving, Go players rely heavily on the use of Go terminology. With the aid of
evidences obtained from various Go documentations1, a pseudo Information Process-
ing System (COMPOSER) is constructed to explain the problem solving aspect of Go.
In particular, COMPOSER highlights and encompasses the verbal processing aspect of
problem solving in Go.
In the previous chapter, we have seen the development of Chess playing pro-
grams where the chunks in Chess knowledge play a critical role in explaining Chess
expertise. Throughout this chapter, the readers’ attention it to be drawn to the observa-
tion that almost all labelled chunks in Chess have definite number of items, members,
and relations among the members. That is to say, a program can reproduce exactly the
same pattern when it is given a name (symbol) of that chunk. In other words, there is
an one-to-one correspondence between the label of a chunk and the pattern of a chunk.
However, many Go terminologies refer to definitions on membership or concept2
rather than a single and specific configuration. That is, many patterns can be referred
to the same term, and the program may not be able to display all the cases that belong
to it. An immediate example is the Check Mate in Chess that it works on definition. It
is a “many-to-one” relation.
The main argument of this chapter extends from the above observation and some
investigation into the problem: The problem spaces of Go are semantically richer than the
ones of Chess3. This statement follows from the research on Go based on problem solv-
1Among the various documentaries discussed in this chapter, the verbal protocol that comes from
Simon’s tradition of protocol analysis plays the most important role.
2By concept, our understanding of it coincides with its definition Simon and Kotovsky (in 1963,
p.534), “a concept is taken to mean a subclass of some class of objects, or, alternatively, a procedure
for identifying a particular object as belonging to, or not belonging to, such a subclass.”
3Recall that the problem space should be distinguished from task environment, see previous chapter
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ing tasks and protocol analyses and closer observation of Go terminologies. Go play-
ers’ reasoning operates not only with specific patterns but also the meanings of a con-
figuration, thus some of the intermediate responses produced in the course of problem
solving are the output of the higher-level production systems. If we are allowed to
expand this interpretation to other task environments, then our conjecture is that more
ill-structured a task environment is, more semantic the problem space might be.
The fundamental difference between Go and Chess emphasized by this study is
that the explicit rules of the game of Go is extremely simplistic and the most elemen-
tary units of Go are the characterless and identical stones. However, massive number
of implicit rules have emerged from the accumulated Go knowledge that is encapsu-
lated by the Go terms. Without the understanding these implicit rules and their inter-
relationships that are known to the human players, it is impossible to conduct effective
evaluation procedures like those successful cases in Chess.
The general properties of the game of Go that are summarized in this chapter
match those of many real-life problem domains that concern CBE. A decision making
process involves a number of faculties, which are in turn driven by different regula-
tions and even interactions with other faculties. If we take these implicit rules into
account, the regularity of Go is much more complex than other domains than it may
appear at first. A better player can understand and manipulate higher level rules (con-
cepts) that are not comprehended thoroughly by the intermediate players. Therefore,
this chapter suggests that the beauty of Go lies not in the search algorithms alone, but
in the organization of Go terms and inferences that can derive from them.
Section 5.2 introduces the game of Go, its mythical origin, rules, and its relevance
to other problems. Section 5.3 provides a more detailed analysis of the problem spaces
of Go in the perspective of Go learners and players. Section 5.4 brings together the
evidences of problem solving of Go and suggests a theoretically feasible pseudo IPS
that explains the behaviour of Go problem solvers.
5.2 Game of Go
The game of Go is believed to be roughly 4,000 years old, making it the most ancient
board game in the world and it seems to have originated in China. There is no consen-
sus on its precise origin. It was a game played by aristocrats and royals. The contem-
porary version of the game is played worldwide on a 19 by 19 board. There was an
evolution of board sizes and from archaeological evidences, board size with 15 by 15,
17 by 17 and 19 by 19 were found at different sites.
This game appeared in classical Chinese literature and folk stories, and some of
them are mythical and exaggerated. For example, some ancient Go veterans cared
about their game and dedicated themselves so much so that when they were about to
lose a game they vomited blood and died. Although Go originated in China, it later
developed and was preserved in Japan. Even in Japan, there were several aristocratic
‘Go families’, in which the title of the Go master goes only to their sons. Yasunari
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Kawabata, a winner of a Nobel prize in literature, has written a story which records
the historical match that ended the 300-year old of aristocratic tradition (Honinmbo).
This match lasted for almost 6 months.
A game of Go, played on a relatively big board with very elementary rules and
identical stones, can last for days or months if there is no time limit specified. A com-
plete game if often roughly divided into three phases: Opening, mid-game and end
games. The target in the opening stage is to get a good span on the board, because the
arrangement on the board can be used to develop future solid territory. At this stage,
fierce short distance battles are rare. At the mid-game, there are many local life-and-
death and killing battles and the boundaries between territories are still vague. In the
endgame, the players are usually competing for one point because the rest of the terri-
tories are all settled. At this stage, players usually have to look for the “optimal play”.
The most important feature which distinguishes Go from Chess is that the stones are
added to the board without being removed (except for being captured) one by one.
Thus, killing (capture) such as the exchange in Chess is never the main goal of the
game. When a game is finished, there are plenty of stones remaining on the board; on
the other hand, a Chess gamemay endwith only few pieces on the board. The ultimate
skill of playing Go is the ability to balance the whole board and detect the weakness of
the opponent.
5.2.1 Go Rules
One of the attractions of Go is that it is possible for a novice to learn the rules and to
recognize those important rule-concerning patterns in a few minutes, however, facing
a rather empty board, a novice might not have a clue on what to do.
AGo board has 19 vertical lines and 19 horizontal lineswhich intersect 361 points.
There are 9 small black dots on the board, and they are called the star points (See figure
5.1). The game is played by two people, who sit face to face with the board in the
middle. One player possesses 181 black stones, and the other holds 180 white stones.
The total number of stones is exactly the number of grids on the board. The stones are
initially stored in the containers. Conventionally, the weaker player takes Black and
the stronger players takes White. The game terminates after both two players pass in
succession or by resignation. The player who gets a higher score by surrounding more
territories wins the game.
The Black places the very first stone on the board, and every point of the grid
is possible. White places the second stone. They continue to place one stone at a
time alternatively on an unoccupied intersection. Every vacant point is a legal move
except for two cases: suicide and Ko4. A player commits suicide in the game when the
placement of a stone causes the exhaustion of liberties of his/her own chain of stones.
Suicide is not allowed, because a chain of stones which has no liberty will be captured
4In this chapter, all the Go terms will be italicized and their meanings are either explained in the text
or collected in the Appendix A in the alphabetical order.
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Figure 5.1: An Empty Go Board
and become the prisoners of the opponent. The idea of liberty and chain need to be
defined later. Ko is a situation of (infinitely) alternating capture of opponent’s single
stone that causes repeating loops of the board configuration. The possibility of infinite
loops resulting from this kind of capturing is excluded by Go rules. Ko situations will
be demonstrated later.
Chains, Liberties and Go
A chain is a unit of stones that are either vertically or horizontally adjacent to each
other. By definition, a single stone is a chain of one stone. The Go rules can be more
illustratively explained by the aid of the small diagrams within figure 5.2. Diagram a
shows that a chain of two black stones which are horizontally connected, on the other
hand, Diagram b shows the same case for vertical connection. Diagram c is an example
of a chain of 3 stones. Diagram d is a counterexample; this is not a chain of two stones,
but two unconnected stones. Diagram e is an example of a chain of 8 white stones.
Liberty After knowing the definition of a chain, it is then straightforward to observe
the liberties of a chain. Diagram f shows the liberties of a single stone. The liberties
of the stone are marked with the star signs. By definition, the liberties of a stone are
the unoccupied intersections immediately adjacent to the stones through the ways (the
lines). They are called liberties in English, because these are the ways through which
the a chain of stones can be extended. As it is shown in the Diagram f , a single stone
which is located at the interior part of a board has at most 4 liberties. Diagram g shows
a chain of 3 stones and its 8 liberties.
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Figure 5.2: Demonstration of the Go Rules
Capture In Diagram h, 4 liberties of the single black stones are occupied by 4 white
stones, therefore, the black stone has run out of liberties and is about to be captured by
White. Diagram i shows the situation after the black stone is captured. Black can NOT
place a stone to the × position any more. By doing so, the black stone will be captured
as soon as it is place on that spot; this is suicide and is prohibited. However, there
is an exception when suicide is allowed, that is the placement exhausts the liberties
of opponent’s chain even though that position is also the last liberty of own stones.
Diagram j shows an example of this case. It seems that Black cannot place a stone at
the ? point, because it is a suicide. However, by doing so, the two white stones with the
∆ mark have also run out of their liberties, therefore are captured. In this case, Black is
allowed to place a stone at the ? point to capture 2 white stones. If it is White’s turn,
then White can also place a stone at the ? point to capture the single black stone.
Ko Diagram k is a standard shape of Ko. Black can place a stone at the ? point and
capture the single white stone, and the result is in Diagram m. In Diagram m, if While
places a stone immediately at the blue dot, the configuration goes back to Diagram k.
By doing so alternatively, the board enters an infinite loop of Diagram k and m. To
prevent this from happening, the rule about Ko is that after the board changes from
Diagram k to m for the first time, the White is prohibited to recapture the black stone
immediately, he/she has to place the white stone somewhere else, and then it will be
the Black’s turn again. After Black plays at the blue dot to win/terminate the Ko or
elsewhere, White is now allowed to recapture the black stone and continue the Ko
fight if the blue dot is not filled.
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Other regulations
The above discussion has explained the Go rules. Note that, the stones, once placed
on the board, will not be removed, except for being captured. After the game is fin-
ished (either by passes from both sides in succession or resignation), the scores will be
calculated to decide the winner.
Score Count Score counting is not very straightforward, and the beginners are not ex-
pected to perform it flawlessly. It demands the player to identify the territories which
are composed by a hierarchy of stones from the rather complex configurations and the
neutral points (dame). The hierarchies of the Go stones on the board can be classified
into: stone, string (chain), group, territory, and the whole board. Up to strings, they
are clearly defined, and groups that are alive are a potential territory. However, the
definition of the groups is rather vague and sometimes they are overlapping.
There are two systems of calculating scores: Chinese counting and Japanese count-
ing. In Chinese counting, both the own stones on the board and the vacant area
surrounded are considered as a final territory and an imprisoned stone is worth two
points. In Japanese counting, only the vacant areas on the board are final territory and
an imprisoned stone is worth one point. Based on the definitions of these twomethods,
there are respective counting heuristic procedures applied by the players. The essential
result from calculating is the difference in scoring of the two sides. Therefore, despite
the fact that these two methods are slightly different, the consequences (the winner)
are the same.
Komi and Handicap Black plays first in Go, so it is believed that Black receives some
privilege. In order to compensateWhite, 5-8 points (commonly it is 5.5 or 6.5 to prevent
the draw) will be given to White at the end of the game. This rule is rather modern,
it was formally introduced in the first half of 20th century. Komi is the compensation
for White being the second hand. There is another compensation called handicap for
the differences in players’ strength. The number of handicap stones can vary from one
to nine, and they are placed on the star points traditionally. Normally the number of
stones indicates the difference in the player’s rank.
Ranking System The ranking in Go begins with 30 kyu; and as the player improves,
it decreases one kyu at a time to 1 kyu. After kyu stage, it comes amateur dan which
ranges from 1 to 7 dan (with abbreviation d). The successive stage is professional dan
which ranges from 1 to 9 dan (with abbreviation p).
5.2.2 The Philosophical Reflections of Go
“One of the most extraordinary aspects of the game of go is that it has
been proven that in order to win, you must live, but you must also allow
the other player to live. Players who are too greedy will lose: it is a subtle
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game of equilibrium, where you have to get ahead without crushing the
other player. In the end, life and death are only the consequences of how
well or how poorly you have made your construction.”
- Go proverb, author unknown.
The game of Go is essentially a game of territory, not a game of killing. Of course,
some local attacking and battles are inevitable in a game. The ultimate target is to
survive in ways better than the opponent. The kind of subtlety in Go can also be seen
as being analogous to many real-life problems
Its Counterparts
The nature of the game of Go has beenmetaphorically linked with many different kind
of conflicts, dilemma and problems in real situations. These situations include warfare,
politics and international relations; between two players or business competitions be-
tween two rivals. Due to the nature and ultimate goal of the game - occupying larger
territory - it provides more freedom for high-level reasoning than the pure killing tac-
tics do.
The battle between black andwhite by using their seemingly powerless and iden-
tical stones has given rise to different metaphors and semantics of the Go board. These
metaphors, in turn, play important roles in the analysis of the games. Moriarty (1996)
suggests that there are three semiosis of the Go board: warfare5, light and dark, and
life. Let me bring together some other metaphors to this collection: drops of oil and
water, electronic charge (Zobrist, 1969). Different ways of perception will lead to dif-
ferent internal representations and in turn affect the way of reasoning6.
Understanding Go via Go Seigen
One can get many interesting and deep perspectives about this game in real life through
reading the autobiography of Go Seigen (WuQingyuan)7, who is considered as the best
Go player in the 20th century. The autobiography is basically organized in chronolog-
ical order and with plenty of his mentors, friends, competitors, etc., as sections.
Go Seigen, who was born in China and whose talent for Go was discovered by a
Japanese, was one of the three pupils of Kensaku Segoe. Lee Chang-ho (a South Ko-
rean player), 60 years younger than Wu, was considered as the second best Go player.
However, they play with very different styles, that is, Lee is a conservative and Wu
was innovative. One of the reasons for this difference might be that at Go Seigen’s era,
5Boorman (1969) interpreted Mao’s revolution by using the game of Go.
6Myhunch is that at different stages of the game, differentmetaphors are applied. If we are interested
in building a machine which is capable of learning to play good Go, then we cannot ignore how a good
player is trained.
7Go Seigen was also the person who invented the 9 by 9 board with the intention to broadly promote
the game of Go to Western societies. He realized that women’s opinion in western families is quite
dominating, therefore, it is better to attract females’ attention first.
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there was no regulation of Komi; therefore White who has the disadvantage of playing
after Black has to fight more aggressively than maintaining the balance on the board.
Go Seigen and Mironu Kitani were the best rivals and friends; the first game
played by Wu and Kitani was a mimic Go8 which upset Kitani a lot, but according to
Wu, that was the only way to beat Kitani. Wu started the game by placing the stone
on the tengen (the very center of the board) and began the mimic Go, i.e. playing on
the symmetric point where White has just played. Wu lost by two points. After this
match, they became friends and invented new fuseki that focuses the central territory
together.
From Go Seigen’s own lifelong study of Go, he concludes that the game should
be viewed as a whole, rather than as a combination of different openings or styles. A
good move for him is the move that balances all parts on the board, just like the balance
of Ying and Yang9.
5.3 Problem Solving of Go
Herbert Simon never aimed to create an ambitious model, which can comprehensively
explain every characteristics of human thinking. Here, my aim is to provide an ini-
tiative of problem solving for Go, along the direction that Simon has set up. Despite
abundant studies in the literature of computer Go, the application of satisficing as the
principle to mimic human selective search is rather rare. However, it is always impor-
tant to start somewhere. My target at the stage of this thesis is to construct a general
architecture capable of playing Go, which allows individual differences to be its de-
tailed content and learning across time (adaptive behaviour).
The study of problem solving of Go is not new, especially it is a popular domain
for computer science, combinatorial game theory and cognitive psychology. There are
competitive commercial programs of Go and studies of Go players’ behaviour, but so
far there are no concrete algorithms of Go which are developed out of the premises
of IPS. This section focuses on understanding the possible problem spaces and the
acquisition of expertise of Go, with occasional reference to Chess which is one of its
precursor in HPS.
In the real Go games, the only external memory that the players have is the Go
board itself. Unlike Chess, Go players can spend as much time as they need10 for a
move, therefore, sometimes a play can last for days. I’m motivated to uncover the
mental processes which go on in the head of the players when they spend a lot of time
staring at the board.
As for a tentative remark, individual players differ in the ways in which they
construct the problem spaces given the same task environment. As we will see soon in
8This involves the player making exactly symmetrical moves of the opponent.
9From this point of view it seems to be formally tied to Satisfiability problem, in which the objective
is to find the solution which satisfies all the sub-goals of the game.
10At least in the old Japanese tradition.
91 Chapter 5
this chapter, the problem spaces that the subjects construct differ in the quantity and
the quality of the semantics.
5.3.1 Problems and Task Environment
There are at least two kinds of task environments in standard games of Go. One is to
decide to make a single move by looking at a given configuration on the board11. The
other is to start the game from an empty board and play alternatively one stone at a
time with the opponent.
When a subject faces the first kind of task, there are pros and corns in contrast
to a real game. On one hand, the subject has no definite idea about the sequence
of game which results in the configuration presented; on the other hand, the sub-
ject does not need to face the consequence of his/her solution12. When a player is
given a static configuration, then the player should spend some time and effort to
have an overview about the configuration and decide the sub-goal of this move13 (the
“search widely scene” introduced on p.737 or “initial orienting behavior” on p.776 in
Newell and Simon (1972)). The amount of computation spent on overall search varies
according to tasks and also the strength of the players.
The second type of task environment is exactly the same as how a standard game
is conducted. A normally executed game lasts for more than 200 moves, as a result,
the players have to plan more carefully and activate all the faculties that take care of
different aspects of a game. The player is facing the consequence of each move thus
he/she has to inspect the flow of his own thought and the opponent’s purpose and
make successive moves. Although the playersmight interpret the board configurations
differently over time, these changes often result from the new input, i.e, the latest move
by the opponent. The players may focus their attention more precisely on particular
goals or regions without much orientation and in turn generate a few candidate moves.
In this kind of task, a procedure for reasoning and playing 200+ moves is certainly not
equivalent to an exact sum of each single move. This is different from the first type of
task environment in which it is possible to carry out static evaluations and generate a
move from taking current board configuration as the input. Here, a holistic perspective
and history of the previous moves matter. It is unlikely that a player can generate
a good move, simply by looking at the current configuration of the board, without
a knowledge of the different battles and aims that characterized the game thus far.
This directly relates to the inability of devising robust evaluation functions for a static
configuration. In this sense, the game of Go is more dynamic. It can be more or less in
11It is exactly like the task faced by S2 in Chapter 12 of Newell and Simon (1972) and de Groot’s
subjects.
12One exception to this statement is found in those problems set designed for educating Go learners.
Such problems may appear as soon as a new concept is taught. However, most of the problem sets are
hinted with the sub-goals and are provided with possible answers. Therefore, the trainee can know
whether his/her solution is right or wrong as soon as he/she answers.
13Because, anyway the subject cannot win the game with only one move!
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different cases. Sometimes there is only one candidate for a goodmove, and sometimes
a move is forced.
I believe that a good player has the ability to solve both two kinds of task effec-
tively, because this is how they are trained and practice. Likewise, a reasonable Go
program should differentiate these two kinds of task environments; that is, whether it
is in a course of a game or whether it is given a configuration as input and is expected
to generate a good move as output14.
5.3.2 Heuristics: evidences from Go literate and documentations
In the history of Go, there have been many different themes of play which were pop-
ular in their respective eras. A theme is related to a certain pattern or strategy that
should be used at a certain stage of the game. These themes are claimed to have been
invented by famous players and largely discussed by media press and veterans alone
in the initial stages. Gradually the themes will appear in the analyses of commentaries
and later be included into pedagogical textbooks.
Due to the time and space limitations, the research summarized in this section is
highly selective. In particular, the discussion here is in favour of knowledge represen-
tation, therefore, the most competent approaches in computer Go society -Monte Carlo
sampling - is intentionally omitted due to its irrelevance to human cognition and pro-
cedures. Only those programs that conduct selective search are considered and likely
to be relevant.
Instead of dissecting the problem structure and taking perspectives from a out-
sider or an observer’s point of view, I am more interested in how real Go players per-
ceive this game. This section presents evidence from protocol analysis of Go players
pioneered in 90s and the Go documents which assist Go learners’ and veterans’ devel-
opment and understanding of this game.
Early Go Programs
The earliest attempts to investigate Go players’ perceptions, in the context of artifi-
cial intelligence, are Zobrist (1969); Reitman et al. (1974); Reitman and Wilcox (1975);
Reitman (1976). From the early state of development of Computer Go, the importance
of perception, knowledge and coordination of a good play were amply recognized.
The definition for knowledge in Go was largely influenced by the notion of chunks in
Chess.
Zobrist (1969) emphasizes the importance of the ability to recognize meaningful
patterns of good Go players. Human players visualize a static board and organize the
whole board configuration into their own internal representations. Zobrist’s program
has the following features:
14This problem is less critical in Chess, because there are good static evaluation processes. Therefore,
a Chess playing program can be thought of as a composite of repeated processes of input-output or
stimuli-response procedures.
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• Grouping of stones in terms of local and global perspectives
• Viewing mental picture as internal representations
• When the program reads a board, it generates 7 internal representations as 7 ma-
trices. Each internal representation concerns different attribute of the game, such
as segmentation of a board, the domains of influence of the stones and the armies
of stones.
• There are many built-in templates (chunks) which are n-tuple stones, which con-
tain the relative location of the stones in the template and the respective refer-
ences. The references are characterized as the combination of numerical condi-
tions based on those internal representations.
• The program runs through all the templates which are associated with the in-
ternal representations and simply selects the position which has the maximum
weight. However, how templates assign the weights to the particular positions
when the templates are recognized on the board is rather unclear.
• This program is not able to calculate score when the game ends.
This program may look complicated enough, but its characteristics are remote from
the human ones. To mention a few, human players are unlikely to evaluate a given
configuration on a board by a linear combination of different attributes and criteria.
The programs came after Zobrist’s have a different organization. That is, there are
faculties from different hierarchy in charge of different tasks of the game. This kind of
improvements did contribute to better strength of the programs. The next question
is whether human experts also possess such hierarchical structures in their mind for
playing Go.
Reitman (1976) replicated de Groot and Simon and Chase’s method for finding
the structural difference between Go expert and Go novice. The results of different
treatments suggest that the chunks stored in the memory of experts are not well nested
and very often overlap with each other. This paper is often cited by later papers as a
disputation of chunking theory proposed by Chase and Simon (1973a,b). This result
revealed the very sign of qualitative difference between Chess and Go in the context of
human problem solving.
Cognitive and Protocol Analysis in Go
“The results of the experimental studies indicated that inference im-
pacts to some extent on memory performance, that memory for sequences
of moves is related to Go skill, and that Go is a better domain than chess for
investigating memory for sequences”
Burmeister (2000), p. iv
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The content of this section is a summary of the work by Saito and Yoshikawa
(1995), Saito and Yoshikawa (1996), Yoshikawa et al. (1999), Saito and Yoshikawa (2000),
Burmeister (2000), and Burmeister et al. (2000). They are among the very few whose
work digs into the Go players’ cognitive mechanisms and performance. In general, ac-
cording to the empirical evidence of Go players’ thinking processes, sufficient amount
of inferences are involved. This discovery is a counterexample to de Groot’s assess-
ment that (Chess) masters’ ability is merely an outcome of perception and pattern
recognition.
Yoshikawa et al. (1999), Burmeister and Wiles (1995) and Burmeister (2000) rec-
ognized the dominating role of language that is used to assist sequential memory of
Go players. It is surprising to know that even a static configuration can trigger dynamic
perception, note that “human players recalled the board situation in the sequence order
even when they only observed a static pattern.”(p.297, Yoshikawa et al. (1999)). Lan-
guage or terms used by the Go players connects a sequence of play into meaningful
stories, which reduce the size of the search space dramatically. This research scheme
can also be traced back to de Groot’s analysis and Chase and Simon’s chunking theory.
Burmeister has concluded that inference in problem solving is applied more evidently
by Go players than Chess players.
Iceberg model, which is the source of inspiration for this chapter is proposed by
Yoshikawa et al. (1999) to interpret the advanced players’ ability to communicate with
each other by using highly abstract Go terms. The authors claim that Iceberg model
is related to the template theory15 proposed in Gobet and Simon (1996), but there is a
difference.
The key phrase of the ‘iceberg model’ is that “Each Go term is an iceberg.” (op.
cit. p.295). Metaphorically speaking, the huge part of the iceberg which is under the
surface of sea that is unspoken and unrevealed has the capacity to contain many slots
of emergent meanings of the Go term. Yoshikawa, Kojima, and Saito think that the
slots in the iceberg, which tie to each Go term, are defined dynamically and vaguely
depending to the situation on the board. However, it is said that the slots in template
theory are predefined. The template theory is proposed to extend Chase and Simon’s
chunking theory with new evidence collected from memory tasks of Chess players.
The template hypotheses are proposed for keeping the capacity of Short TermMemory
assumed by Chase and Simon intact.
To complement the chapter’s emphasis on the mysteries behind Go terms, it is
useful to have some examples of Go terms. Themost simplistic Go terms among a huge
glossary are positional terms, which describe the relations between two stones from the
same color that are in a small neighbourhood. Of course, this bunch of locations can be
mirrored to four or eight different directions keeping the reference stone at the center.
Figure 5.3 indicates these spatial or positional Go terms. These terms which appear
frequently in the Go textbooks and commentaries are associated with different aspects
of Go tactics and higher-level concepts. They are like the most basic elements which
15Templates in the cognitive models have their correspondences in AI, such as ‘frames’ in Minsky
(1975), which is later developed into Frame Representation Language by Roberts and Goldstein (1977).
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Figure 5.3: Local Spatial Go Terms that describe the relation between two stones of
the same color. A=nobi(stretch); B=ikken-tobi(one-point jump); C=nikken-tobi(two-point
jump); D=kosumi(diagonal); E=keima(knight’s move); F=ogeima(large knight’s move);
G=daidai-geima(very large knight’s move); H=hazama-tobi(diagonal jump)
go into different levels of Go concepts. Each Go posture has its own dual meanings in
defence and attack, however, those higher-level meanings can only be realized with a
series of follow up and elaboration.
It should be illuminating at this point to systematically bind together the facts
and evidences collected from cognitive observation of Go players by Saito, Yoshikawa
and Burmeister. I summarize the evidence of subjects’ behaviour on Go related tasks
based on novice/expert comparison and general tendencies. It should be noted that
although the distinctions made in table 5.1 is binary and simplified, the evidences col-
lected suggest a smoother spectrum on the variable of individual strength. The Go
players’ abilities and characteristics are in many ways consistent with de Groot’s sub-
jects. However, the use of language and Go terms in players’ thinking processes is
too profound to be ignored. The rationale behind the Go terms should be that naming
a definition or a situation can reduce the time of describing it all over again. Simi-
lar to Chess players, Go players’ cognitive processes also travel through several states
(episodes), such as candidate move generation, lookahead16, evaluation. However, Go
protocols of advanced players are richer in Go terms and show the ability of memo-
rizing the sequences of the games. The second part of the summary after table 5.1 is
mainly based on the behaviour and reports of experienced players.
16According to my intuition, looking ahead by imagining stones being played on the board in suc-
cession seems to be easier than the cases in Chess. Because in Go, the stones are placed and will not be
removed or exchanged, except for being captured. Therefore the imagined sequence of play should be
properly achieved with the aid of external memory, the board.
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Attributes Experts Novices
Board Description Using Go terms Using their own words
Size of Protocol Big Small
Knowledge of Go terms More Less
Positional Judgement in Protocol Yes No
Global Plan Yes No
Strategic Terms Yes No
Evaluation in Protocol Go terms Sentences
Table 5.1: A General Comparison on Protocol between Experts and Novices
The ability to use Go terms In Go player’s protocols, lots of Go specific terms and
idioms appear. Most Go players are equipped with good amount of Go vocabular-
ies, but the individual differences occur in their ability to explain these Go terms in
words. Even weak players can recognize the patterns using Go terms, however, they
are weaker in explaining the terms by placing the stones on the board (retrieval)17. In
the course of making a move, their utterance contains ‘naming’, ‘purposes’, ‘candidate
moves’ most of the time. Even form and positional terms can describe the purpose. Op-
ponent’s move, candidate moves and board situations are usually named and referred
to by the name. An expert player can use only positional terms to imply judgement
and planning. Abstract Go terms (adjectives) used by the experts have more than one
correct answer. When a subject looks at the board, he/she is conscious of the purposes
and future images are expressed through the Go terms. Language level inferences can
be found.
Sometimes a given local configuration on the board may be understood by and
refer to different Go terms by different players and in turn, the deviations in naming
might cause completely different interpretations of the game in retrospect. One of
the examples of pair-Go protocol in Saito and Yoshikawa (1995) shows the situation
when one pattern is understood with different terms by the competing teams. After
the game had finished. Black team said the reason why they lost the game is because
they underestimated the effect of the two white Kake in the center, white 54 and 56, of
figure 5.4. However, the white team simply called white 54 and 56 as “Keima”.
“Keima”, the knight’s move which is introduced in figure 5.3, is simply a posi-
tional term. “Kake” (means press in English, is a term that means to prevent the op-
ponent’s stone from coming out toward the center by blocking them from above) is a
term that conveys the intention and action. Press as a definition can have many various
configuration on the board. In this case, White’s intention of making a knight’s move
in the center confused Black.
17Learning a foreign language has the same phenomena. A word can always be perceived by its
visual, aural or spelling patterns; and a word which contains meaning can be used in forms of conver-
sation and writing. Only when the users nearly fully comprehended the many aspects of a word, can
he/she retrieve it and use it effectively and correctly.
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Figure 5.4: A reproduction of an intermediate game record from a pair-Go match
demonstrated in Saito and Yoshikawa (1995)
Chunking and Board Representation The evidence of chunking of a static Go board
is weak, however, it seems that there exists sequential chunking from the analysis of
episodic memory and inferential memory. The players do not pay attention on the
whole board all the time, but there is a flow of thought about how the game is led. Two
players may also pay attention to different regions on the board. A board configuration
has a hierarchical internal representation in the players’ mind. The hierarchy is a result
of different degrees of abstraction, which is inversely proportional to its relatedness to
the current battlefield. This relatedness is not always associated with spatial proximity
of the stones or closeness. This kind of hierarchy alters according to the status quo of
the game.
Sequential Memory The master players have the ability to remember a sequence
of moves by connecting each move into a story. Especially when joseki are present,
they are easy to be remembered. Unusual moves are remembered as well, because
they surprise the subjects. The rest of the moves are remembered because they make
sense and are meaningful. The story line that the subjects create facilitates them to
predict the successive placement. A static board configuration is read and understood
sequentially. A good player will have his own perception on how a board is developed
from the beginning.
Decision Making Procedures Go players’ decision making procedures contain both
spontaneous and elaborate thinking. A forcing move or a recognized joseki sequence
can trigger fast and inevitable responses. Evaluations of a few candidate moves and
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selection can be instantaneous. When an elaborate lookahead and evaluation are con-
ducted, the players often become silent. It is natural for a player to think from oppo-
nent’s point of view. More than 80% of the time, the players understand their oppo-
nent’s purpose correctly. The losing point of the game happens often when the player
fails to understand his opponent’s purpose.
The generation of candidate moves Advanced players think about their own pur-
pose and their opponents’ purpose at first, only then do they generate candidatemoves
and lookahead. A few candidate moves are generated from quick and pattern-directed
identification process. The number of candidates is one or two and it is very rare that
it is more than five.
The look-ahead behaviour Lookahead does not happen all the time, but it occupies
about 20-30% of their verbal report. Quick look ahead is spontaneously verbalized
and progressive deepening is observed. The average depth is about four, and the most
frequent lookahead is just two moves ahead. Branching-over lookahead occurs early,
and it is more often for binary-branch than tri-branch and very rarely four-branch.
Lookahead in the branches is shorter18.
Evaluation Evaluation of a move varies according to different phases of the game. In
the opening, personal preference and style/feeling are the most frequent reasons. In
the middle game, when looking ahead, players visualize the board situation in their
head (internal representation) and evaluate that situation according to their current
purpose, general good shape or good moyo (large framework of potential territory).
When there is no lookahead, evaluation is quick and instantaneous. Amove is rejected,
if it would in turn present a good move (good response) for the opponent, and a move
is often selected because it achieves several goals simultaneously.
Go textbooks
Looking into Go textbooks is a good way to investigate how Go knowledge can be ac-
cumulated and what kinds of tactical skills are in concern. We can find some construc-
tive procedures of learning Go from the way pedagogical Go tutorials are structured.
One realizes that the important issues which concern the Go players are only handful,
and the same topics appear repeatedly in textbooks which are claimed to be for dif-
ferent levels. However, the depth in which a topic is touched upon varies drastically.
The most direct measure of the depth of a topic is the number of moves required to
complete an action.
Especially in pedagogical texts, the evaluation of a certain kind of strategy or con-
figuration is always demonstrated with a small continuation of stones. That is to say,
18This is in sharp contrast to orthodox game theory, where the player is capable of even infinitely long
lookahead.
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the evaluation is mostly dynamic and rarely static. Another big difference is that the
evaluation in textbooks is qualitative, and never numerical. Beginners start learning
by looking into problems which address local tactics, such as ‘to live’ and ‘to kill’. They
are trained in considering a sequence following a good move. That is, a solution is not
merely a base-move, but a sequence of moves following this base-move.
I summarize the important issues that Go players learn and study throughout
their Go life in the following list. More detailed discussion can be seen after the list.
Elementary Level:Basic and Essential
1. Connection and Cutting: A competition for the cutting point
2. Capture and Escape: The concept of liberty
3. Connection + Capture:
• The use of edge
• Atari and Shicho (ladder)
• Geta (net)
• To know how to sacrifice for bigger benefit
• To know how to escape more rapidly
4. Life and Death (two eyes is alive):
• How to make two eyes from different number of vacancies and different
shapes
• How to identify false eyes
5. Semeai (Capturing Race): it begins when both sides have no chance to make two
eyes
• In principle, the side which has more liberties wins, the caveat is that the
sequence of play is important
• The race between ‘one eye’ and ‘no eye’
• seki (mutually alive)
6. Ko: the importance of Ko threat
7. Endgame: Calculating Territory
• To care about living with bigger number of points
• To understand that some capturing race is unnecessary
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• To be sensitive to the different results in terms of the number of points cor-
responding to different actions (evaluation)
Advanced Level: Go theory
1. Tesuji (strategically important position)
2. Joseki
• To support one’s own stones at the corner or side in order to construct a
good shape or to destroy the opponent’s framework
• To obtain sente in order to occupy the critical position on the board
• To better execute the plan for opening
3. Fuseki
• Corners, Sides, and Center: With the same number of stones one can sur-
round biggest territory at the corners, and then on the sides, and the least in
the center.
• Center oriented
Duality in Go Concepts One can learn the first two topics in the elementary level
within minutes and soon realize that in many cases the position that attributes a con-
nection (strengthening one’s own groups) and the one which blocks the potential con-
nection is on the same point. That is to say, if one has learnt how to connect, one
already knows how to cut. The same analogy happens in capture and escape as well.
This kind of duality in Go results in the competition in inferring and reasoning for Go
players. The third task is a kind of skill that combines the concept of connection and
capture which attributes to many births of Go terms and variations of capturing. All
techniques above are encompassed by the bigger concept, Life and Death. However,
killing is not the prime purpose of the game, but the competition for territory is.
Problem Sets It is conventional to add few exercises right after each section of the
textbooks. When a beginner is provided with a concrete problem to solve, such as
“What can White do now to capture Black?”, it is not so difficult for him/her to come
up with a good solution, as long as he/she understands the concept of liberty. How-
ever, it is quite a different case when a real game is played. When one does not have a
hint with some guidance, the beginner might not know what to do and to foresee the
possible consequence of the move. Their reasoning is very constrained by what they
learn about the Go rules and are not able to understand the big
101 Chapter 5



































Figure 5.5: Named Position on the Board: A=komoku (3-4 point); B=mokuhazushi (3-5
point); C=takamoku (4-5) point; D=hoshi (star point); E=san-san (3-3 point); F=side hoshi
(side star point); G=tengen (10-10 point, origin of heaven)
Fuseki The discussion of fuseki cannot be separated from displaying few famous lo-
cations on the Go board. Some intersections on the board are given absolute names,
and these names show up very frequently in the opening (fuseki). See figure 5.5. A
Go board is highly symmetric. The points A-E in figure 5.5 are also mapped to their
coordinates at other three corners. These points are named based on their distance
from the very corner point of the board. Each of these points have their advantage and
disadvantage to corner territories and the speed of development, however the theo-
ries on each point are based on the possible successive sequence that follow each the
placement of these points. These names appear also frequently in joseki dictionary.
Joseki Dictionary The collection of joseki (the sequences of moves that are proved to
be able to balance the local areas) is the consequence of the institutionalization of the
game of Go. That is to say, it is the natural result from the severely limited individual
rationality. They are normally named after the positions in figure 5.5, the name indi-
cates that the location where the joseki sequence initiates. However joseki dictionary
is a dynamic collection, where new joseki are constantly invented and some old joseki
are modified or disputed from time to time. It is believe that memorizing joseki by rote
memory is not a sustainable way to become a very good player, instead, one should
understand the meaning of each component in a joseki.
The collection of joseki is the result of the archive of Go wisdom uncovered from
numerous games and research. The more joseki one remembers, the more flexibility
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one is endowedwith for proceeding with a good opening. However, I doubt that joseki
sequences are organized into LTM merely in the form of rote memory. A good player
should have understood the motive and reason of each move in the joseki sequence
and use them in clever ways. The ability of understanding the reason and motive of
each move cannot be built without the elementary concepts and a good fixation of
those concepts in the LTM by reinforcing them through practices.
The same argument can be applied to the development of fuseki as well. The
birth of new fuseki theory, which emphasizes the importance of central influence, was
very prosperous in 1930’s. Prior to that era, if a player places the stone at a position
which is considered to be an unusual response, he might appear to be unprofessional if
he does not know how to support this decision ex-post. However, no Go rule excludes
the possibility of “peculiar” moves. On the other hand, if the player knows the “style”
of his opponent, he might invent some new strategies to fight with certain new fuseki.
As a result, a new fuseki is born. These sequences will not make sense without the
meanings attached to them. They are more than just spatial patterns.
From the Go textbooks, the players are guided to learn the important topics by
looking at massive number of examples that show only a local segment of the board.
When they are at the real match, they are confronted with a big piece of land. There is
no aid of problem set which can remind them which side of the problem they should
focus on. At least, we can conclude that the players’ ability at the tournament is a a
result of their cumulative skills for solving specific problems.
Why Go Terms Help? A player can certainly become stronger by getting to know
and use more and more Go terms. Even before the players start to know the official Go
terms, they have a rough understanding of the spatial relations and some consequences
of their actions. As long as those patterns that are familiar as a whole or partially to the
beginner are given the names, then these ideas can be encapsulated as packages and
stored in LTM. Henceforth, those ideas can be retrieved faster as terms without going
back to inference according to the Go board configuration.
Commentaries
I believe that the Go commentary is also a rich source from which we can gain the in-
sights into the experts. It is habitual for a commentator to evaluate alternative moves
along with the chosenmove, to show those alternatives are not chosen because they are
inferior. The way they evaluate is to display an imagined sequence until certain weak-
ness has appeared to the side that is going to play. At most one or two alternatives are
considered. It confirms to what de Groot observed and defined as progressive deepen-
ing. It indicates that a good player has the ability to know, at least pretty certain in his
own mind, how the opponent is going to respond to his each move. In other words,
an expert does expect that his opponent will conform to his flow of thought. I believe
that Go Seigen is one of the best players is because his moves are often unexpected and
innovative.
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Go commentary is a retrospective report on a Go match. The entire kifu will be
displayed with the order of the placements of stones. Some evaluation and comment
will be addressed to the moves. Go commentaries is also an illuminating source of
Go protocol and reasoning, especially for amateur players. The amateur players have
little access to play with professional players; as a result, they can get new stimuli
and inspirations by reading the commentaries of professional matches. A complete
game can contain more than 200 moves, therefore it is unusual that the commentator
explains and evaluates everymove in detail. Conventionally, the opening catches more
attention. If a players does not know enough Go terms and Go theory, a commentary
can be somehow not be comprehensible and may appear too abstract.
Let us summarise the general patterns observed from the commentaries and they
reveal how standard games are played as well. A move is either positively an initiative
or continuum of a plan, or passively a prevention from an undesired opponent’s plan.
1. In the opening, two players will occupy 2 different corners each in turn.
2. Black invades one of White’s corners or strengthens his own corners.
3. Several placements on the corner or sides, in turn as the preliminary settlements
of future fights.
4. The direction of the game depends on the fuseki used, and depends on the lead-
ing party of the game.
5. Tactical fight is at one of the four corners, so we can see a cluster of moves at one
of the 4 corners or one of the 4 sides. This should be marked as the beginning of
mid-game.
6. Normally, the fight moves from corners to sides and towards the center.
7. If one of the players puts a stone at a region with some intention, these actions
may already break the temporary balance of that region, and the opponent might
have to find a move to maintain the balance of power or make it a quiet position19.
8. Several episodes are divided by tenuki.
9. One of the players will place the stone somewhere else, seemingly unrelated to
the earlier battle. It might be a tenuki or a Ko threat.
19Quiet position is similar to Turing’s dead position, however I think ‘quiet’ will be more illustrative
and less confusing than ‘dead’ in the context of Go. It is a local concept that in a region none of the
players have the immediate incentives to place more stone there, unless one of the players initiates a
capturing race or resolve the life and death problem. It could also be the case that both players have
agreed through their mutual (implicit, but in silence) understanding that there is no more need to fight
at that area, because there is no other way for one side to turn over the losing battle. Of course, this kind
of peace can still be temporary, that is due to the fact that the Go board is not completely decomposable
until the endgame phase.
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10. If the opposite side answers the tenuki, the game might be led to another corner
or side. If the tenuki is not answered, then there might be some minor battle at
the previous area.
11. In the endgame, the players will fill some vacancies in order to obtain the territory
in a definite manner.
Pedagogical Commentaries These commentaries are written for educational pur-
poses. Naturally, almost every move will be commented to a different extent of detail.
Conventionally, when a real move is formally introduced, the authors mention one
to two possible alternatives and display the lookahead (ranging from 4 to 12 stones),
rarely with branching, from that position and terminate at some positional judgement
(keisei handan) with the conclusions similar to “the framework (moyo) or thickness (at-
sui) will not be good.”
Professional Commentaries Go World Magazine20 had been frequently publishing
commentaries on professional tournaments. They are extremely concise, and only the
important, critical and flaw moves will be mentioned. The words used to describe
these moves are very abstract, such as “forceful”, “unusual”, “winning”, “unreason-
able”, “clever”. No phrase related to the spatial patterns would be mentioned. A
sentence like “White 58 is better at point a” appears very often and without further
explanation.
Other applications of Go
Berlekamp and Wolfe (1994) applied surreal numbers that is the foundation of Combi-
natorial Game Theory to solve for the endgame of Go optimally. It requires strong as-
sumptions, such as complete decomposition of the board. The ideology of this method
is quite consistent with the faculty of endgame of human players in the sense that it
is an important ability to be able to count the territory precisely. However, this ability
is gradually acquired and mastered in the later stage of Go learning. Go has been ap-
plied to understand cooperation among team mates for achieving organisational goal
(Hasan and Warne (2008)). The latest cognitive modelling of Go is the neuro-cognitive
model (Bossomaier et al., 2012).
5.3.3 The hierarchies in decision making of Go
“Note first that Go a is resource-limited problem. Not only the two
players compete with one another, but each side’s multiple goals compete
for resource among themselves.. . .Here too, the goal structure of Go differs
20This is a quarterly magazine published first by The Ishi Press and then Kiseido Publishing Company
since the first issue in 1977 until the last issue in February 2013.
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from that of most current problem solving tasks. Any problem solving pro-
gram faces process restrictions deriving from the computational and mem-
ory limitations of the computer. In Go, however, restrictions upon available
material resources also are an intrinsic part of the problem.”
Reitman et al. (1974), p. 124
In my limited knowledge of Go, I suppose that the goals or subgoals can be rep-
resented as concepts or particular shapes (framework) of a group that is the potential
territory, despite the ultimate goal is to enclose more territory than the opponent. In
order to clarify the goal, a good player or a good computer program should at least
acquire the ability to calculate the territory and potential territory at any given point
of time in the game. However, this task should be achieved differently at the different
stages of the game.
Decomposability also plays multiple roles in the game of Go. They are conceptual
(hierarchical), sequential and spacial and these roles also correspond to each other. In
the beginning of a game, the players place the stones carefully in order to create a good
moyo on the board. At that moment, the board has not been divided completely and
clearly. In the endgame, the players may fight over a local area while the other regions
on the board are settled. At that moment the board will be almost fully decomposable
for score calculation. The most interesting and difficult phase is the middle game pe-
riod. The boundaries that divide territories are still movable, and the players will focus
on one battlefield until a certain situation has been reached. This scenario can be sup-
port by the order with which the game is played. In the middle game of a 200+ stones
game, there will be always a cluster of stones played in a local area in successions, and
then suddenly there will be a tenuki, meaning one of the players decides to place the
stone somewhere else rather than answering his/her opponent at the previous area.
The spatial relations on the Go board are not always the precise ways to confine
the players’ attention. Instead, there is a hierarchy of the players attention to the whole
board.
“The degree of abstraction is inversely proportional to its relatedness to
the current battlefield. Even if a certain area is far away from the current
battlefield, if that area contains some stones which are intrinsically related
to the current battle, those stones are precisely represented in detail.”
Saito and Yoshikawa (2000), p.254
I believe that the use of specific Go terms plays an important role to decide the players’
perception and decision. As a player enters a different phase of a game, he/she needs
to move back and forth from different levels of attention and concepts. The Go terms
play the role of orienting the players.
As a summary of what have been observed in the Go documentaries of prob-
lem solving, it is evident that despite the easy and unambiguous rules of the game
of Go, there is a set of ambiguous, ill-defined, unwritten rules that is known and re-
spected among most of the players. This is more related to what Simon would call,
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culture. There are some styles or methods of play that would be considered as un-
usual, unwise, or even rude, despite the fact that they are not excluded by the rules.
Although there are absolute definite ways to generate all legal moves, but a) the crite-
ria for judging whether the goals (intermediate more than final) of the problem have
been achieved is too complex and b) the scope of information needed for solving this
problem is not definite. For these reasons, I would like to place the game of Go on the
grey boundary between well-structured and ill-structured problems. Since there is no
clear-cut division between these two types of problems, I claim that the game of Go is
more ill-structured or general than Chess. Go players have to cope with the complexity
by using heuristics that are encapsulated by the rich collection of Go terms.
5.4 A Pseudo IPS of playing Go: COMPOSER
5.4.1 Highlights of Components and Characteristics of COMPOSER
Before we see the mechanism of COMPOSER, deeper discussions into the relevant
topics and aspects of problem solving of Go may be needed.
Sequential Memory
An Example of Sequential Memory with Go Terms It is evident that the memory
of Go players are sequential. That is, it takes a certain order to create some patterns. In
figure 5.6, the stones Black1, Black3 and Black5 all together construct an usual pattern
in the opening. The Go board in figure 5.6 is displayed with European coordinates, i.e.,
the black stones’ locations are, R17, R4 and Q15 respectively. Instead of recognizing
this pattern of three stones with their board coordinates, it is more likely that they
were first understood as a sequence of meaningful placements. Black1 on R17 is 3-3
point, and Black3 on R4 is named Komoku (4-3 point). The first two stones together is
a typical way to occupy the corners at the right hand side of Black. Black3 is too close
to the very corner despite that it effectively secures the up-right corner, so Black5, a
Knight’s move from Black3, is placed to support Black 3 at the corner. In a nutshell,
it is the relation between the successive stones and the current stone that provides the
meaning for the last placed stone. Imagine that Black1’s position is a term called X,
and Black3 is called Y and then the knight’s move from Black3 is called Z; from time to
time XYZ might have become one of the familiar vocabularies for Go veterans. XYZ is
a vocabulary composed of 3 symbols. An expert might be able to memorize and utilize
the “vocabularies” and “phrases” which contain more symbols.
An expert who can memorize a whole game of more than 200 stones and com-
ment on each move is like an advanced reader who thoroughly understood the mean-
ing of each move of the game. A good player is metaphorically like a good composer.
None of these symbols (positional or spacial relations) and vocabularies (sequences
of moves) are defined in Go rules, but recognized and verbalized in to terms used
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Figure 5.6: An Example of Sequential Chunk in the Opening
in Go textbooks and among players. Go terms consists of different hierarchical as-
pects. The abstract Go terms used by advanced players are constructed and defined by
sub-level terms, and sub-level terms are constructed by sub-sub-level terms, etc.. Nat-
urally, a player who has studied Go textbooks and has experience in playing complete
Go games should have already acquired a good amount of terms.
EPAMNet: Stimulus and Responses
Iceberg Model and Template Theory This version of COMPOSER is inspired by the
proposal of Iceberg model that is similar to template theory, but the slots in the tem-
plates should be dynamically assigned according to the situation on the board and they
vary according to the level of the player.
A discrimination net in EPAM functions as a general but dynamic catalogue of
memory structure of a particular domain. The terminal nodes are images and are es-
sentially list structures which are internal codes of external patterns. If we adopt the
similar discrimination net for organising Go knowledge, then the terminal nodes must
also contain programs which are the procedures of some specific actions in Go, such
as, capturing race, Ko threat, ladder, life and death, connecting and cutting. The termi-
nal of the discrimination net can also be a familiar sequential chunks as the outcome
of frequently used production or chain of productions. This architecture suggests that
an external stimulus can lead to a response that activates a program which checks the
possibility of certain action.
The discrimination net is developed by encountering more andmore stimuli. The
processor installs a new test to discriminate an item whenever it is not recognized, that
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is , it does not belong to any terminal of the current net. The most elementary level
of Go terms are learned first, so that they will become the base for higher-level Go
terms. Learning is a bottom up cumulation and playing is top down performance.
They are both tied to hierarchical components in the memory. For simplicity, the effect
of forgetting should not be considered in the current model, but whatever is learned
will be strengthened by more knowledge and practised effectively.
Production Systems
COMPOSER includes production systems which are the core of IPS to explain the suffi-
cient amount of inference that appears in players’ protocols. Inference is the reasoning
that requires more than perception and pattern recognition. Identifying the Go board
configuration with the Go terms or Go concepts can be accomplished by entering the
EPAM-like net (discrimination net). However, the meaning of the Go terms that the
players infer from the Go board require production like relations: “Term A & Condi-
tion 1 → Meaning or Purpose”. The production system is a suitable way to specify
such reasoning activity. Moreover, a production system that is associated or attached
to a Go term or concept is stored in the template of the Go term, which is in turn at a
terminal of the discrimination net.
Some inference happens at merely semantic level, such as “if the opponent is
trying to escape then I should block it”; such inference does not necessary involve any
specific Go terms. By doing so, the player can generate only few candidate moves.
My conjecture about the number of candidate moves is that the higher the inference
level, i.e. more specific in semantic meaning, the the fewer the candidate moves are.
Go Seigen’s wisdom says that one should look at the Go board as a whole. I suppose
that one needs penetrating observation and determined dedication to reach this level.
What actually involves in acquiring this ability is the very high-level inferences instead
of intensive lookahead.
One of the advantages of the production system is that the production can be
added independently one by one after the previous productions without affecting the
system which already exists. The analogue of addition of productions into an existing
production system is that as the player learns about more patterns and implicit rules
of the game, his strategies will be enriched by adding more conditions and actions. For
example, after the player learn about Ko in Go, he might develop a situation when the
Ko thread can be applied.
Knowledge Acquisition and Representation
COMPOSER’s structure is not based on any particular subject’s behaviour, but refers
to a widely accepted and observed tendency of Go players. As a result, there is no
legitimate reason why one should discriminate export systems from the architectures
of intermediate players and beginners. Because, after all, the current mechanism of the
program simply represents a state of development of a problem solver. Programming
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human expertise is a very justifiable approach to achieve strong AI. However, one
cannot ignore the transition from being a weaker player to a stronger player. Because
a grandmaster is not a born expert, instead expertise is a consequence of accumulating
knowledge and massive practices of memory retentions and retrievals. One cannot
view expertise as a steady state and model it.
Apart from the explicit rules of Go, such as the definition of a chain, the legiti-
macy of a capture, there are many implicit patterns and names which are known to Go
players. I distinguish those patterns that are absolutely specified (see figure 5.3) and
those patterns are only defined and thus refer to a membership, such as atari. Those ab-
solutely specified patterns can be associated in a discrimination net. However, the Go
terms that work on definitions should be organized as cues and programs that check
whether the definition is satisfied.
Regarding the evidences collected from cognitive and protocol analyses, it is rea-
sonable to assume that even a Go beginner’s knowledge contains many definable Go
terms. What really differentiates the strength of players is their different organization
of these terms. These differences are embedded in the templates that are attached to
each Go terms in the discrimination net. COMPOSER should be a system that com-
bines EPAM-like discrimination processes and GPS-like inference processes.
Equipped with fundamental pattern-related Go terms and the basic list of pro-
ductions, an ideal Go playing architecture should be allowed to learn from its own
experience (at the spot or retrospectively) or from external knowledge. I propose that
the model can learn from a detailed commented Kifu (game record). A annotated Kifu
will be stored in a separate storage in LTM. When I say commented Kifu, I mean each
move is marked to a Go term (Go verb or noun) and if possible, with some adjective or
emotional comment, such as “too heavy”, “tesuji”, and “losing move”. The program
has very limited access to the data in this storage while it is solving a problem. How-
ever, when the program is not assigned to play a game, it has free access to it even
before it can fully understand the meaning of each move that is played and associate
each component to its existing discrimination net.
First of all, the annotated Kifu should be encoded into the language that the pro-
gram can read, so that it can classify the sequence of the whole game into opening,
midgame, and endgame. The information about different phases of the Kifu will be
associated to different faculties. When the program is “reviewing” the game, its atten-
tion follows the flow of the game exactly like it is playing the game. When a move is
unfamiliar to the program, the comment that is attached to the move will be learned;
when a move is familiar and its comment is what already known by the program, this
piece of knowledge is either not altered or reinforced. When a familiar move has an
unusual comment on it, the program learns to discriminate it further or temporarily
ignores it and marks it as something still unclear. When there are more and more such
comments appear in the database, it will decide to digest it.
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General Discussion
I list out a number of properties that the IPS as human problem solvers of Go should
equip itself in the light of the above evidences. These properties are further categorized
into general properties and domain-specific properties. Later on, some of the proper-
ties will be applied to build pseudo IPS models. No attempt in this thesis is made to
encompass all the properties in one go.
• General Properties
1. Heuristics and satisficing: The database of Go knowledge in the LTM as-
sists the human heuristic behaviour. The IPS’s intensity in reasoning and
computation is constrained by the capacity of STM and time. The macro-
processors will not embark the kind of search which is too time-consuming
when a good amount of time is already wasted in the course of the problem
solving.
2. The ideal IPS of Go should permit the flexibility for learning and interpreting
the qualitative difference between masters and a intermediate players, and
the difference between intermediate players and beginners. The learning
activities include the implicit learning from the problem solving tasks and
the explicit learning from education.
3. Opponent modelling is a reflection of the player’s own knowledge, unless
there is more information about this opponent, i.e. his style of play. In the
later cases, the prediction of opponent’s behaviour can be pinned down to a
subset of the player’s own knowledge.
4. There exists a preliminary processor which takes care of the Go rules. It
will be able to identify all the legal moves. There is a evaluation processor
which takes care of positional judgement. It works closely with the macro-
processors and micro-processors that are stored in the templates. Because
at different phases of the game, different kind of judgements are needed.
Positional judgements answer various decision problems and report either
“good” or “bad.”
• Domain Specific Properties
1. Kifu should also be the source of the learning activity of the IPS. The exam-
ples of wrong moves or sequence should also be collected in the database.
2. Productions: There should be interconnections between some productions
in the production system and memorized sequence of play. The very fre-
quently adopted chain of productions may gradually become a fixated se-
quence of moves in the memory. A simple example shows that “If A then
B, if B then C” may become “If A then B then C”. When C is not a desired
position, then A is denied. This organization of the database should allow
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the forming of standardized sequential chunks from familiarized chained
productions. Likewise, joseki sequences should not be remembered by rote
memory, instead they should be associated with some production systems.
3. The program should distinguish between playing from the beginning on an
empty board and choosing a move from a given configuration. These two
kinds of task environments should trigger different procedures.
4. Sequential Chunks: Go players should have the ability to start from remem-
bering, say, a sequence a 2-3 stones, to a sequence of 10-15 stones and to the
whole game21.
5. Handicap and Komi. Because the rule of Black’s komi, Black sometimes
would like to speed up the opening; for example, the 4-4 is a better start.
6. Go veterans are sensitive to the change of balance and thickness (positional
judgement). I believe the stronger a player is, the bigger fragment of a board
that he/she can read and judge. Recall that Go Seigen focused on “balance”
in his play. The professional players look for a position which maintains
the balance of two players. I believe this idea of balance is hierarchical and
dynamic22.
7. Purpose of own moves and opponent’s move are central in players’ reason-
ing. When a stone is placed, no matter it is a own stone or opponent’s stone,
it is a seed of a purpose that might be realized only few steps later. Follow-
ing this seed, there is a sequence of imagined moves in the player’s head
23.
The purpose of constructing such an pseudo IPS is to demonstrate a possible and
potential mechanism that explains the Go players abilities of thinking, communicating
and decision making with Go terms. One of the unsolved problems of playing Go is
that Saito and Yoshikawa were not able to answer how a good Go players can come
up with only few candidate moves in short time. This section provides a tentative but
possible mechanism with which the this question can be answered. My hunch is that
higher is their level of reasoning in Go concepts, the fewer and more precise they can
21I believe when they remember the whole game, they memorize the sequence by dividing them into
episodes, and the dividers are tenuki. A Tenuki is like a punctuation. Within episodes, each move is con-
nected with each other by their meanings or Go verbs. Of course some of the segments of these sequence
have become Joseki. We can imagine the whole game sequence is a long article, and the episodes are the
paragraphs. Joseki becomes phrasal verbs or idioms.
22From the opening of the game, they will keep the balance for the whole board, and then they search
for regional balance, and then local. When the battle becomes local, few lookahead are necessary. While,
when they look ahead, the continuation seldom branches out. Besides, they are able to give each move
a meaning, that is, the sequence in looking ahead is connected with a story. Therefore, when they expect
that a sequence is leading to an unbalanced or disadvantageous situation, they will exclude that position
from the search space.
23In COMPOSER, purposes are tied to (programs) algorithms or production systems. Each program
decides whether a certain action is possible in a finite numbers of moves.
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be in generating good candidate moves. In particular, I utilized the players ability to
use Go terms in this model.
As mentioned in previous chapter, CHREST is a remarkable program that pro-
vides amore comprehensive structure, which is dedicated to Chess thinking. However,
verbal processing is overlooked by CHREST, instead as it suggests, playing Chess is a
highly visual activity. On the contrary, as it is analysed above, Go players’ reliance
on all levels of Go terms is significant. The meanings and purposes attached with the
Go terms play a radical role in the decision making in Go. Certainly, pattern recog-
nition is a very important faculty in Go playing, but it is not enough. Borrowing the
terminology from Chess, when a chunk or chunks are recognised as their names (Go
terms), some inference based on the Go terms are conducted in order to generate the
purpose of the player, and then candidate moves are generated and some lookahead is
implemented.
The sophisticated nature of Go results in complex and hierarchical knowledge
structure required to be a Go master. Their skills should at least be categorized into
spacial, tactical, strategic and psychological. Language or Go terms play a central role
in Go thinking. The qualitative structure of COMPOSER is demonstrated to show
how and why labelling Go patterns and situations can help reduce the search-space
drastically. We attempt to build a reasonable knowledge structure where Go terms and
Go concepts are properly involved.
5.4.2 Discussions about Go Terms and Concepts
The game of Go is played and studied by four main ethnic communities: Chinese,
Japanese, Koreans and the Westerners. This game is called “Weichi” in Chinese, “Igo”
in Japanese, “Baduk” in Korean and “Go” in English. English being the necessary
language of communication in international occasions for Go shows its preference
in favour of adopting Japanese terms into English terminologies. Many Romanized
Japanese Go terms are adopted into the glossaries of English Go terms. The reason
might be that romanized Japanese is more pronunciation friendly. However, such
adoptions do create communication problems to Korean and Chinese players who par-
ticipate in international congresses and tournaments. One thing in common is that ev-
ery community utilizes huge amount of Go terminologies in their respective languages
and fortunately, many but not all concepts that can be named have their counterparts
in other three languages. In some cases, a term has variations that are used by different
groups of associations, publishers and researchers. There is no unifying version of Go
term dictionary in the international communities. Professor Chihyung Nam from the
Department of Baduk Studies at Myongji University, South Korea has made the first
attempt to systematically collect the logical definitions of English Go terms with their
counterparts in other three languages (Nam, 2004).
I believe that the emergence of Go terms are the consequences of the accumulated
knowledge of the game of Go over thousands of years. An immediate analogue of this
phenomenon is the evolution of natural languages for us. It is debatable whether a
113 Chapter 5
concept or the form of an object came first or the name of that concept came first in our
daily reasoning and communication. However, it is quite clear that naming in the game
of Go can either encapsulate the already existing concepts or define a new concept
for the players. Two examples of these two cases are given as the following. First, a
concept such as a chain of stones has only one liberty left and is about to be captured is
familiar even to a beginner. Because it is derived from the Go rules. The concept exists
in the beginner’s memory before he/she gets to know that it is called atari. After the
term atari is learned, the player can associate this concept with other concepts faster.
Second, the concept like “large knight’s move” (Ogeima) was not innate in the players’
understanding of the game until the term is defined. The term is connected to strategic
and tactical concepts and the development of joseki sequences.
Apart form the various categories and hierarchies of Go terms, these terms are
not entirely independent of each other. Some Go terms are based on a combination of
more than one Go term. From the hindsight of Go textbooks, we have already seen at
least two associations of Go concepts: i) the association of connecting and capture, and
ii) the association of capturing race and one eye.
In Go societies, intermediate players and the above can recognize almost as many
named Go terms as experts, while they can not retrieve, demonstrate and explain some
terms as well as experts. However, the same term or concept, when named by different
languages with their slight difference in literal meaning, might evoke different inter-
pretations and cultures of play by different communities. More importantly, a massive
number of patterns can refer to the same Go term. For this reason, it is difficult to
estimate the number of chunks stored in an expert’s LTM based on the definition of
chunking theory developed from studies of Chess.
There is a hierarchical organisation among Go terms. The elementary level is pat-
tern and position related, such as atari and the positions introduced in figure 5.5. The
second level can refer to the Go verbs; some of them describe the binary relations of
two stones, the latter placed stone is the transitive verb having the first stone as the ob-
ject. The examples of this category are in figure 5.3. Each such term has its own tactical
meaning (tied to other actions or higher-level Go terms) that reflects on the later devel-
opment; of course, how a player reads the potential meaning of these terms depends
on his strength and experience. The terms introduced in figure 5.3 are restricted to the
relations on two stones of the same color. There is another set of Go terms referring to
the same binary relations on stones of opposite colors. Because the tactical meanings
they carry are very different. Higher level of Go terms are strategic concepts which
require more experience and commitment in order to understand them, the examples
of these terms can be found in Nagahara (1972).
There are always more than one relation a person can read when a stone is added
to a board. My hunch is that experts are able to eliminate the objectively multiple
relations to only one or two and they are called by the Go terms. According to the
Go terms, the expert can work on the opponent’s purpose and then derive their own
strategies and then generate good candidate moves. On the other hand, the multiple
relations on the Go board might be too overwhelming for the beginners.
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From the diverse characteristics of Go terms that are used heavily in the problem
solving of Go, I conclude that the game of Go is semantically richer than Chess. It is
evident from its multi-level Go terms library. Thus, when there are number of levels
of Go terms/concepts, using these terms in the course of a game to make good moves
involves different levels of semantic reasoning24.
5.4.3 Descriptions of Composer
The construction of COMPOSER takes into account how Go knowledge is acquired by
human players, and how Gomemory is organised. If one can get this part of the whole
structure fairly right, then the performance of a problem solving case is simplified to
an execution of the existing system. This idea is inspired by the way in which EPAM
utilizes the discrimination net.
Having many sophisticated and competent computer programs of Go, the moti-
vation of building COMPOSER is not to participate in the brutal race. It is more fruit-
ful, at this moment, to back off and inspect what latest Computer Go approaches have
overlooked. Knowledge-based algorithms play a role against brute-force algorithms,
however, the game of Gomight contribute new insights to what has been known about
domain-specific knowledge and expertise.
Composer is an IPS for playing Go. It has some elementary macro-processors
and microprocessors. The most elementary processors take care of the basic Go rules,
so that the illegal moves will not be considered later in other processes. There is a
short-term memory which holds up the input, output and intermediate variables of
the elementary information processors. STM has the capacity of 5-9 objects. Long-
Term Memory contains all the Go knowledge, production systems and programs that
relate to actions and purposes. COMPOSER works very intensively with the Go board,
which is its external memory.
Discrimination Net The Go knowledge that is categorized by Go terms and pro-
grams are organized by discrimination-net like hierarchical structures. Especially, the
production systems, programs that are related to Go terms are stored in the template
at a terminal node of the discrimination net. The Go knowledge database is organized
into several faculties, such as fuseki, midgame, endgame and positional judgement.
Each faculty manages its own discrimination net, whose terminals are Go terms and
possibly with its cue and template. A recognized pattern that is labelled by a Go term
can also trigger a familiar sequence of play that is stored in the template.
Positional Judgement Positional judgement is a program that is called from time to
time. It is a program designed to check the potential territory and the balance of a
region and the whole board. It deals with several specific decision problems that are
tied with the own purpose. It works intensively with Joseki archive and Go terms













































Figure 5.7: The Procedure of COMPOSER
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(mostly the adjective Go terms and the terms related to situational judgement e.g. aji).
It has a database of wrong examples and very good examples.
Macro-Processes Not only is the Go knowledge classified by the different phases of
the game but also the macro-processes have at least three departments: Fuseki, Mid-
Game and Endgame. There is no clear cut among the departments. Roughly speaking,
as soon as some capturing race appears on the board, then themacro-process will mark
it as the end of Fuseki; and when the whole board becomes fully decomposable de-
spite some dame, it begins with endgame. The macro-processor is aware of the phase
of the game, so it will deliver the board situation accordingly. Joseki dictionary be-
longs to Fuseki department, but it is not only documented with huge amount of joseki
sequences25, but they are also organized into a discrimination net according to their
properties and components. The endgame problems under the assumption that the
board is fully decomposable can be effectively solved by using Combinatorial Game
Theory, therefore it does not concern COMPOSER for the moment.
Attention The board situation that the macro-processor reports is filtered with its dy-
namic attention. The board can be geographically decomposed to 9 regions: 4 corners,
4 sides, and the center. I believe the center can be further divided into 4 small squares.
Depends on the flow of the game, e.g. whether it is in an episode of a fight on a region
and whether the central planer would like to continue the fight, the processor will con-
trol the focus on the board, i.e. whether it should be global or local. This decision can
be hinted by the location of the latest opponent’s move. When it is focused on one of
the regions, the positional judgement about the rest of the board will be more abstract,
i.e. only the most general report about the other regions are retrieved. The abstract
report may go like: White’s region, Black’s moyo is good.
OpponentModelling Understanding opponent’s purpose is a reflection on the player’s
knowledge. Therefore, there is no need for extra system of modelling the opponent.
The process of yielding opponent’s purpose is characterized as a kind of production
system in this model. Likewise, generating a Go term that corresponds to the own
purpose should be similar to a duality or a mapping to the production system men-
tioned above. In other words, a player need not to spend as much time to construct
a brand new production system for yielding actions from own purpose as he/she did
for the production which yields opponent’s purpose from a Go term. It is likely that
the opponent’s purpose is misunderstood though. It is often a losing point of a game.
Figure 5.7 illustrates a general procedure of making amove by COMPOSER in the
course of a game. This procedure elaborates themodel proposed in Saito and Yoshikawa
(1996) (p.73). The EPAM net and positional judgement vary according to different
states of the game which is supervised by the macro-processor. For example, if the
25There are about 20,000 joseki sequences in theory, and only up to 500 of them appear more often in
the real games.
117 Chapter 5
game is in the opening state, then the EPAM net is fuseki and joseki dominated. The
first decision in Figure 5.7 asks whether it is a move that the player has to answer (a
sente), otherwise the player will undergo a loss or bad situation. When it is decided
to answer, then the possibility is usually only one. The second decision basically asks
whether the opponent’s move follows an early planned sequence in mind. If yes, the
player can simply play out the next move in the plan.
COMPOSER will become an executable algorithm when Go-specific contents are
inserted into it. It contains several states of process. In general, a state receives an
input from the previous state and operates on the information, and then passes on the
output to the next state. In some cases, the output will be examined to see whether
this is satisfactory. When an output is not satisfactory, the procedure that generates it
will be assigned to regenerate a new output. These evaluation processes are controlled
by the internalised and endogenously evolving aspiration levels, so that the system
satisfices and will not go on to infinite loops. Satisficing here can be thought of as a
stopping rule.
There is a central planner or macro-processor which is in charge of directing the
phases of the game and providing a board that is layered with hierarchical informa-
tion. Only the local region that is the temporary focus will be perfectly revealed to the
processes triggered at different state of the computation. The rest of the board will be
marked as, for example, White’s territory or unsettled battle. Only when the micro-
processors require more information, deeper information can be revealed. In this way,
the micro-processors’s burden is reduced by being provided the radical focus of the
board.
One remarkable component of COMPOSER is its double-level production sys-
tems: purpose/action level and semantic level. When COMPOSER recognizes and
labels the opponent’s move with a Go term that is one of the terminal nodes in the
discrimination net. The term triggers a purpose-producing production system, whose
condition part calls for information on the board, and whose action part contains the
purpose of that move. After the purpose of the opponent is generated, it is delivered to
the semantic production system which generates appropriate own purpose according
to the climate of the game as well. The own purpose will in turn be the input of the
action production system which generates relevant a Go term for the move generation.
Since different production systems are evoked at any given point of time and the pro-
gram’s attention is changing, I can fairly claim that the problem space on which the
program works is adapting too.
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we explored the research on the verbal reports of Go players, their
behaviour and performance. The emphasis was on the abilities of players in using and
reasoning by means of Go terminology. These observations were incorporated into
the construction of an pseudo IPS, COMPOSER, whose structures are faithful to the
premise of the theory of human problem solving.
Go terminologies play an important role in decision making of Go when com-
pared with their counterparts in other domains. Besides, Go-terms should not be mis-
taken as mere counterparts of chunks in the case of Chess. The role, use and properties
of Go-terms are far more general. They are not only huge in magnitude, but also or-
ganised in hierarchy. From this observation we suggest that Go is a semantically richer
domain, this aspect is revealed by a higher-level production system of COMPOSER.
The result of this chapter can be extended to several directions.
1. To verify COMPOSER with more comprehensive and detailed verbal reports and
insert domain-specific knowledge into COMPOSER and turn it into a computer
program.
2. To extend the characteristics of COMPOSER in the investigations of problem
solving in more complex economic problems (the problems faced by economic
agents not the problems defined by the economists) whose goals and scope are
more ambiguously defined in general.
As for as obtaining better data, the ideal way to fairly collect and record the
games and extract the players decision process is to have them playing in the con-
text of tournament. The tournaments should be done with the computerized setting
and the players are physically separated, so that the players’ thinking aloud protocols
can be collected without intervening the game. Apart from recording the whole game,
there should also be the record of the time spent on each move. Besides, there should
be a third expert who observes the whole match and later on comment on the whole
game. We should interview the players after the games are finished, if possible.
The knowledge representation of Go shows thatmany implicit regulations known
by players have emerged from extremely simplistic elements of the game and its rule.




In this thesis, a distinction between Classical and Modern Behavioural Economics was
made and it was suggested that Information Processing Systems are a reasonable and
more general formalisation to model human decision makers who are facing complex
and uncertain environments. Modern Behavioural Economics has now developed into
a solid line of research that continues to provide alternative models and evidence from
experimental environments. Despite that, an important premise remains unchallenged
by MBE - i.e, optimization, except for some occasional protests from here and there.
Classical Behavioural Economics, pioneered by Herbert Simon serves as a fundamen-
tally different, multi-disciplinary platform to observe and theorize about decisionmak-
ing in the face of complexity and uncertainty. By putting oneself in the shoes of a
Modern Behavioural Economist, it is often difficult to see the general impossibility of
optimization. For MBE, decision makers’ problems are still formulated as (modified)
mathematical optimization problems, taking into account psychological and emotional
factors. This thesis discussed the underpinnings of CBE from a computability theory
point of view, which serves as a useful lens to understand the ideas that Simon and
Turing have advocated.
The recurring and central concepts of this thesis were bounded rationality, satis-
ficing, and heuristics. These notions were examined and elaborated by making a dis-
tinctions between CBE and MBE, the algorithmic underpinnings of the former - in the
light of computability theory and computational complexity theory, and the charac-
teristics of Information Processing Systems in Human Problem Solving, respectively.
It concludes that in the general cases of decision making, the best solution often can-
not be found procedurally, but a good solution may. Put formally, optimization as a
method to find the solutions is merely a special case of satisficing, which appears to be
a natural procedure of human decision makers who suffer from severe limitations in
information processing.
This thesis argues that CBE should exploit the richness of the concept of Informa-
tion Processing Systems in Economic environments to understand decision making.
This involves both construction of IPS and studying its theoretical properties. It will
also help us to look for ways to extend and move beyond the well-structured problems
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in Human Problem Solving to more complex economic problems. The game of Go is
being put forward as a candidate platform for this transition. There are several direc-
tions in which this paradigm can move forward - both in terms of the breath of issues
or deeper investigations.
Organisational Decision Making The logic behind the construction of an IPS that
is able to mimic Go players’ behaviour can be suitably modified with domain specific
information and applied to organisational decision making. One way is to externally
observe the members’ behaviour in the naturally hierarchical organisations. The other
way is to extract the external task environment and the internal problem space that the
members work with by analysing their verbal reports.
Near Decomposability Near Decomposability, which may appear to be remote from
CBE, is however an integral concept in this tradition. Although it is not discussed in
great detail in this thesis, it has implicitly appeared as an essential property in var-
ious forms and ideas in our discussions earlier. The presence of decomposability in
problems can help simplify the problem space from the problem solvers’ point of view.
Unfortunately, the problems in the real world are very rarely fully decomposable. As
a result, the assumption of decomposability that is often employed in economics can
lead to bad approximations. Near decomposability, which is also mathematically de-
fined on matrices like the case of decomposability, provides the flexibility that goes
beyond to simplify the problems for the observer and the solver. It allows interesting
and complex phenomena and evolution to emerge from the weak channel between
two sub-systems that is considered negligible in the short run. In the future, we can
explore the property of near decomposability as a form of heuristics for a problem
solver to simplify task environments and the problem space. It can be useful in inves-
tigating different aspects of problem solving across domains and its role in complexity
reduction and learning faced by the problem solvers.
Understanding Learning An important lesson obtained from building the pseudo
IPS for playing Go is that human reasoning and behaviour is not a mere outcome of a
search in huge knowledge database that is stored in a problem solver’s mind. Instead,
as an organism that is able to think, reason and learn, we have the innate abilities to
associate and transform information or knowledge into heuristics that facilitate us in
coping with many complex situations. When a general architecture which mimics such
innate abilities is built, then we are ready to “teach” the machines to become different
kinds of experts. This is also true for organizations, which are constantly learning and
evolving.
Our insight is in some ways consistent with Turing’s suggestion about a machine
which is able to learn by receiving education:
“If a machine were able in some way to ‘learn by experience’ it would be
muchmore impressive. If this were the case there seems to be no real reason
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why one should not start from a comparatively simple machine, and, by
subjecting it to a suitable range of ‘experience’ transform it into one which
was much more elaborate, and was able to deal with a far greater range of
contingencies. . . . Let us suppose that it is intended that the machine shall
understand English, and that owing to its having no hands or feet, and not
needing to eat, not desiring to smoke, it will occupied its time mostly in
playing game such as Chess and Go, and possibly Bridge. . . .As I see it, this
education process would in practice be an essential to the production of a
reasonably intelligent machine within a reasonably short space of time. The
human analogy alone suggests this. ”
Turing (1951), p.257-8, italics added
Alan Turing has shown us the ability of the Universal Turing Machine in simu-
lating all the programmables (i.e. It is ready to learn); This seemingly simple, almost
playful, mathematical construction is shown to be capable of computing all that is in-
tuitively calculable. Simon on the other hand has established the Human Problem
Solving approach, in which IPS (that are capable of universal computation) are ca-
pable of providing procedural characterizations of the heuristics involved in human
problem solving. This thesis has taken a small step to incorporate the relevant as-
pects of their contributions and put them in to one coherent algorithmic framework
for understanding economic decisions. This involves building IPSs that encapsulate
domain specific knowledge in different areas of economics. This vision - of Classical
Behavioural Economics - I believe, presents a more general behavioural approach to




The Go terms used in this chapter favour the Japanese version (romanized Japanese).
Some of the English terms directly adopt the Japanese counterparts. The definitions
are from Nam (2004). The texts in the parentheses are the English translations, and if
there is no parentheses behind the term, it means the Japanese and English terms are
the same.
• Aji (Aji/Potential Trouble): Unpleasant possibilities remaining for one player in
a position, after a local sequence has been played out.
• Atari: An immediate thread to capture, which leaves the opponent’s stone(s)
with only a single liberty.
• Atsui (Thick): A characteristic of stones that are strong and solid with no weak-
ness or potential trouble, so they have influence in a certain direction.
• Dame (Neutral Point): An empty point on the board, which is not a part of either
player’s territory and has no prospects of becoming territory.
• Fuseki (Opening): The initial stage of the game where the players place stones in
preparation for middle-game fighting and for making territory.
• Geta (Net): A capturing technique that blocks all avenues of escape of the oppo-
nent’s stones without touching them.
• Gote: i) A move which does not require the opponent’s answer. ii) A position in
which one is forced to answer the opponent’s last move.
• Joseki (Joseke/Pattern): A formulaic sequence of moves which is established for
giving equal outcomes to both players.
• Kake (Press): To prevent the opponent’s stones from coming out toward the cen-
ter by blocking them from above.
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• Keisei Handan (Positional Judgement): Evaluating the state of the game or esti-
mating the territorial balance.
• Kifu (Game Record): A diagram that shows the moves of a game.
• Komi (compensation): A set number of points given to White for making up his
loss which results from Black’s taking the first turn in an even game. It is usually
set 5.5 or 6.5 points in modern Go.
• Moyo (Framework): A territorial outline, made up of several strategic points that
can become actual territory as the game continues.
• Shicho (Ladder): A sequence in which one keeps giving atari to the opponent’s
stones until the stones are driven to the edge of the board or to friendly stones
and captured.
• Seki: A situation in which two combined opposing groups without two eyes
cannot kill each other because the internal liberties cannot be filled, so both are
considered to be alive.
• Semeai (Capturing race): A local skirmish in which the stones of both sides are
surrounded and each have a most one eye. Each player is reducing the liberties
of their opponent’s stones. The first one to capture the opponent’s stones wins
the race and his own stones live.
• Sente: i) A move that requires the opponent’s answer. ii) A state in which one an
enforce the opponent to answer every move in a certain sequence and then play
elsewhere. iii) The privilege of not having to answer the opponent’s last move
and being able to choose freely where to play next.
• Tenuki (Play Elsewhere): To ignore the opponent’s last move and make a move
in another part of the board.
• Tesuji: An important or key place in a local position.
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